

Professor Christina J. Schneider

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DESCRIPTION: The international system is often characterized as anarchic and scholars focus on the interactions between nation states. However, since World War II, the number of international organizations has increased considerably and international organizations have become more prominent players in the international arena. Why do international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or the European Union exist? What role do they play in solving global problems?

This course exposes students to seminal research on the role of international organizations in world politics. The first part of the course will seek to explain how, if at all, international organizations (IOs) obtain some measure of authority in international affairs. We will consider the legalization of world politics and ask why states delegate certain tasks to international organizations instead of dealing unilaterally or multilaterally outside of an institutional context. We will also consider the role of domestic politics, both as a source of international cooperation and as a limitation. The second part of the course focuses on the design and influence of IOs. We assess the rational design line of explanation and its critics and consider in detail enforcement and flexibility features of organizations. We also assess whether and how IOs influence state compliance with agreements and explore the conditions under which IOs have influence on political behavior. The final part of the course explores organizational evolution and change and also the pathologies and complexities associated with growing legalization.

REQUIREMENTS: Students will be graded based on class participation (60%) and a final exam (40%).

- **Class participation:** You will be responsible for leading the discussion of the required reading material for one or two classes. A good discussion debates the broader issues, themes and questions underlying the readings, it identifies problems with theory, research design or other potential flaws in the particular readings, and discusses potential for improvement. Your discussion should be organized around 2 to 4 central questions from the readings; you must clear those central questions with me by class time in the previous week. These questions will serve as a starting point for a more focused in-class discussion. A good presentation will encourage a lively discussion focused on controversies, debates and puzzles in the literature as well as foster critical thinking about the implications. You will submit a short paper (3-4 pages) summarizing the readings for your presentation. The short papers will provide an opportunity to hone your skills in providing an analytical summary of a complex literature; a skill that will be quite useful for your dissertation

and later writing of academic papers. 60% toward your grade will be based on class participation, including the short papers and discussions you will lead, as well as your general participation in each session of class.

- Final exam: The grade for your final exam is 40% of your overall course grade. You have two options:
 - You will write a 15-20 page research paper which will be due at 5pm on the last day of classes. The topic has to be cleared with me **by the end of week 2**. The work has to be original and should not be used to receive a grade for any other courses in the department:
 1. You can write a research paper that proposes to resolve some of the limitations of the literature we discuss in class. The proposal has to identify a question or puzzle, discuss how you would try to answer that question (theoretical argument, hypotheses, and research design), lay out the necessary steps of the project, and suggest how this project would advance the literature.
 2. You can empirically evaluate one of the theories we have discussed in class using one or multiple international organizations, or alternatively, compare theories using case studies or quantitative data analysis.
 - You write a mock comprehensive exam at the beginning of finals week. I will give you comprehensive exam questions related to the topic of the course and you will have six hours to complete the exam under typical comprehensive exam conditions.

Academic Integrity. It is your responsibility to inform me of any factor(s) that might interfere with your class performance well in advance of any problems. Under all circumstances, plagiarism is a violation of your academic integrity. If you have questions about what constitutes original research, or how to reference the work of others, please ask me.

Disability. If you are a student with a documented disability who will be requesting accommodations in my class, please make sure you are registered with the Office for Students with Disabilities (University Center 202; 858.534.4382) and provide me with documentation outlining your accommodations. I will be glad to meet with you privately during my office hours to discuss your special needs.

READINGS: Most of the readings for the course are journal articles. The articles are available electronically on JSTOR or through the UCSD library home page. Interests will vary and time is often scarce, but at a minimum you should read the assigned required readings for each week ahead of our meetings. As most of you will build your profession in this area (and will take comprehensive exams in this or adjacent fields) the additional (highly recommended) reading will be of considerable interest as well.

SCHEDULE: The weekly schedule is subject to change.

PART 1: COOPERATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Week 1: Cooperation Under Anarchy

- Olson, Mancur. 1965. “A Theory of Groups and Organizations.” In *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press, 5-52.

- Oye, Kenneth A. 1985. “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies.” *World Politics* 38(1): 1-24.
- Keohane, Robert. 1986. “Reciprocity in International Relations.” *IO* 40(1): 1-27.
- David A. Lake. 2007. “Escape from the State of Nature. Authority and Hierachy in World Politics.” *International Security* 32(1), 47-79.
- Christina J. Schneider and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2013. “Abiding by the Vote: Between-Groups Conflict in International Collective Action.” *IO* 67(4): 759-796.

Highly Recommended

- Martin, Lisa L. 1992. “Interest, Power, and Multilateralism.” *IO* 46(4): 765-92.
- Axelrod, Robert and Robert Keohane. 1985. “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions.” *World Politics* 38(1): 226-54.
- Stein, Arthur A. 1982. “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World.” *IO* 36(2): 299-324.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” *IO* 46(2): 391-425.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1981. “The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists.” *American Political Science Review* 75(2): 306-18.
- Mearsheimer, John. 1994. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” *International Security* 19(3): 5-49.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. “The Promise of Institutional Theory.” *International Security* 20(1): 39-51.
- Kupchan, Charles A. and Clifford A. Kupchan. 1995. “The Promise of Collective Security.” *International Security* 20(1): 52-61.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. 1995. “The False Premise of Realism.” *International Security* 20(1): 62-70.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1995. “Constructing International Politics.” *International Security* 20(1): 71-81.
- Mearsheimer, John. 1995. “A Realist Reply.” *International Security* 20(1): 82-93.
- Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” *IO* 42(3): 485-507.
- Kydd, Andrew H. 2000. “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation.” *IO* 54(2): 325-57.
- Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. 2001. “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy.” In *Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium*. Roger Porter, Pierre Sauv, Arvind Subramanian, and Americo Beviglia Zampetti, eds. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Kahler, Miles and David A. Lake. 2003. *Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition*. Princeton University Press.
- Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” *Science* 162: 1243-8.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. “Reflections on the Commons.” In *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press, 1-28.

Week 2: Legalization

- Hafner-Burton, Emilie, David G. Victor, and Yonatan Lupu. 2012. “Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field” *American Journal of International Law* 106(1): 47-97.
- Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. “The Concept of Legalization.” *IO* 54(3): 401-19.
- Finnemore, Martha and Stephen J. Toope. 2001. “Alternatives to ‘Legalization’: Richer Views of Law and Politics.” *IO* 55(3): 743-58.
- Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2001. “Response to Finnemore and Toope.” *IO* 55(3): 759-60.
- Blake, Daniel J. 2013. “Thinking Ahead: Government Time Horizons and the Legalization of International Investment Agreements.” *IO* 67(4): 797-827.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Brad LeVeck, David G. Victor, James H. Fowler. 2014. “Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation.” *IO* 68(4): 845-876.

Highly Recommended

- Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. “Introduction: Legalization and World Politics.” *IO* 54(3): 385-99.
- Goldstein, Judith and Lisa Martin. 2000. “Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note.” *IO* 54(3): 603-32.
- Keohane, Robert O., Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. “Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational.” *IO* 54(3): 457-88.
- Kahler, Miles. 2000. “Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case.” *IO* 54(3): 549-71.
- Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 2000. “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.” *IO* 54(3): 421-56.
- Deitelhoff, Nicole. 2009. “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the ICC Case.” *IO* 63(1): 33 -65.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2000. “The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs.” *IO* 54(3): 573-602.
- Lutz, Ellen L. and Kathryn Sikkink. 2000. “International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America.” *IO* 54(3): 633-59.
- Kahler, Miles. 2000. “Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization.” *IO* 54(3): 661-83.
- Posner, Eric A. and Alan O. Sykes. 2010. “Economic Foundations of the Law of the Sea.” *American Journal of International Law* 104: 569-96.
- Vogel, David. 2008. “Private Global Business Regulation.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 261-82.

Week 3: Delegation and Pathologies

- Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1): 3-32.

- Lake, David A. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2006. “The Logic of Delegation to International Organizations.” In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, eds. Cambridge University Press, 341-68.
- Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 1999. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.” *IO* 53(4): 699-732.
- Voeten, Erik. 2008. “The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights.” *American Political Science Review* 102(4): 417-33.
- Johnson, Tana L. 2013. “Institutional Design and Bureaucrats’ Impact on Political Control.” *JOP* 75(1): 183-197.

Highly Recommended

- Vaubel, Roland. 2006. “Principal-agent Problems in International Organizations.” *The Review of International Organizations* 1(2): 125-38.
- Pollack, Mark A. 1997. “Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community.” *IO* 51(1): 99-134.
- Nielson, Daniel L and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform.” *IO* 57(2): 241-76.
- Stasavage, David. 2004. “Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining.” *IO* 58(4): 667-703.
- Clifford Carrubba, Matthew Gabel, and Charles Hankla. 2008. “Judicial Behavior Under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice.” *American Political Science Review* 102(4): 435-52.
- Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions*. Princeton University Press.
- Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. 2006. “Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-agent Theory.” In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, eds. Cambridge University Press, 3-38.
- Copelovitch, Mark S. 2010. “Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending.” *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 49-77.
- Milner, Helen and Dustin Tingley. 2013. “The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy.” *Review of International Organizations* (forthcoming).
- Ikenberry, G. John. 2000. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1982. “The Demand for International Regimes.” *IO* 36(2): 325-55.
- Voeten, Erik. 2007. “The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights.” *IO* 61(4): 669-701.

- Martin, Lisa L. 2006. “Distribution, Information, and Delegation to International Organizations: The Case of IMF Conditionality.” In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, eds. Cambridge University Press, 140-64.
- Farrell, Henry. 2003. “Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce: The EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Arrangement.” *IO* 57(2): 277-306.
- Nye, Joseph. 2001. “Globalization’s Democratic Deficit: How to Make International Institutions More Accountable.” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August).
- Johnson, Tana and Johannes Urpelainen. 2014. “International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot.” *IO* 68(1): 177-209.

Week 4: The Domestic Politics of International Organizations

- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” *IO* 42(3): 427-60.
- Mansfield, Edward and Jon Pevehouse. 2006. “Democratization and International Organizations.” *IO* 60(1): 137-67.
- Chapman, Terrence L. 2009. “Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy.” *IO* 63(4): 733-764.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1999. “Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View.” In *Democracy’s Edges*. Ian Shapiro, ed. Cambridge University Press, 19-36.
- Christina J. Schneider. 2018. “Public Commitments as Signals of Responsiveness in the European Union.”
- Schneider, Christina J. and Cesi Cruz. 2017. “Foreign Aid and the Politics of Undeserved Credit Claiming.” *AJPS* 61(2): 396-408.

Highly Recommended

- Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1997. “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide.” *European Journal of International Relations* 3(4): 473-95.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. “Introduction-Bringing Transnational Relations Back In.” In *Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*. Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed. Cambridge University Press, 3-36.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 2004. “Is There a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis.” *Government and Opposition* 39(2): 336-63.
- Gourevitch, Peter A. 1996. “Squaring the Circle: The Domestic Sources of International Cooperation.” *IO* 50(2): 349-73.
- Milner, Helen V. 1997. *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton University Press, 3-157.
- Keohane, Robert O., Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. 2009. “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism.” *IO* 63(1):1-31.
- Gartzke, Erik and Megumi Naoi. 2011. “Multilateralism and Democracy: A Response to Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik.” *IO* 65(3): 589-598.
- Keohane, Robert O., Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. 2011. “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism: A Response to Gartzke and Naoi.” *IO* 65(3): 599-604.

- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorf. 2002. “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements.” *IO* 56(3): 477-513.
- Richard Price. 1998. “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.” *IO* 52(3): 613-44. Mansfield, Edward D. and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. “Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 269-94.
- Broz, J. Lawrence and Michael Brewster Hawes. 2006. “Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund.” *IO* 60(2): 367-99.
- Hug, Simon and Thomas König. 2002. “In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference.” *IO* 56(2): 447-76.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe.” *IO* 54(2): 217-52.
- Chapman, Terrence L. 2007. “International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(1): 134-66.
- Goldstein, Judith. 1996. “International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American ‘Unfair’ Trade Laws.” *IO* 50(4): 541-64.
- Milner, Helen V. 2006. “Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-agent Problems.” In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, eds. Cambridge University Press, 107-39.
- Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization.” *IO* 56(3): 515-49.
- Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Cowhey, Peter F. 1993. “Elect Locally, Order Globally: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Cooperation.” In *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*. John G. Ruggie, ed. New York, Columbia University Press, 157-200.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” *IO* 51(4): 513-53.
- Vreeland, James R. 2009. “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture.” *IO* 62(1): 65-101.
- Staton, Jeffrey and Will H. Moore. 2011. “Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics.” *IO* 65(3): 553-587.
- Christina J. Schneider. 2018. “The Responsive Union. National Elections and European Governance.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McLean, Elena V. 2014. “Multilateral Aid and Domestic Economic Interests.” *IO* 69(1): 97-130.
- Chaudoin, Stephen. 2014. “Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes.” *IO* 68(4): 877-911.
- Stephanie J. Rickard and Teri L. Caraway. 2014. “International Negotiations in the Shadow of National Elections.” *IO* 68(3): 701-720.

- Caraway, Teri L, Stephanie J. Rickard, and Mark S. Anner. 2012. “International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality.” IO 66(1): 27-61.
- Fang, Songying. 2008. “The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics” AJPS 52(2): 304-32.
- Voeten, Erik. 2006. “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force.” IO 59(2): 527-557.
- Christina J. Schneider and Branislav Slantchev. 2018. “The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation. Germany and the European Debt Crisis.” IO 72(1): 1-31.

PART 2: DESIGN AND INFLUENCE

Week 5: Design (Part I): Rational Design

- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” IO 55(4): 761-99.
- Rathbun, Brian C. 2011. “Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations.” IO 65(2): 243-273.
- Tallberg, Jonas, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito and Christer Jönsson. 2014. “Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organizations.” IO 68(4): 741-774.
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2015. “Delegation and Pooling in International Organizations.” RIO 10(3): 305-328.
- Gray, Julia. 2018. “Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations.” ISQ 62(1): 1-13.

Highly Recommended

- Wendt, Alexander. 2001. “Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design.” IO 55(4): 1019-49.
- Duffield, John S. 2003. “The Limits of Rational Design.” IO 57(2): 411-30.
- Miles Kahler. 1992. “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers.” IO 46(3): 681-708.
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. “Rational Design: Looking Back to Move Forward.” IO 55(4): 1051-82.
- Raustiala, Kal. 2005. “Form and Substance in International Agreements.” American Journal of International Law 99(3): 581-614.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. and Patricia M. Keilbach. 2001. “Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange.” IO 55(4): 891-917.
- Morrow, James D. 2001. “The Institutional Features of Prisoners of War Treaties.” IO 55(4): 971-91.

Week 6: Design (Part II): Bargaining

- Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. “Is there a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements?” IO 58(3): 459-84.

- Stone, Randall. 2008. “The Scope of IMF Conditionality.” IO 62(4): 589-620.
- Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Vreeland. 2009. “Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes in the United Nations Security Council.” *European Economic Review* 53(7): 742-757.
- Schneider, Christina. 2011. “Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations.” ISQ 55(2): 331-355.
- Phillip Y. Lipsky and Haillie Na-Kyung Lee. 2018. “The IMF as a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises.” IO 73(1): forthcoming.

Highly Recommended

- Vreeland, James and Axel Dreher. 2014. *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schneider, Christina. 2010. *Conflict, Negotiations, and EU Enlargement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO.” IO 56(2): 339-74.
- David B. Carter and Randall W. Stone. 2015. “Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly.” IO 69(1): 1-33.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2001. “Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement.” IO 55(4): 801-28.
- Mattli, Walter. 2001. “Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration.” IO 55(4): 919-47.
- Helfer, Laurence R. and Erik Voeten. 2014. “International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe.” IO 68(1): 77-110.

Week 7: Design (Part III): Enforcement, Dispute Settlement and Flexibility

- Fearon, James. 1998. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.” IO 52(2): 269-305.
- Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. “Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime.” IO 60(4): 935-67.
- Allee, Todd L. and Paul K. Huth. 2006. “Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover.” *American Political Science Review* 100(2): 219-34.
- Donno, Daniela. 2010. “Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms.” IO 64(4): 593-625.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner. 2001. “The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape.” IO 55(4): 829-57.

Highly Recommended

- Busch, Marc L. and Krzysztof J. Pelc. 2010. “The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization.” IO 64(2): 257-79.
- Smith, James McCall. 2000. “The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts.” IO 54(1): 137-80.

- Koremenos, Barbara. 2001. “Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility.” IO 55(2): 289-325.
- Busch, Marc L. and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. “Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement.” Journal of World Trade 37(4): 719-35.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Laurence Helfer, and Chris Fariss. 2011. “Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties.” IO 65.
- Yarbrough, Beth V. and Robert M. Yarbrough. 1997. “Dispute Settlement in International Trade: Regionalism and Procedural Coordination.” In The Political Economy of Regionalism. Edward L. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, eds. New York, Columbia University Press, 134-63.
- Kucik, Jeffrey and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. “Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime.” IO 62(3): 477-505.
- Sykes, Alan O. 1991. “Protectionism as a ‘Safeguard’: A Positive Analysis of the GATT ‘Escape Clause’ with Normative Speculations.” University of Chicago Law Review 58(1): 255-305.
- Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger. 2005. “Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause.” Journal of Legal Studies 34(2): 471-513.
- Koh, Harold H. 1998. “How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?” Addison C. Harris Lecture. www.law.indiana.edu/ilj/volumes/v74/no4/koh.pdf
- Helfer, Laurence. 2006. “Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk and Treaty Design.” Yale Journal of International Law 31: 367-82.
- Davis, Christina and Sarah Bermeo. 2009. “Who Files? Developing Country Participation in WTO Adjudication.” JOP 71(3): 1033-1049.

Week 8: Compliance and Effectiveness

- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?” IO 50(3): 379-406.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. 2007. “International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements.” American Journal of Political Science 51(4): 721-37.
- Nathan M. Jensen and Edmund Malesky 2018. “Nonstate Actors and Compliance with International Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.” IO 72(1): 33-69.
- Julia Gray. 2013. “Domestic Capacity and the Implementation Gap in Regional Trade Agreements.” CPS 47(1): 55-84.
- Carnegie, Allison. 2014. “States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions.” APSR 108(1): 54-70.

Highly Recommended

- Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. “On Compliance.” IO 47(2): 175-205.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2001. “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change.” IO 55(3): 553-88

- Simmons, Beth A. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 819-35.
- Tallberg, Jonas. 2002. “Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management and the European Union.” *IO* 56(3): 609-43.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression.” *IO* 59(3): 593-629.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. ”Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance.” *IO* 48(3): 425-58.
- Goldsmith, Jack and Eric Posner. 2005. *The Limits of International Law*. Oxford University Press, 3-17.
- Bernauer, Thomas. 1995. “The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More.” *IO* 49(2): 351-77.
- Finnemore, Martha. 1996. “Review: Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism.” *IO* 50(2): 325-47.
- Guzman, Andrew T. 2008. *How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory*. New York, Oxford University Press, 3-24.
- Simmons, Beth. 2010. “Treaty Compliance and Violation.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 273-96.
- Downs, George W. and Michael A. Jones. 2002. “Reputation, Compliance and International Law.” *Journal of Legal Studies* 31(1): 95-114.
- Von Stein, Jana. 2005. “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance.” *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 611-22.
- Simmons, Beth A. and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2005. “The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods.” *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 623-31.
- Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. “Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism.” *IO* 59(2): 363-98.
- Jonsson, Christer and Jonas Tallberg. 1998. “Compliance and Post-Agreement Bargaining.” *European Journal of International Relations* 4(4): 371-408.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. “Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance.” *IO* 48(3): 425-58.
- Young, Oran R. 1992. “The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables.” In *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds. Cambridge University Press, 160-194.
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