

# THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIOR: INTERACTIONAL APPROACHES

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Since Durkheim, one claim that human behavior is socially ordered, organized, or structured (used interchangeably here) has rested on the fact that a person's behavior is best understood in terms of the person's relations with specific others. Unfortunately, the insight in this formulation has been obscured by traditional methods of inquiry into the social order, which seldom allow for a careful description of the behavior of particular persons. Rather, various biographical indices or facts about a person—gender, race, descent line, occupation, and the like—are assumed to gloss adequately the persons's relations with others, and the relations between the indices are taken as descriptions, often causally stated, of the social organization of the person's behavior. .

This review deals with a more principled and powerful formulation of the social organization of behavior. It calls for a description of the ways people organize concerted activities in each other's presence. We review research that adopts methods which assume that *a person's behavior is best described in terms of the behavior of those immediately about that person, those with whom the person is doing interactional work in the construction of recognizable social scenes or events*. Not all human behavior occurs in settings in which people are immediately available to each other's senses, but a great range of it does, and we are concerned to describe the ethnographic victories which can be won with a careful attention to immediately concerted behavior.

Interactional approaches to the social organization of behavior have proceeded under several subdisciplinary banners: cognitive anthropology, conversational analysis, ethology, ethnomethodology, exchange theory, kinesics, network analysis, sociolinguistics, and even symbolic analysis. No

effort will be made here to review the developments in each of these fields. There are three key concerns which cut across each of the subdisciplines, i.e. the concern for communicative codes, native knowledge, and information management. We will show how each has been used to focus attention on the social order as the environments people build for each other with their behavior in social interaction. In addition, we will review some important work on the behavioral machinery people use to organize their interactions, and we will make some effort to extend the logic of interactional research to the analysis of organizations and communities.

Before undertaking a discussion of the leading concerns which have led to interactional analyses, we will point to the inadequacy of the traditional division between micro and macro studies of social order and make a claim to the centrality of interactional approaches in the social sciences. In a second section, we give this claim some depth with a discussion of the history of interactional approaches to anthropology.

## BEYOND MICRO AND MACRO

Interactional analyses often are referred to as micro. On the surface, the designation seems to stem from the fact that interactional analysts work on short strips of behavior, often only a few seconds at a time. At a more profound level, however, the diminutive carries the additional bias that interactional analyses are not about much, that they do not address the real constraints on people's lives in ways which macro studies of whole cultures or market systems do.

There are two reasons for rejecting the micro-macro distinction and its attendant bias. One is that macro studies need to be verified by an interactional record. The various social and economic indices which go into the construction of macro models represent complex pieces of verbal behavior in their own right that cannot be taken to speak literally for the organization of other kinds of behavior (19, 20). When social behavior is the subject matter, research questions and answers have to flow from particular behaviors and their contexts. This means that to be complete macro studies must define the interactional mechanisms in terms of which their variables can be said to work. For example, economic anthropologists have been making considerable progress by the systematic placement of traditional communities within regional (83) and even worldwide (78) market systems. What is distinctively powerful about this effort is the specification of market resources as mechanisms of constraint on the organization of social behavior. If markets have consequences, the consequences must be visible in the ways members constrain each other at market-relevant moments. Without such specification, macro analyses offer little justification for claims about the social organization of behavior.

The second reason for abandoning a micro-macro distinction is that interactional analyses have been showing how ordinary behavior can reveal much of the machinery for the workings of social structure. This is not well appreciated. One point of resistance may be that interactional analyses often document a previously ignored level of behavior and accordingly appear difficult and time-consuming to produce or even to read. To know how a behavior is socially organized, it is necessary to describe what all parties to the interaction are doing at the same time and what everyone does before and after the move. The contexts or interactional environments in terms of which behavior is sequenced and has consequences must be established to insure a reliable account of how people organize what they are doing together (12, 46, 57, 72).

As much as such detail seems to obscure the original purpose of most ethnographic efforts, the astounding finding is that the institutional constraints which we usually address with broad "macro" generalities are actually observable at the behavioral level of immediate interaction. The specifics of such socially pervasive facts as gender, ethnicity, status, and role are, to use Sapir's phrase (70), "reanimated or creatively affirmed" from one moment to the next by members constraining each other to appropriate ways of proceeding given the environments they have reflexively generated for each other. In constraining each other to the display of different social facts at particular times, participants make the social order observable to each other and to analysts in the finest details of their behavior (57).

The sense in which we use the term constraint is literal and direct. Often sociocultural constraints are thought of either as external to the actor's situation (social structure) or internal to the actor (personality). Parsons (63) portrayed Durkheim's theoretical development as a shift in emphasis from external constraints to internal constraints, and most social theorists since that time have sided with one or the other. The interactional research we are concerned with cuts between these, focusing on constraints which are external to the actor's personality but internal to the situation at hand. From this point of view, the internal workings of any social interaction is a "situated practical accomplishment" of the participants in that setting alone (28, 29, 60, 68, 87).

By constraints in this case, we mean behavior, like the torso, elbow, and vocal chord work people do in organizing each other. Behavior is both the subject and the criterion for adequacy of description (46, 57, 58, 68, 72). The effort is to locate the constraints put on people in their interactional work, as the work is attended to and used by participants in their organization of some next moments of concerted activity. This way of proceeding offers us the most empirical documentation of how the social world is ordered; as such it tells us a great deal about what traditionally has been called the social order, namely, the organization of interactional—com-

municative, institutional, and material—resources people have available for ordering their behavior with each other. With this approach there are no macro and micro constraints, no macro or micro behaviors, but people leaning on each other in specifiable contexts.

What becomes glossed as micro and macro in the discourse of everyday life may not be a useful dividing line in the study of how behavior is socially organized (31). Although we all talk about the world in terms of newsworthy events, there is no reason to think that such cover stories literally mark off the behavioral pieces in terms of which the social order is constructed by participants or studied by analysts (25, 26). A careful analysis of people in interaction shows how the smallest and least talked-about strips of behavior can help to constitute and reveal a great deal about a social order.

As an example, Erickson (23, 24) has offered us a description of a counselor-student interaction from a junior college. Every speaker needs some listener(s) to engage in appropriate listening behavior if a conversation is to continue, and Erickson's effort is to show what happens when particular listener behavior slots are not properly filled, e.g. when a speaker's pause is not met with the apparently necessary head nod from the listener. At such times a speaker usually does not continue as if nothing has happened, for the nothing that has happened constitutes a noticeable or "accountable absence" (59, 68) in the expected flow of behavior. Instead, the speaker often backs up and says a simplified version of what had been said immediately before the pause.

In response to a student's stated desire to be a guidance counselor, the counselor starts to give an apparent two-part answer that both a teacher certification and a master's degree are required for such a life choice. However, the student withholds head nods at the appropriate pause moments in the counselor's talk, and the counselor gives the following long answer in which each absence of a nod from the pupil is followed by a simplified and more explicit version of the first utterance:

Essentially what you need . . .  
 First of all you're gonna need state  
 certification . . .  
 state teacher certification . . .  
 in other words you're gonna have to be  
 certified to teach in some area . . .  
 English or History or whatever happens  
 to be your bag . . .  
 P.E. (listener brings hand to face)  
 (listener nods)  
 ("mhm")  
 Secondly, you're gonna have to have a master's  
 degree (two slight nods).

While examples of this type nicely exemplify how people constitute active environments for ordering each other's behavior, Erickson uses this particular example to make some further points.

The kind of "talking down" which the counselor is forced to produce by the non-nodding student occasionally elicits head nods but seems to interfere with the transmission of plausible advice from counselor to student. The counseling interview is unsuccessful in that the student does not receive the direction he needs to proceed in school. This is more than an unsuccessful interaction, but a systematic piece of social structure in which a differential access to institutional resources is arranged. Further, the counselor is white and the student black, and their respective communities appear to be set apart by, among other things, different rules for the sequencing of head nods and pauses in conversation. This raises important questions, such as how it is that the two people constrain each other for the display of such different styles and subsequent miscommunication when it would be so easy to sequence their talk in more congenially concerted ways (56). How is it that in organizing their own interaction, the participants can constrain each other in ways which illustrate so clearly both the racial distribution of interactional resources in their community and the ways they have of talking about the community?

A macro analysis would most likely not get to such a question, settling perhaps with information on how white counselors and black students in general did not do well with each other. A micro analysis, on the other hand, would not get to the question for a different reason, settling perhaps with the fact that blacks and whites use different head nod rules and therefore miscommunicate. Assuming that the constraints on people come from the environments they set up for each other, neither the macro nor micro stand is complete, and more crucial questions emerge, which if answered give a strong description of the social organization of, in this case, institutional racism. The questions are, "What are they doing?" and "How do they do it?" To answer these questions, we need some detailed analyses of people in social interaction.

## FOUR DECADES OF INTERACTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY

The resolution of the micro/macro or structure/behavior division in an analysis of concerted activities has a long history in anthropology, not only in the trivial sense that ethnographers have always relied on some detailed descriptions of social interaction, but in the sense that we have available from the 1930s coherent statements about the importance of interactional analyses to the study of social order. This history is displayed best perhaps in the works of Arensberg, Bateson, and their respective collaborators.

Independently they produced both classic formulations of problems and methods in interactional analysis and important ethnographies with which to forge their claims. The differences and similarities in their work since then continue to inform the state of the field.

In 1936, Bateson (5) published an ethnography of the Iatmul people of New Guinea in which he detailed various Iatmul premises or propositions about the world as they were made evident in a particular ritual interaction, namely, the *naven* ceremony in which men and women reversed their gender roles in a celebration of various milestones in a child's development. One major conceptual device he used to organize his data was that of *ethos* by which he referred to the emotional patterning apparent in the behavior of the Iatmul. Behavior was at the core, and he apologized for using the language of the emotions as an "attempt—crude and unscientific perhaps—to convey to the reader some impression of the *behavior* of the Iatmul" (5, p. 124). In a later passage, he affirms the interactional bent in his thinking by calling for an end to any distinction between individual and social which allows for one being a part of the other rather than two sides to the same coin, and he specifies his subject matter as the "reactions of individuals to the reactions of other individuals" (p. 175). In *Balinese Character* (7), the introduction to which could stand as the introduction to this paper, Bateson & Mead developed this theme by attempting a balance between an analysis of the sense of the whole culture won by participant observation with the presentation of a behavioral record in the form of thousands of photographs which come alive as they are discussed in sequence units which display the logic of interpersonal constraints among the Balinese.

In 1940, Arensberg & Kimball (4) sounded the same theme in the introduction to their important monograph, *Family and Community in Ireland*: there is "no such thing as *the* society or *the* individual," . . . but only "the data of the interaction of human beings, to be found in what they do to one another" (p. xxxiii). The primary fact about the Irish country people is that they are surrounded by Irish country people. From this premise the authors described the work Irish country people did in organizing each other for specific occasions. This approach rendered the normal conceptual equipment for ethnographic description problematic. Status and role differences, for example, were only well described if the interactional specifics were included. In their words, "terms designating status are not to be understood or interpreted on the basis of a priori or philological meaning, but as references to the events in connection with which they were used" (p. 60). The term "events" is used technically here in a sense well in tune with the tenor of this review and with the Bateson passage cited above. In their monograph on *Measuring Human Relations*, Chapple & Arensberg (18)

used the term event [as do Collins & Collins (21) in their recent review of the Chapple & Arensberg effort] to refer to concerted patterns of action and reaction by two or more people. Social structural concepts like status, family membership, and market participation all were identified by people's behavior toward one another in the construction of the events which made up the daily round.

Despite their similarities, Arensberg and Bateson tried to establish behavioral anthropology in markedly different ways. To Bateson, the adequate analysis of one event could reveal the whole of Iatmul culture, as if all parts of the culture were equipotential, each containing the logical seeds for reproducing the whole. Arensberg proceeded as if individual events were distinct and connected only by the organization of constraints within the whole community.

By the 1950s, the differences between the two efforts were magnified. Bateson had focused his work on single events, exploring the logic of relations in pathological dyads (6). Although this work is exceedingly important, it is so without reference to issues in social or cultural structure. The focus is still on how persons constrain each other's behavior, but the structure of the interactional resources people have at hand for constraining each other are not a subject of inquiry. Rather, only the possible logic of the constraints receive much attention—usually as they are embedded in propositions uttered by one member of a dyad to another in a way which allows for their truth value and relational functions to be exposed.

At the same time, the Arensberg tradition was moving in the opposite direction, spearheading the development of community studies in anthropology. Arensberg (2) struggled to keep the logic and language of interactional analysis at the heart of studies focused on whole communities, and defined the community study method as that in which problems “in the nature, interconnections, or dynamics of behavior and attitudes is explored against or within the surround of other behavior and attitudes of the individuals making up the life of a particular community” (p. 109). The result was a lively tradition, still producing sound ethnographies (80), which show considerable sensitivity to interactional details. However, the focus of attention was unmistakably on the “table of organization” of a whole community. With the exception of some industrial studies, a systematic analysis of interactional events as fundamental units in the flow of life in a community was bypassed.

Through the 1950s, where Bateson's focus on the dyad locked out an account of social structure, Arensberg's focus on the community locked out a careful attention to behavior analysis. This could only be a temporary division, and the convergence of these two kinds of concerns in a more inclusive form of interactional analysis in the 1970s helps to frame a review

of the most recent literature on the role of interactional analysis in the study of social structure. In his most recent work, Arensberg (3, 30) has been calling attention to the social order as emergent in behavior by plotting various events as "minimal sequence units" in the more inclusive forms of constraint generally called social structure. Bateson has increasingly confined his writing to matters epistemological, but some who have traced their development through him, namely Birdwhistell (12, 15) and Schefflen (72, 73), have taken up the task of detailing how people together organize concerted activities in ways that display how much of the behavior between people services various forms of institutional order. The two traditions have merged in defining the task facing ethnographers as the adequate description of how people in different scenes constrain and order each other's behavior. Further, they have made clear that this must be done in enough detail across enough scenes to display the full range of interactional resources available to people, the conditions for their use and their consequences. In this way, an account of the social order as it is worked on, experienced, talked about, and accomplished becomes a possibility. Work of this type is in progress under different guises.

### METAPHORS LEADING TO INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNTS OF THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIOR

Work on the social organization of behavior has proceeded under a number of organizing metaphors for focusing descriptive attempts. When confronted with the task of describing interactional scenes, analysts use metaphors to simplify the behavioral flow. For example, where one analyst will reduce a complex sequence of behavior to a simple example of aggression, others will reduce the same behavior to an example of a communicative code, knowledge use, identity work, whatever. When taken too literally, each metaphor serves to limit inquiry to narrow topics and to occasion bitter within-discipline disputes. At worst, each has led to the development of coding schemes which record only the aspects of an interaction which are important to the life of the metaphor as if the remainder of the interactional work people did with each other was uninteresting. However, if the ultimate evaluation of the reduced analyses rests on the behavioral record, the metaphors can lose their literal edge. In this way, each of the following metaphors has been powerful in generating some rich descriptions of the social order in everyday life.

The organizing metaphors are a diverse lot. One is the effort to locate the *communicative codes* in terms of which people interact with each other. The bulk of this work has been done by sociolinguists who have shown how



members of different groups, variously defined, use different kinds of structural and functional rules governing the generation and interpretation of talk. Kinesicists and ethologists also have contributed here with a concentration on the fixed action patterns of people from different groups. Under the banner of what has been called ethnoscience and cognitive anthropology, others have called for the analysis of what people *know how to do* in everyday life participation in different groups. Still another group of authors has concentrated on the drama of daily interaction by characterizing the *information management* people must do to constrain the ways in which group members can treat them.

Although these metaphors have proved useful for initiating inquiry, in the long run each is in need of some further devices for addressing the behavioral complexity of social interaction. There is some unity both in the problems they have caused and the solutions being attempted. The unity of problem can be found in their heavy reliance on the analyst's ability to get behind the eyes of the natives, to get at the communicative competences, the cognitive systems and the management strategies inside the natives' heads. This is a problem as mental events are never directly available for analysis; they can only be modeled by inference from people's behavior in extremely well-defined environments. Each of the metaphors runs the risk of having an inherently unspecifiable subject matter.

The unity of solution can be found in each form of analysis settling on the description of what happens between heads as units of analysis. In other words, there is a unity in calling for finer behavioral accounts of interaction as a way to define the range of constraints available to people for organizing the particulars of doing things together, for organizing displays of particular kinds of communicative skills, concepts, or information management strategies. This is an important shift in that it transforms the various skills and tricks said to be behind native eyes into behavioral displays which appear in relation to certain specifiable contexts. This transformation is crucial to any analysis of the social order for it can no longer be said that members of different groups simply and inherently have different things in their heads. When members of different groups appear to be inarticulate, stupid, or untrustworthy, we no longer have grounds for understanding these as merely problems in linguistics, psychology, or ethics. Rather, we will have to ask questions about the contexts for organizing such displays between people. We will have to ask how the members constrain each other for the consistent arrangement of such displays.

### *Communicative Codes*

Work on the role of standardized patterns of communication, or communicative codes (39), in the social organization of behavior has been quite

productive. It is apparently the case that the social organization of the vocal chords and other parts of the body as communicative media is easy to document at the level of statements such as, "members of group X usually can be expected to walk or talk with a typical X's walk or talk." At the level of accounting for the specifics of who walks and talks, how, and when, however, there is enough variability in the use of communicative codes within and across groups to insure that a code cannot be taken as a primary social fact about a person or group. The metaphor that people act as if they had communicative code competencies which service their interactional needs regardless of the environments in which they are asked to display their competence cannot be taken literally.

**THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE VOCAL CHORDS** Given great impetus by Hymes's (41) calls for an ethnography of speaking and Labov's (51, 52) analyses of the organization of talk across different ethnic and social class borders in America, work on the structure and function of talk in different groups has mushroomed in the past few years (17, 50, 69, 71). Some of the work has proceeded as if a straight mapping of language features and functions onto social groups were possible, as if the specifics of communicative competence were embedded uniformly in the heads of the members of any well-defined community. However, neither language nor social structure constitutes an exact calculus for how utterances are to be heard. In linguistics (of the pragmatics orientation), theoretical questions are focused increasingly on how conversationalists construct environments which inform each other just how to hear particular utterances "for sure" (41, 42, 53, 54, 66, 81, 90). The order in people's talk and social interaction is emergent, that is, it depends from one moment to the next on the participants both producing it and using it to produce more of the same. If there is consistency or variability in the communicative behavior of people within or across groups, we cannot turn to facts about the people or their communicative codes as a complete explanation; code consistency only raises the question of how the code is accomplished. Communicative codes appear to be conceptually secondary to the environments people build with each other for the appropriate display of one particular code over another.

**THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE BODY** The case for the differentially patterned use of the body in communication in different groups is remarkably like the case for talk. Much as sociolinguists have been mapping speech habits to membership in various social groups, kinesicists have been detailing the gestural behavior of different kinds of people. In 1941, Efron published a pioneering work [now happily republished (22)], in which he

reported the gestural behavior of first and second generation Italians and Jews in New York City. He not only documented how members of the different groups moved, he also showed how individual members of the different groups altered their gestural patterns from one situation to the next.

Off to an auspicious start, kinesicists lost sight of Efron's work and continued along the same line as structural linguistics, documenting the differences in gestural patterns across groups without asking how the patterns serviced the various institutional settings in which people constrained each other as to the appropriateness of different kinds of interactional behavior. Aside from delaying the onset of interactional questions, this oversight produced the welcome product of hundreds of studies on the communicative movements of different peoples the world over. The interested reader can now consult a helpful and extensive bibliography (49), an interesting book of readings (48), and some powerful ethological accounts on the embodiment of social action (9, 84). Birdwhistell's work remains essential (12-14).

The major question facing students of body motion is identical to the major question facing linguists, namely, what does any given movement mean on any occasion of its occurrence in the social world. This is a difficult question, and when phrased properly actually calls for the specification of the behavioral function of different movements within the flow of behavior between people in interaction (12, 46, 57, 72).

**THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNICATIVE CODES** In showing that communicative codes never constitute an exact calculus, linguists and kinesicists have opened some interesting questions for the student of the social order. The most important issue is the identification of what could be happening between persons on occasions when agreements or "working consensuses" (34, 46) about how to communicate together cannot be reached. Immigrants can travel far and pick up radically divergent codes with some competence in a short period of time, whereas members of the same city can have difficulty understanding each other across structurally minor dialect borders. Newcomers to the Japanese language seem to make themselves more intelligible to Japanese (on first encounters anyway) than they will after years of practice (61). We have on record numerous cases of members of different groups developing divergent codes and using the code differences to mark off more fundamental social differences between the members of the two groups such as smart/dumb, good/bad, or rich/poor. The interactional management of these divergences and the constraints on the people generating them is a classic problem. It asks the

question how speakers arrange inequality among themselves (40). Some answers are becoming available in a literature defining the general social circumstances for the development of pidgin and creole languages (10) and dialects (51, 52) by various oppressed groups. However, analyses of the contexts in which the display of different communicative codes is simultaneously encouraged and made problematic still rest on anecdotal data. An example of such an analysis is necessary.

McDermott & Gospodinoff (56) have examined a possible communicative code conflict between a Puerto Rican first grader and an Anglo teacher. The boy gets the teacher's attention by touching her buttocks, and the teacher responds negatively. The question addressed was how it might be that the child would do such a thing nine months into the school year with this particular teacher, no matter how acceptable such a move might be for a youngster in Puerto Rican culture. An analysis of the scene revealed that the boy broke a number of other rules at the same time, one generalized throughout the culture (he called the teacher by a last name without the appropriate title), the other specific to that classroom (he broke into a small group lesson to get the teacher's attention). At other times, the boy shows considerable respect for each of these rules. A further analysis suggests that the boy picked his behavioral repertoire efficiently in that he not only gets the teacher's attention, but after a slight scolding he gets the teacher to scold a child with whom he has been fighting. As the proverbial bad boy of the class, he had to work hard to arrange the circumstances for the other child getting into trouble.

This particular communicative code conflict appears quite functional in the context in which it appears. The analysis also suggests that the code conflict may also be functional to the solution of some interactional problems for the teacher. This raises empirically the question to which this whole section on communicative codes has been developing: how is the invidious display of communicative code differences made necessary by people's arrangement of contexts for concerting their actions. The point is that identity differences such as in-group/out-group, good/bad, or smart/dumb do not exist over time simply because people in different groups are communicatively different. They may start off communicatively different (as in the case of immigrants), but over time they can either become more like each other communicatively or they can stop evaluating their communicative differences so negatively. That this does not happen often, that communicative codes can continue to be used as yardsticks for differences in intelligence and morality, is interactionally managed on each occasion in which communicative codes become a problem. Some careful analyses of how this is done could lend considerable insight into the social organization of behavior.

*Native Knowledge*

For the reader familiar only with secondary sources, the citation of the effort to describe native knowledge as an important impetus to interactional analyses of the social organization of behavior may be surprising. In fact, psychological language aside, cognitive anthropology is at the core an effort concerned with the production of descriptively adequate and reliable ethnographics of what people do together. Goodenough's famous definition of ethnography as the description of what natives have to know in order to act in culturally appropriate ways was never meant to be a call for an analysis of the internal workings of native minds. The rhetoric was mentalistic, but the methods and problems tackled consistently pointed to a concern for knowledge as public displays for which natives held each other accountable. Native responses to situations in their collective life and not simply their most articulate accounts of their life were from the beginning the basic concern. This is clearly stated by Goodenough (37) in an early and seminal monograph and stressed by others in recent reviews of the field (16, 27).

The crux of the matter is that native knowledge is not simply available for the asking. An adequate description of knowledge demands a description of the environments in which the knowledge is applied. As the environments generally are set up by group members for each other, social interaction was never far from the concern of the cognitive anthropologists. In the early 1960s, this concern took form in the controlled interview in which well-framed question-answer exchanges were used to contextualize any strip of native talk as a display of knowledge specific to that exchange. The effort was to get the most culturally appropriate questions possible so as to display further the question-answer frame in the context of the larger culture. Frake (27, p. 2) has recently complained that the "notion that the answers are there, that the job is to find the questions, while often cited, did not seem really to take hold. Frames began to be called *eliciting* frames, to be thought of not as contexts for behavior but as prods to behavior." This oversight, on the parts of both adherents and antagonists, along with the distort-and-destroy efforts of Marvin Harris, has helped to obscure the ethnographic achievements of cognitive anthropology and their possible contribution to interactional analysis.

Interactional criteria for the adequate description of native knowledge is most apparent in the exemplary work of Frake, for whom the basic ethnographic question is a properly phrased and well-timed native version of the English, "What's going on here?" and the basic answer is the work people do with each other in generating enough of a shared context to offer a limited range of interpretations of what they are doing together. This proce-

ture has led to the description of various interactional occasions or "scenes" in which natives display their knowledge of the world and negotiate interpretations of the adequacy of the displays: thus we have records of how the Subanun together diagnose disease or negotiate minor disputes in drinking rituals or how the Yakan litigate complaints and, most recently, negotiate the border between public and private space (25). Such analyses can reveal important dimensions or themes (1, 16) in the social organization of behavior across settings in different groups; Frake (27) suggests, for example, formality and risk as two important dimensions along which societies arrange and stratify scenes and the social identities of their participants. Smartness could be another. Whatever they are, they are necessarily available in the natives' behavior with one another, their interpretations of each other's behavior simply being further behaviors and further displays of native knowledge. The next question centers on the identification of the constraints under which people consistently display certain knowledge and use certain interpretative grids to scale their performances. Much as in the case of communicative codes, approaches to the description of native knowledge have moved from a rhetoric of the head to a description of the environments people build for each other for the display of different kinds of know-how in social interaction. In such descriptions, we should be able to locate the interactional circumstances for the alleged successes and failures of particular persons. School performances have received such attention of late (55, 59, 65), and we can look forward to more analyses of the interactional management of differential conceptual displays in other scenes.

### *Information Management*

A third approach which starts with what goes on behind native eyes has also led to interesting interactional analyses. This approach calls for an examination of the work people do to manage how others will treat them over time. Goffman (33) once described the primal sociological scene as one in which a normal person meets a person with a stigma, e.g. when a person with a nose meets a person without a nose. The question the participants necessarily are concerned with is how to handle such a blatant piece of information; whether they hide it, talk about it, or just leave it unmentioned makes a difference in how their interaction is to proceed. The point, even for those of us with noses, is that we all encounter situations which have such features. We all must manage information to minimize such troubles; whether we know it or not, we all do what can be called fabricating, lying, covering up, and contradicting. The list of strategies and the situations for plying them may be endless.

The social organizational question suggested by the ubiquity of information management strategies is the description of the practical circumstances

which make them necessary. While it may be obvious why not having a nose is a problem, most of our embarrassments do not appear to be so well deserved until an account of the immediate social circumstances of our behavior is made clear. As Garfinkel has suggested (28, p. 175), the adequate description of information management strategies requires their location "as attempts to come to terms with practical circumstances as a texture of relevances over the continuing occasions of interpersonal transactions."

In an intriguing paper on a simple phenomenon, Sacks (67) has attempted to show how "everyone has to lie" in certain circumstances. Given that talk between persons is organized so that something untrue at one point in a conversation in order to forestall some unwelcome or irrelevant topic later in the conversation. If asked "How are you?", one says, "Lousy!" only if one wants to answer the most likely reply, "Why?". Otherwise, it is best to answer "Fine," even if it is untrue. Such a lie is forced on people by the rules of conversation.

The constraints which organize information management strategies also can be seen in longer strips of behavior. Indeed, there is a century of speculation, starting with Simmel (82), that lying and contradiction are at the heart of any social order (6, 34, 62), and we are now getting some case studies showing how whole cultures (32, 38, 45) and specific institutions (53, 79, 87) enforce elaborate information management strategies in the face of paradox and contradiction in the behavior demanded of normal participants. Some examples should help to make clear how an interactional analysis of such displays can offer considerable insights into the social organization of behavior.

An interesting ethnography by Gregor (38) brings the excitement and the limitations of the information management metaphor front and center. Gregor worked with the Mehinaku Indians in the Brazilian jungles. Among this small group of people, never more than 80 total, two kinds of social problems stand out. One is theft. Although they have a minimum of property things, almost everyone pilfers small items from time to time, and the few who steal important items are a source of discomfort for everyone. The second social problem is that everyone secretly breaks the rules against extramarital sex. Among 37 adults, some of whom are married to each other, and many of whom are barred from each other by age differences (age being one border they respect), Gregor counted 88 ongoing affairs. This covers just about half of the possibilities available to each person in the village. Sexual preference looms large over sexual prohibition.

All this subterfuge takes a considerable amount of information management, and Gregor has written a superb account of how Mehinaku move around the village and make the contacts they have to make in order to do the underlife of the culture. He describes some of the problems they create in holding each other to rules that none of them seem to keep, and even

details how they manage to get around these problems in an average day: how they walk down a path, who gets joked with and teased, where they go on various rendezvous, etc.

There are some questions to which Gregor can offer only speculative, although persuasive answers. How come it had to be that way? How come no one Mehinaku blows the whistle on their various charades? How is it that lying and subterfuge in general, and stealing and extramarital sex in particular, are at the core of the environments the Mehinaku construct for each other? It is not an easy interactional environment, and long periods of each person's life are spent in seclusion, away from the pressures of daily life with each other. What is the nature of the world they set up for each other that they periodically have to escape it? An interactional approach specifying the order in people's behavior by the detailed description of what they do to each other could give us some answers. The answer demands a description of how and in response to what constraints the Mehinaku formulate a world in which they are all involved in doing other than what they say they are doing while at the same time holding each other accountable for the proper doing of the world as formulated. In other words, what are the pressures on the people that they together construct their practical circumstances in ways which demand elaborate information management strategies to hide the very problems they have set up for each other.

Wieder's (87) account of a half-way house for drug addicts conditionally released from prison raises such interactional questions more directly. His work focused on a moral code that sociologists have called the convict code because versions of it have been found in most prisons. As formulated by the residents, maxims of the code were easy for Wieder to recognize: "above all else, do not snitch; do not cop out; do not take advantage of other residents; share what you have; help other residents; do not mess with other residents' interests; do not trust staff—staff is heat; and show your loyalty to the other residents" (87), pp. 115–17). Wieder goes beyond the usual arguments that the residents followed the code to maintain their membership in the deviant subculture of drug addiction. Wieder did not stop with the identification of the code as a complete explanation of the residents' behavior (11, 20, 28, 60, 88). In order to specify the practical circumstances which occasioned code use, Wieder examined specific scenes when the residents mentioned the code to staff.

He found that residents invoked the code when they were refusing to comply with staff requests. This served the residents by justifying their refusal to comply in a way which the staff accepted as a realistic adaptation to the harm threatened them by other residents if they complied. In this way, the residents escaped the most immediate sanction the staff could impose on them for noncompliance: being sent back to prison for violation



of parole conditions. What is surprising, however, is that Wieder found staff members enforcing the code by advising residents not to cooperate more than the code allowed, lest they be marked as traitors. These same staff members also complained bitterly about the code and how it kept them from helping the residents back to a normal life. Much like the Mehinaku who help each other to break the rules that they then hold each other to, there appear to be some contradictions in the behavior staff and residents demand of each other, and elaborate information management strategies are essential to handle these contradictions. Wieder's excellent book does not offer enough of an interactional analysis to describe the full details of the constraints which organize the behavior of the staff and residents, but along with Gregor's volume, it gives us good reason for seeking them out.

One interesting implication of an interactional approach to the use of information management strategies echoes developments in the interactional analyses of communicative codes and native knowledge. It centers on the possible description of how different persons may be constrained consistently to produce displays of particular information management strategies for which they are immediately rewarded, but in the long run degraded. This is the case for the inmates of the halfway house. The lower-class hustler—the junkie, pimp, prostitute, and drunk—may be a classic example. What is the organization of constraints such that they are not only forced to lie, but to lie often in detectable ways which allow their successes to be balanced by a recognizably lower status within the moral order? A description of such a phenomenon in terms of how members behaviorally do it to each other would give us important insight into how behavior is organized in ways which allow for more traditional talk about social structure.

## MECHANISMS FOR THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIOR

Perhaps the most stunning results of interactional analyses during the past 5 years have come from the description of sequences of behavior as they are internally ordered as if by a system of rules. To date, analyses have displayed the interactional machinery in terms of which people both organize their bodies for concerted activities in facing formations and sequence their talk in conversations. The findings are complex and important enough to deserve a review of their own. As we are concerned only with directing ethnographers to the implications of interactional analyses, these developments can only be mentioned. It must be stated, however, that they represent the core of any future developments in interactional analysis. They have been and will continue to be attacked as overly narrow and irrelevant to such important social science concerns as inequalities across gender,

class, or race, or the social biographies of the people they study. This "irrelevance" is motivated by an unwillingness on their part to assume a priori that the important facts about persons are available before behavior analysis. If description reveals traditional social facts as organizing mechanisms in what people do with each other, only then can they be a legitimate part of the analyst's conceptual tool kit.

The crucial difference between these efforts to locate how people organize their behavior and more traditional accounts which rest content with a description of the general parameters in terms of which behavior may be organized can best be seen in the use of the notion of context. It is axiomatic within anthropology that a culture or social structure forms a context for the individual who has to operate in the context; thus, as apparent parameters for the organization of behavior, gender, race, and class become contexts which are said to frame and even cause behavior. Bateson has tried to correct our tendency to treat structure or context as the independent variable and behavior as the dependent variable. As he put it (6, p. 338), we must view each action "as *part* of the ecological subsystem called context and not as the product or effect of what remains of the context after the piece which we want to explain has been cut out from it." Accordingly, behavior cannot be described completely by reference to the contexts in which it is immersed, for the behavior to be described is partly constitutive of those contexts. The contexts for any given strip of behavior are the various sequences of behavior of which the strip is a constitutive part. For the social scientist, this means that there is no escape from the careful and detailed analysis of how people together organize their behavior from one moment to the next.

Such a strong stand calls for a new beginning of the social sciences. As uncertain as the reader might be about that call, the importance of the descriptive work cannot be denied. Whatever the form of inequality people are doing to each other, they do it in facing formations and with talk. No matter who they are, what they are doing, or what the consequences of their behavior, people in interaction have to solve the problems of occupying the same space-time together, and they have to solve them with a machinery something like those described so far.

### *Facing Formations*

In organizing concerted activities, people use each other to inform themselves as to what they are managing to get done together. They use the order apparent in their behavior as the most immediate environment for their subsequent behavior. How do they do this? One important piece of interactional machinery people use to locate the order in their behavior is the facing formation, by which Kendon (46, 47) means a sustained relationship

between two or more people who by their continuous orienting to each other define a space to which they together have exclusive access. The phenomenon is easily recognizable at any gathering. Schefflen (74; see also 75) has presented a helpful photographic introduction to this and related phenomena using a wide range of examples. Kendon (46) has offered important, well-analyzed examples from a single birthday party during which people routinely move in and out of small conversational groups. Each group is a facing formation; it has a clear beginning and end, and for its duration it is a stable interactional unit of behavioral organization.

For the person beyond the border of a conversational space, the facing formation has an imposing autonomy as the focus of sustained interactional work by those inside the group; it is not easily entered, for example, without an elaborate opening ritual. For the person inside the conversational space, the facing formation is an important context or environment for any behavioral regularities its members might produce.

Life within a facing formation has been described in a seminal analysis by Schefflen [(72); cf Kendon (47) for a helpful review of the field]. In the stream of behavior in a four-person psychotherapy group, Schefflen discerned a hierarchy of behavioral units or contexts which the members used to regulate each other's participation in the group. The description of the structure of behavior is derived from the participants' own structuring activities, and each unit is defined in terms of behavioral regularities across persons over time as those regularities are oriented to and used as environments for next behaviors.

With the analysis of such elegantly managed order in hand, Schefflen (72, 73) raises an important question. Two of the participants in the therapy sessions are institutionally labeled schizophrenics. Their behavior in both this scene and others is said to be inherently disorderly. Yet the context analysis reveals that they stay within the facing formation with the therapists, and each subunit of the formation is attended to and acted on by all the participants in concert. As active environments, the therapists are thoroughly involved in staging their patients' bizarre behavioral displays. This leaves us with the question of how so much orderly behavior can be used to manage what is held to be a display of disorder. How could they constrain each other to an order somehow beyond their own scrutiny? Similar descriptions have been offered for classrooms (56, 57) and counseling sessions (23, 24), and in each of these cases, the disorder is attributed by institutional gatekeepers to minority persons (therapists to women patients, teachers and counselors to ethnic students). Schefflen has raised social structural issues of the most classic kind, but in a new way. Rather than allowing us to rely on the people's minority status to account for their behavior, Schefflen forces us to consider the organization of contexts in terms of which such disorder

could be systematically arranged. In equipping us with eyes to locate the machinery people use in ordering each other's behavior, communicational analysts have supplied us with a starting place for an analysis of the full range of constraints on social behavior.

### *Conversational Sequencing*

Some of the strongest displays of how parties to an interaction constrain and organize each other's behavior are available in their talk. Conversational analysts take most seriously the claim that the context for any strip of behavior is the behavior which precedes it, follows it, and co-occurs with it across persons in an interaction. Accordingly, the adequate description of, for example, a turn change, a repair of a conversational problem or a display of a disagreement among speakers necessarily requires a description of the environments in which it occurs, that is, a description of the behaviors to which it appears to be sequentially relevant. Such a description leads to the specification of a set of rules, or mechanisms, which can be expected to "operate on a case-by-case (environment-by-environment) basis" (77, p. 362), in the sense that conversationalists can be seen using such rules, orienting to their use, and holding each other to their successful operation in specific environments in most forms of conversation. The mechanisms are defined as much by the environments in which the behavior takes place as by the behavior in question.

Rules for the smooth transition of the turn to talk across speakers with a minimum of speaker silences and overlaps have been specified in numerous papers by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson [now collected in two volumes (68)]. Other related topics have been given detailed attention: one, mechanisms for solving problems of speaker identification and recognition in conversational openings (76); two, mechanisms for making necessary ties between adjacent utterances of the same type by different speakers as in a greeting-greeting sequence, an invitation to laugh-laugh sequence (43), a complaint-reformulation sequence (85), or an assessment-agreement/disagreement sequence (64); and three, mechanisms for the organization of the repair of various conversational problems (44, 77).

Whatever else it is people do when they talk to each other, they appear to work hard at organizing the specifics of how their talk is to be sequenced. As intriguing as these descriptions are, their relevance is not immediately apparent to the analyst attempting to describe the full range of constraints on people's behavior. At their most generalized, the mechanisms are about conversational sequencing; at their most particular, they are about the particular environment in which a particular sequencing is performed. Clearly, the conversational analysts are not trying to supply us with new variables to plug into old formulas for relating group membership to partic-

ular behavioral complexes, for relating, e. g. the gender or culture of the conversationalists to particular sequencing rules. People in different situations or cultures may do things differently, but they nevertheless will have to sequence their talk with each other in principled ways. The description of how this is done, for the limited number of American examples conversational analysts have given us, represents a considerable achievement in its own right.

Along with students of facing formations, conversational analysts have given us crucial tools for the reliable specification of how some aspects of behavior are organized by people in interaction. Now that we have accounts of how some pieces of the social world work, it is not easy to settle for correlational explanations of behavior; once we have had a taste of the particular go of the social world, the careful description of more inclusive pieces of that world becomes our greatest imperative.

## THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIOR ACROSS SITUATIONS

Weber (86) defined social interaction as behavior which “takes another’s action into account and is thereby oriented in its course.” This review has focused on studies of interaction in which the actors are oriented to each other’s immediate presence, but we have tacitly understood interaction to include actors oriented to each other at greater distances in time and space. Even the organization of face-to-face interaction can sometimes be shown to reflect a person’s orientation to actors and circumstances not immediately present. This possibility raises the question whether the methods of interactional analysis developed in the studies we have reviewed can be “stretched” to describe more distant interactions at the behavioral level of social organization.

The description of the social organization of behavior—whether the participants are far apart or in each other’s presence—raises a uniform task, namely, the description of how people accomplish the coordination of their activities. Such descriptions are most easily accomplished for people actively constraining each other in face-to-face behavior. The description of people less immediately in touch with each other is only slightly more difficult in that it requires the specification of the work people do to *embody across* situations the constraints they use to coordinate each other in more immediate situations.

Interactional approaches can contribute to the study of the social organization of behavior across situations in two ways. One is to detail the various demands on persons as they enter and leave different encounters. Displays of communicative codes and conceptual know-how are essential

here. People must look and sound in specific ways to gain access to different interactional scenes, and the enforced conditions for entry offer some of the most powerful constraints on people between scenes. The vicissitudes of gender displays and their differential scheduling across both moments and years are interesting in this regard (28, 35, 36, 89). The question of just how much one must be a thoroughly natural male or female between the interactional occasions on which an elaborate gender display is required can be determined at the borders of different occasions.

Another interactional approach to the institutionalization of behavior across situations is to analyze the many proxy systems in which the constraints on people's behavior are embodied, quite literally by the built environments which house our institutional lives, less literally by newspapers and more circumscribed institutional record-keeping devices. Just as social scientists cannot analyze every person's behavior across every situation, so too are natives incapable of keeping tabs on each other for their every moment apart. Nevertheless, they keep elaborate records on each other, either in oral stories and genealogies or in newspapers, file cabinets, and computers. The records are subject to considerable interpretation, and it is best to understand their use in terms of the interactional work people do in arranging their original formulation and their subsequent interpretation. This problem has been the focus of much ethnomethodological work (8, 19, 28) that shows how the writing of records for the purposes of coordinating behavior across situations primarily reflects the problems of coordination at hand in the immediate situation in which they are written (the time available, the cultural know-how of the people involved, the knowledge they assume of readers, the sanctions for various interpretations, etc). Similarly, analyses of how records are read reflect the primacy of immediate interaction; necessarily vague, records depend on the imaginative reconstruction of the reported events by the reader, and such a reconstruction is done through the contingencies of the present moment. Analyses of the interactional management of such proxy constraints may tell us much about the organization of behavior across situations.

## CONCLUSION

This review has centered on a growing literature on how people organize each other in social interaction. The thrust of the review is that such work is critically important to ethnographers in offering tools for the reliable description of concerted activities and their contexts. It has also been stressed that such tools can be used to locate a far wider range of constraints on the organization of social action than would have been thought possible only a few years ago. Many theoretical and methodological gaps exist in the

literature covered, but these pale before our need for more elaborate and detailed description of social behavior. If the literature leads us to a more careful attention to what people manage to do together, interactional analysis will have its reward.

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