

Appendix

Signals of Responsiveness. National Elections and European Governance

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A. Appendix for Chapter 1 (Introduction)

A.1. Trust in the European Union



Figure A-1.: This graph displays the results of Eurobarometer surveys from 2005-2015 on the question “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? – European Union.” The respondents’ answers (“tend to trust,” “tend to distrust”) are displayed in percentages. Data are from the interactive Eurobarometer <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/index>, last accessed: September 2016)

A.2. Popular Support for EU Membership





Figure A-2.: This graph displays the results of Eurobarometer surveys from 1973-2015 on the question “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” The respondents’ answers are displayed in percentages. Data are from the interactive Eurobarometer <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/index>, last accessed: September 2016)


A.3. Perceived Government Responsiveness in European Affairs



This graph displays the results of Eurobarometer surveys from 2005-2015 on the question “Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?: The interests of (OUR COUNTRY) are well taken into account in the EU.” The respondents’ answers (“agree,” “disagree”) are displayed in percentages. Data are from the interactive Eurobarometer <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/index>, last accessed: September 2016)

B. Appendix for Chapter 2 (The Politicization of European Cooperation)

B.1. Electoral Volatility in Western European States, 1950-2010 (by Country)



Graphs by Country

The graph displays the Pedersen index of electoral volatility in 15 Western European countries from 1950-2010. *Source:* Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017).

B.2. Additional Measures of Saliency

One question that has been asked repeatedly (although unfortunately not frequently throughout time) is a question about the importance of the EU to citizens of EU countries:

“Whether or not you have the time to take personal interest in the problems of the European Community, do you feel that these problems are very important, important, not very important or unimportant for the future of *country* and the people of *country*?”

Table B-1 provides information on the average level of importance that Europeans have attached to the European Communities in 1975 and 1991 (the earliest and latest year for which this question was included in the Eurobarometer surveys).¹ In 1975, about 75% of respondents thought that the European Community was very important or important, and about 15% believed the European Communities to be not very important or unimportant. The numbers in 1991 are 83% and 11%, respectively. Whereas there may not be a significant trend across time, the high level of importance that individuals attribute to the EU over time is very indicative of the assumption that voters should care about whether their governments are competent in EU negotiations.

Of course, the importance of the EU varies across EU member countries. Table B-2 presents the results for a selection of EU member states. Across surveys, about 80% of EU citizens think that the EU is important, and 13% think that it is not important. But whereas almost 35% of UK citizens believe that the EU is very important, only 20% of Belgium citizens and 22% of German citizens have the same opinion. Likewise, most individuals in Portugal believe that the EU is very important or important, and only 1.85% believe that the EU is unimportant. In France, on the other hand, almost 5% of respondents believe that the EU is unimportant.

Another question that relates to the general salience of European politics on the domestic level is the extent to which individuals are interested in matters related to the EU:

“To what extent would you say you are interested in European Politics, that is to say matters related to the European Community?”

¹Unfortunately, none of the questions about citizen’s interest in the EU or the importance that they attribute to the EU have been asked after the early 1990s.

	1975	1991
	(% of Respondents)	
Very Important	32.69	35.02
Important	42.11	48.32
Not Very Important	10.75	8.37
Unimportant	4.65	2.26

Table B-1.: EU Importance within the European Union. The graph displays the results of Eurobarometer surveys from 2005-2013 on the question “Whether or not you have the time to take personal interest in the problems of the European Community, do you feel that these problems are very important, important, not very important or unimportant for the future of *country* and the people of *country*?” The responses (“Very Important,” “Important,” “Not Very Important,” “Unimportant”) are displayed in percentages. *Source:* Schmitt et al. (2005)

Table B-3 shows that in 1988 (the earliest year for which this question was included in the Eurobarometer survey) about 39% of EU citizens cared a great deal or at least to some extent about European politics. In 1994 (the latest year for which this question was included in the Eurobarometer survey), the number rose slightly to 42%. The number of EU citizens who were not much or not at all interested in the EU dropped slightly from about 59% to 52%. Nevertheless, at least in 1994 a majority of citizen in the European Union still did not care a great deal about the EU despite the existence of a single European market and the beginning of the European Monetary Union.

Table B-4 indicates that this trend varies across EU members. Overall, there is no majority of EU citizens who believe the EU is not important (the average across years is about 45% which is almost *on par* with the share of individuals who are interested in the EU). French respondents appear to be amongst the most interested citizens (47%), whereas Portuguese respondents are amongst the least interested (28%). 31% of Portuguese are not at all interested in European matters. This compares to much lower numbers in Germany (12.60%).

Finally, it is worth looking at the salience of EU issues in the domestic media. The Eurobarometer includes questions about the extent to which indi-

	All	France	Belgium	Germany	UK	Portugal
	(% of Respondents)					
Very Important	30.51	30.53	20.39	22.68	34.70	22.27
Important	49.90	52.03	51.85	52.37	45.70	53.57
Not Very Important	9.81	9.53	13.35	15.57	11.24	6.04
Unimportant	3.38	4.98	3.90	2.93	3.84	1.85

Table B-2.: EU Importance Across EU Countries The graph displays the results of Eurobarometer surveys from 2005-2013 on the question “Whether or not you have the time to take personal interest in the problems of the European Community, do you feel that these problems are very important, important, not very important or unimportant for the future of *country* and the people of *country*?” The responses (“Very Important,” “Important,” “Not Very Important,” “Unimportant”) are displayed in percentages. *Source:* Schmitt et al. (2005)

viduals read about the EU in the papers, on radio, or on television:

“Have you recently seen or heard in the papers, on the radio, or on television, anything about the European Commission in Brussels, that is the Commission of the European Community?”

Table B-5 shows that whereas a majority of European citizens had not read or heard about the EU in the media in 1987, a majority of respondents recently read or heard about the EU in 1992. The share of respondents recently exposed to news about the EU rose from about 45% to 50%, with a similar decline in those who had not heard about the EU in the media.

	1988	1994
	(% of Respondents)	
A Great Deal	8.89	9.17
To Some Extent	30.30	31.36
Not Much	35.33	33.02
Not At All	23.81	19.69

Table B-3.: Public EU Interest within the European Union. The graph displays the results of Eurobarometer surveys from 2005-2013 on the question “To what extent would you say you are interested in European Politics, that is to say matters related to the European Community?” The responses (“A Great Deal,” “To Some Extent,” “Not Much,” “Not At All”) are displayed in percentages. *Source:* Schmitt et al. (2005)

	All	France	Belgium	Germany	UK	Portugal
	(% of Respondents)					
A Great Deal	9.67	11.31	7.07	9.66	9.79	5.73
To Some Extent	32.81	36.15	30.32	34.21	35.92	22.07
Not Much	25.80	33.56	35.90	41.97	32.17	37.80
Not At All	19.31	17.05	24.81	12.60	21.21	31.03

Table B-4.: Public EU Interest Across EU Countries. The graph displays the results of Eurobarometer surveys from 2005-2013 on the question “To what extent would you say you are interested in European Politics, that is to say matters related to the European Community?” The responses (“A Great Deal,” “To Some Extent,” “Not Much,” “Not At All”) are displayed in percentages. *Source:* Schmitt et al. (2005)

	1987	1992
	(% of Respondents)	
Yes	44.88	50.04
No	49.08	43.48

Table B-5.: Media Salience. The graph displays the results of Eurobarometer surveys from 2005-2013 on the question “Have you recently seen or heard in the papers, on the radio, or on television, anything about the European Commission in Brussels, that is the Commission of the European Community?” The responses (“Yes,” “No”) are displayed in percentages. *Source:* Schmitt et al. (2005)

C. Appendix for Chapter 3 (A Theory of Responsive Government)

C.1. Voting Weights under the Nice Treaty

Each government's votes in the Council are weighted roughly by population size. With each enlargement, the number of votes for each member has changed, but the ranking of member states by the number of votes they have stayed roughly the same over time, until voting weights were abolished with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (the reform took effect in November 2014). Table C-6 presents the distribution of votes across EU members in the EU-28. Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom receive most votes, but some new members (notably Poland) have received a large number of votes upon accession to the EU in the last decade.

Country	Votes	Votes (%)
Germany, France, Italy, UK	29	8.2
Poland, Spain	27	7.7
Romania	14	4.0
Netherlands	13	3.7
Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal	12	3.4
Austria, Bulgaria, Sweden	10	2.8
Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia	7	2.0
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slovenia	4	1.1
Malta	3	0.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>352</i>	<i>100</i>

Table C-6.: Distribution of Votes in the Council, EU-28. The table displays the official number of votes and vote shares of EU member countries as decided with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. *Source:* Council of the EU at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/>, last accessed: September 2016.

It is interesting to note that there is a bias towards the smaller countries in the EU. EU members are extremely asymmetrical in terms of their population size (you just need to compare Germany with 80 million citizen to Luxembourg with 500,000 citizen), and a weighting of votes according to population size would prevent small EU member states from having any meaningful influence in the Council. The EU therefore gives disproportionately more votes to small EU countries. Table C-7 illustrates this. Whereas Germany has only 0.36 votes for each one million German citizen, Luxembourg has 8 votes per one million Luxembourg citizen. It has therefore been argued that small states have disproportional influence on EU decision-making (Rodden, 2002; Aksoy and Rodden, 2009; Aksoy, 2010).

The three criteria for decisions to be adopted under the Nice rules were 74% of member states' weighted votes, cast by a majority of member states, and optionally, a check that the majority represented at least 62% of the EU's entire population. Many criticized that the thresholds were too high, leading to substantial gridlock in Council decision-making. As discussed in Chapter 2, the voting reform under the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 attempted to rectify these problems.

Country	Votes	Population (in million)	Per Capita Votes (in million)
Germany	29	80	0.36
Poland	27	38.5	0.70
Netherlands	13	16.8	0.77
Portugal	12	10.4	1.15
Croatia	7	4.2	1.67
Luxembourg	4	0.5	8
Malta	3	0.4	7.5

Table C-7.: Council Votes and Representation in the EU-28. Distribution of Votes in the Council, EU-28. The table displays the official number of votes, population size, and per capita of EU member countries as decided with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. *Source:* Council of the EU, Eurostat, and own calculations.

D. Appendix for Chapter 4 (The EU-Aware Voter)

D.1. Main Results in Tabular Form

	(Bailout)		(Refugees)	
	Support	Opposition	Support	Opposition
Position Affinity	0.010 (0.009)	0.022** (0.009)	0.022* (0.011)	0.024** (0.009)
Vote Affinity	0.024** (0.010)	0.030** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	0.048** (0.010)
Outcome Affinity	0.005 (0.009)	0.024** (0.008)	0.011 (0.011)	0.049** (0.010)
Partisanship	0.065** (0.019)	0.045** (0.015)	0.030* (0.018)	0.060** (0.023)
Gender	0.021** (0.009)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)
Experience (2)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.044** (0.017)	-0.000 (0.018)	-0.000 (0.013)
Experience (4)	0.010 (0.017)	-0.027 (0.016)	0.005 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.016)
Experience (6)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.037** (0.015)	0.004 (0.019)	0.013 (0.016)
Experience (8)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.037** (0.017)	-0.000 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.013)
Experience (10)	0.030** (0.015)	-0.021 (0.015)	0.013 (0.018)	0.001 (0.015)
Constant	0.460** (0.013)	0.486** (0.014)	0.469** (0.016)	0.431** (0.013)
Observations	2080	2364	1960	2484

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Table D-8.: Weighted Sample Model Results - Position Affinity

	(Bailout)		(Refugees)	
	Responsive	Nonresponsive	Responsive	Nonresponsive
Defense	0.031** (0.011)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.036** (0.013)	-0.037** (0.011)
Position	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.000 (0.008)
Vote	-0.008 (0.011)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.022* (0.012)
Outcome	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.038** (0.013)
Partisanship	0.071** (0.023)	0.038* (0.022)	0.043 (0.026)	0.041 (0.027)
Gender	0.009 (0.012)	0.014 (0.011)	0.008 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.012)
Experience (2)	-0.025 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Experience (4)	-0.029 (0.020)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.009 (0.022)
Experience (6)	-0.042** (0.018)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.019)	0.033 (0.022)
Experience (8)	-0.030 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.021)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.021)
Experience (10)	-0.015 (0.020)	0.017 (0.017)	0.012 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.022)
Constant	0.519** (0.017)	0.505** (0.016)	0.496** (0.017)	0.531** (0.020)
Observations	2233	2211	2247	2197

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Table D-9.: Weighted Sample Model Results - Position-Defending Behavior

	(Bailout)		(Refugees)	
	Responsive	Nonresponsive	Responsive	Nonresponsive
Success	0.026** (0.011)	-0.005 (0.012)	0.030** (0.013)	-0.030** (0.012)
Position Affinity	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.005 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.013)
Vote Affinity	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)
Outcome Affinity	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.009 (0.012)
Partisanship	0.059** (0.022)	0.044** (0.021)	0.035 (0.025)	0.051** (0.025)
Gender	0.029** (0.011)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)
Experience (2)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.021)	0.012 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.018)
Experience (4)	-0.007 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.021)	0.019 (0.021)	-0.023 (0.021)
Experience (6)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.019)	0.011 (0.020)	0.009 (0.019)
Experience (8)	-0.029 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.021)	0.011 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.018)
Experience (10)	-0.016 (0.018)	0.023 (0.018)	0.011 (0.019)	0.000 (0.019)
Constant	0.511** (0.017)	0.501** (0.016)	0.506** (0.018)	0.517** (0.017)
Observations	2248	2196	2234	2210

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Table D-10.: Weighted Sample Model Results - Bargaining Success

	(Bailout)		(Refugees)	
	Support	Opposition	Support	Opposition
Competence	0.025** (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)	0.023** (0.010)	0.024** (0.009)
Position Affinity	0.019* (0.010)	0.059** (0.010)	0.027** (0.009)	0.048** (0.011)
Outcome Affinity	0.024* (0.013)	0.030** (0.008)	-0.000 (0.011)	0.050** (0.010)
Partisanship	0.043** (0.019)	0.056** (0.020)	0.038** (0.017)	-0.001 (0.021)
Gender	0.019* (0.011)	0.022** (0.009)	-0.028** (0.009)	0.012 (0.010)
Experience (2)	0.012 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.017)	0.016 (0.021)	-0.029* (0.017)
Experience (4)	0.016 (0.020)	0.011 (0.015)	0.002 (0.019)	0.006 (0.018)
Experience (6)	0.021 (0.017)	0.017 (0.018)	0.012 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.017)
Experience (8)	0.030 (0.020)	-0.000 (0.013)	0.016 (0.020)	-0.013 (0.018)
Experience (10)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.018)	0.022 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.016)
Constant	0.438** (0.018)	0.439** (0.014)	0.475** (0.017)	0.440** (0.015)
Observations	2052	2452	2080	2424

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Table D-11.: Weighted Sample Model Results - Negotiation Competence

D.2. Results of Unweighted Regressions




Figure D-3.: Position-Taking and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-4.: Position-Defending and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-5.: Credit-Claiming and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-6.: Negotiation Competence and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.

D.3. Results of Weighted Regressions with Continuous Vote Choice

This section provides the results for re-estimating all main regressions, using as the dependent variable the continuous vote choice of respondents. In particular, after respondents decided which of the politicians they would prefer in the comparisons, I further ask them the following question:

If there was an election this Sunday, how likely would you vote for each of these politicians?

Respondents rated each politician individually on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely).² The following tables present results using this dependent variable. The estimations are based on the re-weighted data (see previous section for a discussion).

²The order of categories was reversed for half of the respondents.




Figure D-7.: Position-Taking and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-8.: Position-Defending and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-9.: Credit-Claiming and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-10.: Negotiation Competence and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.

D.4. Accounting for Political Knowledge

This section provides the results for re-estimating all main regressions on a sub-sample that only includes respondents that answered at least two out of three political knowledge questions correctly. The three questions were:

1. Who is currently the minister of defense in Germany?
2. Which party received the largest number of seats in the German parliament in the general elections of 2013?
3. For how many years are members of the German parliament elected?




Figure D-11.: Position-Taking and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-12.: Position-Defending and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-13.: Credit-Claiming and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-14.: Negotiation Competence and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.

D.5. Accounting for Attention

This section provides the results for re-estimating all main regressions on a sub-sample that only includes respondents that passed a relatively stringent attention test. Respondents had to answer the following question:

“We are interested in a number of different topics, including colors. To show that you read this text, please pick the colors red and green from the alternatives below, regardless of your actual favorite color. Yes, please ignore the following question and pick those two colors. What is your favorite color”

The graphs present the results from estimations that only include respondents who answered the question correctly.




Figure D-15.: Position-Taking and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-16.: Position-Defending and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-17.: Credit-Claiming and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.




Figure D-18.: Negotiation Competence and Voter Support. Marginal component-specific effects from a linear probability model. Bars denote 90% confidence intervals. Reference values for each variable omitted.

E. Appendix for Chapter 5 (The EU Budget: Financially Trivial, Politically Substantial)

E.1. Descriptive Statistics – Budget Models

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
ESIF Receipts (%)	1.390681	1.676589	.0011971	9.189159
CAP Receipts (%)	3.271311	3.622601	.0019641	17.48617
Budget Receipts (%)	5.276276	4.945518	.018287	20.83979
Election Period	.5204461	.5000467	0	1
Agricultural Sector (ln, t-1)	5.372428	1.567243	1.280934	8.05484
GDP (ln, t-1)	12.19899	1.531555	8.475266	14.80992
Per Capita GDP (ln, t-1)	-3.951779	.5554865	-5.650322	-2.494962
Unemployment (%)	8.219145	3.746008	.7	22
Voting Power (%)	6.224363	4.437807	.9524	17.8571
Public EU Support	.4281165	.2206227	-.255	.86
New Member State	.1672862	.3735786	0	1
EU Membership Size	18.60781	6.908318	9	27
N	538			

E.2. Model Specification – Budget Models

The time-series cross-sectional nature of the data raises concerns of panel heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. I estimate an unbalanced panel model with fixed effects. The fixed effects estimator controls for unobserved country heterogeneity that is constant over time. This procedure is warranted because the time independent country effects turn out significant in the regression and the results of the Hausman test suggests that alternatives would render the coefficients inconsistent and biased. Note, I show below that the results are robust to including year fixed effects or using random effects. One potential issue with estimating panel models using budget shares as a dependent variable is that all budget shares in any given year sum up to 100%. The compositional nature of the variable puts constraints on the aid shares that countries can receive. In the robustness tests below, I show that the results are robust when taking the compositional structure of the data into account.

All models have panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to correct for panel heteroscedasticity as well as for contemporaneously correlated errors across panels. Whereas a PCSE model can deal with unbalanced panel data, I also include a variable measuring the number of members in each year in order to account for increasing number of panels over time. Using EU size dummies instead does not substantially alter the findings.

Additionally, the Durbin Watson statistic of an untransformed model points to a serial correlation of the error terms. The main specifications use a Prais Winsten transformation of the error term (AR1 process). In the main models I use panel-specific transformations of the error term, but I show in the robustness checks below that the results are robust to using a general AR1 autocorrelation structure.

E.3. Further Robustness Checks – Budget Models

In earlier work, on which this analysis is build, I show that the models are robust to a number of different model specifications (Schneider, 2013):

1. Endogenous election timing (robust)
2. Importance of snap elections (robust)
3. Alternative operationalizations of the main independent variable:
 - Continuous election indicator (robust)
 - Presidential elections (no effect as expected)
 - Year to election (no effect)
 - Postelection dummy (no effect)
4. Alternative Dependent Variable:
 - Total Net Receipts (robust)
5. Additional Control Variables:
 - Financial Frameworks (robust)
 - Partisan Extremity (robust)
6. Model Specification:
 - Lagged dependent variable (robust)
 - System general methods of moments estimator (robust)

In addition to the robustness checks that I conducted in Schneider (2013), I now provide some additional robustness checks. Model 1 in Table E-12 presents the main estimation without country fixed effects. Model 2 includes country and year fixed effects, and Model 3 presents the ESIF Shares model for the period from 1977-2004 to analyze whether countries with higher pc GDP received fewer structural transfers before the enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries (see discussion of the results in Table 5.1). The main effect is robust to these changes in the model specification, and I also find as expected that poorer countries indeed received greater ESIF shares before enlargement. The puzzling result in the main tables therefore owes most likely

to the distribution of income across old and new member states after Eastern enlargement. In addition, whereas I use a panel-specific transformation of the error term in the main model, Model 4 demonstrates that the results are robust to using an AR1 autocorrelation structure that is not specific to the particular panel. One potential issue with using budget shares is that all budget shares in any given year sum up to 100%. The compositional nature of the variable puts constraints on the aid shares that countries can receive. To address this problem, I calculated an unconstrained model that use the log of total aid receipts as a dependent variable (Model 5). Following Aitchison (2003), I also log-transformed the data by creating a log budget ratio between a country's budget shares, and the other EU members' budget shares (Model 6). The advantage of the log-transformation proportional outcome is that it is unconstrained. The main results are robust in both cases.

Table E-13 analyzes whether the budget cycles are dependent on one of the big four in the EU (UK, Germany, Italy, France). It indicates expectedly that budget cycles are indeed much weaker if we exclude observations for the UK and France, but that budget cycles would be stronger without Germany and Italy in the sample. In general, the electoral cycle persists (sometimes weakly) even if we exclude countries from the sample.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Random Effects	Year FE	ESIF (before 2004)	AR Process	Total Receipts (ln)	Log Transformed DV
Election Period	0.118** (0.038)	0.098** (0.044)	0.053 (0.044)	0.105* (0.056)	0.030** (0.012)	0.034** (0.012)
Agricultural Sector (ln, t-1)	1.316** (0.139)	-1.250** (0.364)	-1.123** (0.307)	1.054** (0.432)	-0.450** (0.116)	-0.016 (0.108)
GDP (ln, t-1)	-0.566** (0.188)	3.342** (1.075)	1.536* (0.856)	-5.973** (1.162)	0.528 (0.333)	-0.854** (0.419)
Per Capita GDP (ln, t-1)	2.554** (0.334)	-0.408 (1.070)	-2.683** (0.963)	7.002** (1.193)	0.168 (0.313)	1.385** (0.419)
Unemployment (%)	0.080** (0.021)	0.040* (0.021)	-0.034** (0.016)	0.015 (0.025)	0.016** (0.007)	0.014** (0.006)
Voting Power (%)	0.753** (0.052)	0.494** (0.055)	-0.059** (0.027)	0.660** (0.076)	0.032* (0.017)	0.097** (0.017)
Public EU Support	0.246 (0.410)	-0.180 (0.363)	-1.330** (0.264)	-1.139** (0.422)	-0.137 (0.104)	-0.319** (0.104)
New Member State	-0.881** (0.157)	-1.125** (0.138)	-0.908** (0.235)	-0.961** (0.145)	-0.159** (0.062)	-0.180** (0.061)
EU Membership Size	0.050** (0.025)	-0.397** (0.036)	0.016* (0.009)	0.056** (0.025)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.007)
Constant	8.883** (2.398)	-28.734* (16.934)	-22.645 (14.085)	94.762** (18.506)	3.979 (5.464)	12.002* (6.851)
Observations	553	553	333	553	553	553
Wald Test						
chi2	2308.309	53458793.383	2431276.232	43810.951	1060315.865	2469267.743

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Table E-12.: Model Specification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	No UK	No Germany	No France	No Italy
Election Period	0.078* (0.048)	0.145** (0.047)	0.072* (0.044)	0.125** (0.045)
Agricultural Sector (ln, t-1)	1.199** (0.393)	1.445** (0.372)	1.087** (0.364)	0.632* (0.326)
GDP (ln, t-1)	-3.407** (1.258)	-11.093** (1.356)	-3.277** (1.067)	-5.814** (1.186)
Per Capita GDP (ln, t-1)	4.334** (1.261)	12.735** (1.543)	4.208** (1.074)	6.345** (1.151)
Unemployment (%)	0.014 (0.025)	0.032 (0.023)	0.017 (0.024)	0.017 (0.022)
Voting Power (%)	0.627** (0.075)	0.742** (0.069)	0.701** (0.057)	0.616** (0.067)
Public EU Support	-0.577 (0.415)	-1.447** (0.386)	-1.250** (0.399)	-1.397** (0.393)
New Member State	-1.044** (0.164)	-1.020** (0.143)	-1.010** (0.148)	-1.046** (0.141)
EU Membership Size	0.038 (0.028)	0.076** (0.024)	0.062** (0.025)	0.055** (0.025)
Constant	53.027** (20.029)	177.672** (21.510)	50.910** (17.098)	93.030** (18.778)
Observations	518	518	518	518
Wald Test chi2	329724.467	189105.786	1066481.257	164408.714

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.106, ** p<0.05

Table E-13.: Testing for Country Dependency


E.4. Interaction with Margin of Victory – Budget Models

Whereas my measure of government approval is preferable to retrospective measures of electoral competition because it is prospective, it cannot take into account competition with other parties, which may increase electoral uncertainty dramatically. To account for competition between parties (i.e. the closeness of an election), I created two measures. The first measure uses the approval data, but generates the difference between the incumbent party with the strongest approval and the party with the second strongest approval (could be part of the incumbent coalition or the opposition).³ Second, I use the retrospective measure of the actual difference between the party that received the greatest vote share and the party that received the second largest vote share. Data for the retrospective margin of victory measure are from Döring and Manow (2015).


Figure E-19 presents the results. Subfigure E-19(a) is particularly interesting because it reveals some of the limitations that governments experience when they try to generate electoral cycles. Remember that the data underlying the difference in approval are based on the vote intention questions. Consequently, in some cases the strongest incumbent party had much lower approval rates before elections than other parties either within the coalition or in the opposition (resulting in negative values for *Approval (Difference)*). Parties whose public approval is more than 7% lower than those of other parties should clearly want to generate an electoral cycle, but they appear unable to do so. Theoretically, this makes sense. Why would Council members agree to a reduction in their own budgetary benefits to help a government that most likely will not get reelected in the next year (meaning that they cannot expect this government to reciprocate on their cooperative behavior). At the same time, electoral cycles exist when the elections are close (and also when the strongest incumbent party has a huge advantage to the second strongest party). Subfigure E-19(b) provides additional evidence that those findings are largely consistent when I use a retrospective measure of electoral competition (*Margin of Victory*).⁴ In general, electoral cycles exist in most cases, but in those where

³I also generated this variable without respect to incumbency status and the results are the same.


⁴Note that this measure does not take into account the electoral strength of the incumbent party before the election, but simply measures the difference in vote share between the



(a) Approval Difference



(b) Margin of Victory



(c) Margin of Victory (Post 1990)

Figure E-19.: Electoral Cycles in Budget Shares for Different Levels of Competition. Solid line represents size of coefficient of *Electoral Period* on EU budget shares for different levels of competition. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals. Short-dashed line is the Kernel density estimate of the conditioning variable. The vertical line represents the mean value of the conditioning variable.

governments face the stiffest competition. The finding is somewhat counterintuitive at least for all but the most extreme cases. However, taking into account the importance of politicization since the 1990s, Subfigure E-19(c) shows, in line with previous results, that electoral cycles are indeed more likely when elections are close.

strongest party and the second strongest party after the election.

E.5. Full Tables for Interaction Effects – Budget Models

The Electoral Incentive Over Time & Number of Claimants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	History	Claimants (Total)	Claimants (CAP)	Claimants (ESIF)
Election Period	-1.166 (8.727)	0.350** (0.110)	0.219** (0.075)	0.143 (0.100)
Year	-0.189** (0.025)			
Number of Elections		0.015 (0.013)	0.008 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)
Interaction	0.001 (0.004)	-0.037** (0.016)	-0.019* (0.012)	-0.013 (0.013)
Agricultural Sector (ln, t-1)	-0.649* (0.394)	1.372** (0.365)	2.122** (0.274)	-0.751** (0.262)
GDP (ln, t-1)	2.478** (1.181)	-3.629** (1.175)	-3.867** (0.794)	0.241 (1.129)
Per Capita GDP (ln, t-1)	-0.111 (1.155)	4.492** (1.185)	5.120** (0.768)	-0.823 (1.239)
Unemployment (%)	0.046** (0.023)	0.026 (0.024)	0.018 (0.014)	-0.023 (0.016)
Voting Power (%)	0.630** (0.054)	0.673** (0.067)	0.598** (0.054)	-0.053 (0.054)
Public EU Support	-1.018** (0.348)	-1.226** (0.402)	-0.117 (0.260)	-0.629** (0.320)
New Member State	-0.960** (0.143)	-1.073** (0.150)	-0.487** (0.092)	-0.693** (0.130)
EU Membership Size	0.108** (0.023)	0.057** (0.026)	0.061** (0.015)	-0.022 (0.019)
Constant	348.623** (48.200)	55.137** (18.769)	54.817** (12.781)	-1.325 (18.261)
Observations	553	553	538	544

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

The Electoral Incentive and Unemployment Rates

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Election Period	-0.110 (0.086)	0.118* (0.063)	-0.164 (0.102)
Election*Unemployment	0.027** (0.012)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.027** (0.014)
Agricultural Sector (ln, t-1)	1.257** (0.358)	2.130** (0.278)	-0.773** (0.265)
GDP (ln, t-1)	-3.882** (1.112)	-3.913** (0.822)	0.225 (1.103)
Per Capita GDP (ln, t-1)	4.731** (1.133)	5.196** (0.797)	-0.801 (1.206)
Unemployment (t-1)	0.006 (0.024)	0.020 (0.015)	-0.040** (0.018)
Voting Power (%)	0.676** (0.066)	0.597** (0.054)	-0.054 (0.054)
Public EU Support	-1.223** (0.400)	-0.147 (0.262)	-0.635** (0.322)
New Member State	-1.057** (0.145)	-0.476** (0.092)	-0.676** (0.118)
EU Membership Size	0.058** (0.026)	0.061** (0.015)	-0.023 (0.019)
Constant	59.886** (17.747)	55.701** (13.283)	-0.756 (17.822)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	553	538	544
Wald χ^2	533544.090	163501.183	312288.754

DV: EU Budget Shares

Specification: Unbalanced TSCS Regressions with AR(1)

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

The Electoral Incentive and Government Approval

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Election Period	0.481 (0.300)	0.385* (0.209)	0.142 (0.227)
Election*Approval	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)
Government Approval	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)
Agricultural Sector (ln, t-1)	1.887** (0.543)	1.024** (0.271)	-0.959** (0.369)
GDP (ln, t-1)	2.009 (1.658)	-5.645** (0.950)	1.000 (1.589)
Per Capita GDP (ln, t-1)	-0.051 (1.543)	6.792** (0.924)	-2.110 (1.665)
Unemployment (t-1)	-0.030 (0.039)	-0.036* (0.020)	-0.064** (0.032)
Voting Power (%)	0.677** (0.063)	0.519** (0.045)	0.006 (0.070)
Public EU Support	-2.558** (0.639)	-0.444 (0.377)	-1.706** (0.472)
New Member State	-2.107** (0.358)	-1.159** (0.136)	-1.311** (0.358)
EU Membership Size	-0.181** (0.064)	-0.135** (0.039)	0.114** (0.047)
Constant	-30.800 (27.031)	91.991** (15.024)	-15.775 (25.797)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	267	258	258
Wald χ^2	120408**	208816**	50709**

DV: EU Budget Shares

Specification: Unbalanced TSCS Regressions with AR(1)

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

The Electoral Incentive and Undecided Voters

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Election Period	-0.031 (0.118)	0.040 (0.096)	-0.047 (0.104)
Election*Undecided	0.013** (0.005)	0.008* (0.005)	0.010* (0.005)
Undecided Voters (%)	-0.017** (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.004)
Agricultural Sector (ln, t-1)	2.154** (0.411)	1.198** (0.266)	-0.783** (0.239)
GDP (ln, t-1)	1.209 (2.234)	-4.943** (1.095)	0.317 (2.169)
Per Capita GDP (ln, t-1)	0.871 (2.196)	6.186** (1.072)	-1.341 (2.249)
Unemployment (t-1)	-0.034 (0.031)	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.063** (0.014)
Voting Power (%)	0.684** (0.065)	0.522** (0.044)	-0.002 (0.040)
Public EU Support	-2.869** (0.628)	-0.602 (0.447)	-1.739** (0.271)
New Member State	-2.065** (0.193)	-1.172** (0.136)	-1.347** (0.183)
EU Membership Size	-0.155** (0.065)	-0.134** (0.040)	0.108** (0.039)
Constant	-18.666 (35.829)	79.975** (17.409)	-5.037 (34.831)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	264	255	255
Wald χ^2	1262315**	2.594e+10**	12971752**

DV: EU Budget Shares

Specification: Unbalanced TSCS Regressions with AR(1)

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

The Electoral Incentive and Formal Power

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Election Period	0.003 (0.062)	-0.118** (0.050)	0.026 (0.058)
Election*Voting Power	0.018* (0.010)	0.034** (0.009)	0.005 (0.012)
Agricultural Sector (ln, t-1)	1.272** (0.371)	2.142** (0.278)	-0.752** (0.264)
GDP (ln, t-1)	-3.865** (1.171)	-3.775** (0.818)	0.070 (1.135)
Per Capita GDP (ln, t-1)	4.772** (1.176)	5.130** (0.798)	-0.632 (1.229)
Unemployment (t-1)	0.025 (0.025)	0.023 (0.015)	-0.023 (0.016)
Voting Power (%)	0.672** (0.067)	0.588** (0.054)	-0.056 (0.054)
Public EU Support	-1.208** (0.411)	-0.174 (0.265)	-0.633** (0.319)
New Member State	-1.046** (0.148)	-0.433** (0.093)	-0.682** (0.120)
EU Membership Size	0.058** (0.027)	0.062** (0.016)	-0.022 (0.019)
Constant	59.634** (18.659)	53.728** (13.171)	1.565 (18.324)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	553	538	544
Wald χ^2	800845**	441870**	87705**

DV: EU Budget Shares

Specification: Unbalanced TSCS Regressions with AR(1)

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

The Electoral Incentive and Ideological Divergence

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Election Period	0.133* (0.081)	0.103** (0.041)	0.068 (0.066)
Interaction	0.016 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.017)
Ideological Divergence	-0.067** (0.024)	-0.034** (0.012)	0.010 (0.017)
Agricultural Sector (ln, t-1)	0.472 (0.473)	2.270** (0.244)	-0.784** (0.254)
GDP (ln, t-1)	-2.873** (1.191)	-3.760** (0.640)	0.215 (1.435)
Per Capita GDP (ln, t-1)	2.568* (1.348)	5.046** (0.651)	-0.793 (1.580)
Unemployment (t-1)	-0.004 (0.019)	0.018 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.015)
Voting Power (%)	0.679** (0.038)	0.595** (0.017)	-0.059 (0.050)
Public EU Support	-1.155** (0.370)	-0.203 (0.169)	-0.683** (0.326)
New Member State	-1.250** (0.216)	-0.483** (0.109)	-0.716** (0.175)
EU Membership Size	0.063** (0.015)	0.060** (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)
Constant	42.831** (19.748)	52.753** (10.659)	-0.641 (23.911)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	529	523	529
Wald χ^2	38113252**	3061028**	5864399**

DV: EU Budget Shares

Specification: Unbalanced TSCS Regressions with AR(1)

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

The Electoral Incentive and Divergence in EU Support

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Election Period	0.185** (0.071)	0.131** (0.034)	0.097 (0.067)
Interaction	-0.015 (0.026)	-0.021 (0.016)	-0.021 (0.032)
Divergence on EU Support	-0.044* (0.023)	-0.027* (0.014)	0.003 (0.028)
Agricultural Sector (ln, t-1)	0.527 (0.473)	2.323** (0.233)	-0.766** (0.253)
GDP (ln, t-1)	-2.793** (1.248)	-3.819** (0.609)	0.146 (1.463)
Per Capita GDP (ln, t-1)	2.675* (1.380)	5.198** (0.610)	-0.740 (1.598)
Unemployment (%)	-0.005 (0.020)	0.017 (0.011)	-0.025* (0.015)
Voting Power (%)	0.679** (0.038)	0.594** (0.019)	-0.063 (0.049)
Public EU Support	-1.116** (0.375)	-0.185 (0.172)	-0.691** (0.326)
New Member State	-1.212** (0.213)	-0.491** (0.107)	-0.718** (0.174)
EU Membership Size	0.060** (0.016)	0.060** (0.011)	-0.023* (0.012)
Constant	41.962** (20.713)	53.771** (10.038)	0.365 (24.335)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	529	523	529
Wald χ^2	6.424e+08**	23193828**	3520236**

DV: EU Budget Shares

Specification: Unbalanced TSCS Regressions with AR(1)

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

E.6. Descriptive Statistics – Government Approval Models

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Government Approval	31.593	9.548	7.792	60.323
Budget Receipts (t-1,%)	7.112	5.432	.0182	23.371
Budget Contributions (%)	7.805	8.212	.121	31.216
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)	.001	.001	-.011	.007
Minority Government	.264	.442	0	1
Size of Coalition	2.197	1.305	1	7
Unemployment Rate	8.321	3.841	.7	22
Inflation (%)	5.419	4.812	-1	23.021
Election Period	.508	.500	0	1
New Member State	.155	.363	0	1
Exports to EU (log)	19.436	6.257	9.724	26.280
Agricultural Sector (log)	5.664	1.572	1.410	8.010
Cohesion Country	.252	.435	0	1
N	238			

E.7. Model Specification – Government Approval Models

To analyze the effect of EU budget receipts on domestic government approval, I estimate a time-series cross-sectional analysis for the period of 1977-2002. I use fixed country effects to control for unobserved country heterogeneity that is constant over time.

All models have panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to correct for panel heteroscedasticity as well as for contemporaneously correlated errors across panels. Since the Durbin Watson statistic of an untransformed model points to a serial correlation of the error terms. The main specifications use a Prais Winsten transformation of the error term (AR1 process).

E.8. Endogeneity – Government Approval Models

I discuss in Chapter 3 that negotiated budget shares may be influenced by a government's public support (i.e. incumbents with low support would have greater incentives to receive higher shares). Whereas I do not find any independent effect of public support on budget shares (there is a conditional effect during election times), I address endogeneity concerns in several ways.

First, I provide the results of an estimation where I lag the budget share variable by two years. Although current values of EU budget shares may be endogenous to current or past government approval, it is unlikely that past values of EU budget shares suffer the same issue. Results are available in Model 1 of Table E-14.

Second, an alternative approach to deal with endogeneity would be instrumental variable regression. Although there are no studies that offer an instrument where the dependent variable is EU budget shares, the size of arable land in the EU member countries (measured in 1000 hectares; data from Eurostat) satisfies the criteria of a strong instrument. It is both correlated with my endogenous variable (EU budget shares) and does not have a direct causal effect on my dependent variable, government approval. The size of arable land likely affects EU budget shares, because much of the EU budget is spent on direct support for farmers and poor regions. Consequently, as the size of arable land increases or decreases so should the EU members' share of the EU budget increase or decrease. Although total arable land area will cause fluctuations in the EU budget shares, arable land size are unlikely to have an effect on the percentage of voters that would vote for the government coalition. Using *Arable Land* as an instrument should identify my IV equation with EU budget shares as a potential endogenous regressor. To implement the IV model, I first regress EU budget shares on *Arable Land*. Aside from theoretical reasons for believing that *Arable Land* is a strong instrument, the F-test from the first stage regression is equal to 98.61 ($p=0.000$). An F-test greater than 10 indicates that *Arable Land* is indeed a strong instrument. Next, I implement the second stage of my regression using the main model as a baseline, but substituting the predicted values from a linear estimation of EU budget shares for my original measure of EU Budget Shares. I bootstrap my standard errors to deal with the fact that the second stage model does not correct for *EU Budget Shares* as estimates. The results in Model 2 of Table E-14 are consistent with my baseline specification.

Third, the potential reverse causality problem may not be too concerning in this case, because I expect that lower approval will increase budget shares (only during election years) but that higher budget shares will increase incumbent support. If reverse causality exists, it should bias the coefficient on budget shares downwards. I estimated the main model only for governments that have above-average support in their population on the assumption. Results are available in Model 3 of Table E-14. They are robust to only including governments that do not have a great need to appear politically competent to their electorate (in fact, the coefficient is expectedly larger if I only include governments with greater support base; results are available upon request).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Budget Shares (t-2)	0.698** (0.218)		
Instrumented Budget Shares		4.908* (2.709)	
Budget Shares (%)			0.651** (0.185)
Budget Contributions (%)	-0.387 (0.274)	-0.039 (0.245)	-1.004** (0.258)
GDP pc Growth (%)	430.059* (239.008)	331.792 331.792	-812.705* (432.560)
Minority Government	-1.791 (1.545)	-2.396 (1.457)	-0.138 (1.683)
Size of Coalition	6.651** (0.742)	5.078** (1.088)	6.506** (0.849)
Unemployment	-0.766** (0.266)	-0.514** (0.242)	-0.295 (0.257)
Inflation (%)	-0.126 (0.178)	-0.093 (0.156)	0.300** (0.152)
Election Period	-0.074 (0.824)	0.112 (0.851)	1.329* (0.800)
New Member State	0.745 (1.991)	-0.277 (2.018)	-0.730 (1.838)
Exports to EU (log)	0.268** (0.109)	0.037 (0.116)	0.038 (0.144)
Agricultural Sector (log)	9.904** (3.516)	11.259** (3.192)	3.017 (3.613)
Cohesion Country	3.656 (3.404)	4.417 (3.527)	1.630 (2.156)
Constant	-42.446** (15.568)	-58.010** (18.339)	-5.714 (16.043)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	224	242	117
Wald χ^2	2127**	565**	1048**

DV: Government Approval (%)

Specification: Unbalanced TSCS Regressions with AR(1)

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Table E-14.: Robustness: Budget Cycles and Government Approval

E.9. Net Contributors and Government Approval

The electoral effects of total budget shares should also depend on the relative salience of budget shares on the domestic level. Whereas the EU budget is generally salient, debates tend to occur mainly in countries that are net contributors to the budget. If contributions to the EU budget provide one indicator of the salience of budget negotiations, then it is possible to analyze whether salience of these negotiations affect general budget shares as well. Figure E-20 shows that the effect of European negotiation outcomes on public approval is indeed dependent on the salience of budget negotiations on the domestic level. Voters in EU countries that contribute larger-than-average shares to the EU budget are significantly likely to condition their support of the government to the government's success in budget negotiations whereas voters in EU countries that contribute below-than-average shares to the EU budget are not significantly likely to do so. In EU countries where the EU budget is a very salient topic, the effect of budget shares on public support increases significantly. In these countries, a one percent increase in budget shares increases public support of the governing coalition by over 1%.




Figure E-20.: Effect of Budget Shares on Public Support as an EU Member's Budget Contributions Increase. Solid line represents size of coefficient of *Electoral Period* on EU budget shares over time. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals. Short dashed line is the Kernel density estimate of the conditioning variable (short dashed line). The vertical line represents the mean value of the conditioning variable.

F. Appendices for Chapter 7 (The Legislative Leviathan Marionette)

F.1. Descriptive Statistics – Position Defending Behavior

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Position Defense	.3733719	.4838163	0	1
Election Period (restricted)	.0955137	.2939942	0	1
Election Year	.0969609	.295976	0	1
Saliency	51.76556	26.33673	0	100
Qualified Majority	.8089725	.3932055	0	1
Voting Power	4.85066	3.23174	1.0531	11.7
Distance from Parliament	45.12976	39.33765	0	100
Distance from Commission	40.12639	41.10632	0	100
Distance from Council Mean	30.6203	22.19232	0	100
Multiple Issues	.5619875	.4962624	0	1
N	2073			

Table F-15.: Bargaining Strategies – Descriptive Statistics. The table provides descriptive statistics for all variables in the main estimations. Mean is the average value of the variable, SD represents the standard deviation, Min the minimum value and Max the maximum value of the variable.

F.2. Model Specification – Position Defending Behavior

In the analysis I trace whether EU governments are more likely to defend their positions on legislative issues throughout the negotiation process if they face national elections. The dependent variable, *Position Defense*, is a dichotomous variable. In addition, I analyze position-defending behavior of governments on policy issues, which are nested within policy proposals. To account for the hierarchical nature of the analysis, I estimate the model using a multilevel mixed-effects probit estimator, with random effects at the proposal level. Since the observations are not independent from each other, I compute robust standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. In the robustness section, I show that the results are robust to a number of different model specifications including a non-hierarchical probit regression model.

F.3. Robustness Checks – Position Defending Behavior

Table F-16 presents the results of some additional robustness checks. All robustness checks use the main estimation model in the book (Model 1) as the baseline. Model 1 estimates the main model with country fixed effects. Model 2 adds dichotomous variables for different Council types. *Agriculture Council* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if the issue is negotiated in the Council for Agriculture or Fisheries, and 0 otherwise. *Ecofin Council* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if the issue is negotiated in the Council for Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin), and 0 otherwise. And *General Council* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if the issue is negotiated in the Council for General Affairs, and 0 otherwise. All data are from the DEU II data set. Since an EU member's formal voting power is highly correlated with its income (the pairwise correlation is 0.83), I only included *Voting Power (%)* in the main estimation. Model 3 replaces *Voting Power (%)* with a variable for a EU member's logged income levels (*GDP (log)*). *GDP (log)* is measured as the annual logged gross domestic product of each EU member. Data from Eurostat. Model 4 uses a measure of relative salience instead of the absolute salience measure. *Relative Salience* is coded as the absolute distance between the salience that the EU member attaches to any given issue and the average salience that all EU members attach to the issue (excluding the EU government under observation). The variable ranges from -84 to 100. Negative values imply that EU government attach a lower saliency to an issue than other EU members; positive values indicate that the issue is more salient to the EU government than to other EU governments in the Council. Finally, Model 5 uses a non-hierarchical probit estimator. The main results are robust to any of the changes in the model specification.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Country FE	Control I	Control II	Control III	Probit
Election Period	0.196*	0.226*	0.214*	0.219*	0.189*
	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.104)
Salience	0.007*	0.007*	0.007*		0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.001)
Qualified Majority	0.358	-0.003	0.286	0.214	0.311**
	(0.460)	(0.492)	(0.446)	(0.451)	(0.080)
Voting Power (%)	0.082	0.018		0.018	-0.003
	(0.097)	(0.016)		(0.017)	(0.010)
Distance from Parliament	-0.011**	-0.011**	-0.011**	-0.011**	-0.007**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Distance from Commission	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Distance from Council Mean	-0.018**	-0.018**	-0.018**	-0.017**	-0.005**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)
Multiple Issues	-1.477**	-1.426**	-1.436**	-1.446**	-1.143**
	(0.259)	(0.264)	(0.263)	(0.256)	(0.062)
Agriculture Council		0.393			
		(0.544)			
Ecofin Council		-0.682			
		(0.865)			
General Council		-0.112			
		(0.696)			
GDP (log)			0.028		
			(0.041)		
Relative Salience				0.007**	
				(0.003)	
Constant	-0.245	0.335	-0.035	0.637	0.395**
	(0.707)	(0.531)	(0.623)	(0.429)	(0.118)
Observations	2073	2073	2073	2073	2073

DV: Position Defense
Specification: Multilevel probit model
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Table F-16.: Position Defending Behavior – Robustness Checks

F.4. Full Tables for Interaction Effects – Position Defending Behavior

Table F-17 provides the full estimation results for the interaction graphs that are discussed in the Chapter. All models use the main estimation model in the book (Model 1) as the baseline. Model 1 includes the interaction between *Election* and *Saliency*. Model 2 includes the interaction between *Election* and *Unemployment*. Model 3 includes the interaction between *Election* and *Voting Power*. Model 4 includes the interaction between *Election* and *Number of Claimants*. Finally, Model 5 includes the interaction between *Election* and *Distance from Council Mean*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Saliency	Unemployment	Formal Power	Claimants	Divergence
Election Period	0.351 (0.240)	0.482** (0.213)	0.188 (0.201)	0.461** (0.169)	0.161 (0.227)
Saliency	0.007* (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)
Interaction Term	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.035 (0.023)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.069 (0.043)	0.002 (0.008)
Qualified Majority	0.298 (0.445)	0.304 (0.448)	0.299 (0.446)	0.292 (0.455)	0.298 (0.446)
Voting Power	0.018 (0.016)	0.019 (0.018)	0.018 (0.016)	0.017 (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Distance from Parliament	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)
Distance from Commission	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)
Distance from Council Mean	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.007)
Multiple Issues	-1.432** (0.265)	-1.425** (0.266)	-1.429** (0.266)	-1.433** (0.264)	-1.430** (0.265)
Unemployment (%)		-0.000 (0.012)			
Number of Claimants				0.055 (0.101)	
Constant	0.190 (0.485)	0.199 (0.481)	0.207 (0.480)	0.134 (0.476)	0.214 (0.474)
Observations	2073**	2073**	2073**	2073**	2073**

DV: Position Defense

Specification: Multilevel mixed-effects probit model

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Table F-17.: Position Defending Behavior – Full Interaction Models.

F.5. Descriptive Statistics – Bargaining Success

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Bargaining Success	65.62948	31.16011	0	100
Pending Elections (6 Months)	.2177955	.4128847	0	1
Pending Elections (12 Months)	.4462151	.4972639	0	1
Past Elections	.0956175	.2941637	0	1
Saliency	53.10425	26.26169	0	100
Position Defense	.3638778	.4812739	0	1
Voting Power	5.193873	3.345124	1.0531	11.7
Distance from Commission	39.83201	40.64347	0	100
Distance from Parliament	43.10691	38.95084	0	100
Distance from Status Quo	48.60292	42.38625	0	100
Distance from Council Mean	28.53312	22.2896	0	100
N	1506			

Table F-18.: Bargaining Success – Descriptive Statistics. The table provides descriptive statistics for all variables in the main estimations and the robustness checks. Mean is the average value of the variable, SD represents the standard deviation, Min the minimum value and Max the maximum value of the variable.

F.6. Model Specification – Bargaining Success

In the analysis I trace whether EU governments are more likely to achieve successful legislative outcomes on issues that are adopted during an electoral period. The dependent variable, *Bargaining Success*, is an ordinal variable. In addition, I analyze position-defending behavior of governments on policy issues, which are nested within policy proposals. To account for the hierarchical nature of the analysis, I estimate the model using a multilevel mixed-effects linear regression model, with random effects at the proposal level. Since the observations are not independent from each other, I compute robust standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. In the robustness section, I show that the results are robust to a number of different model specifications including a non-hierarchical linear regression model.

F.7. Robustness Checks – Bargaining Success

Table F-19 presents the results of some additional robustness checks. All robustness checks use the main estimation model in the book (Model 1) as the baseline. Model 1 estimates the main model with country fixed effects. Model 2 adds dichotomous variables for different Council types. *Agriculture Council* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if the issue is negotiated in the Council for Agriculture or Fisheries, and 0 otherwise. *Ecofin Council* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if the issue is negotiated in the Council for Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin), and 0 otherwise. And *General Council* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if the issue is negotiated in the Council for General Affairs, and 0 otherwise. All data are from the DEU II data set. Since an EU member's formal voting power is highly correlated with its income (the pairwise correlation is 0.83), I only included *Voting Power (%)* in the main estimation. Model 3 replaces *Voting Power (%)* with a variable for a EU member's logged income levels (*GDP (log)*). *GDP (log)* is measured as the annual logged gross domestic product of each EU member. Data from Eurostat. Model 4 uses a measure of relative salience instead of the absolute salience measure. *Relative Salience* is coded as the absolute distance between the salience that the EU member attaches to any given issue and the average salience that all EU members attach to the issue (excluding the EU government under observation). The variable ranges from -84 to 100. Negative values imply that EU government attach a lower saliency to an issue than other EU members; positive values indicate that the issue is more salient to the EU government than to other EU governments in the Council. Finally, Model 5 uses a non-hierarchical probit estimator. The main results are robust to any of the changes in the model specification.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Country FE	Control I	Control II	Control III	OLS
Pending Elections (6 Months)	2.061** (0.892)	1.878* (1.028)	1.838* (1.051)	1.867* (1.028)	2.606* (1.565)
Salience	0.058 (0.061)	0.050 (0.053)	0.056 (0.059)		0.004 (0.024)
Position Defense	20.869** (4.623)	20.875** (4.720)	20.890** (4.733)	20.844** (4.712)	10.601** (1.363)
Voting Power	-1.180 (1.194)	-0.111 (0.232)		-0.105 (0.221)	-0.112 (0.211)
Distance from Commission	-0.109 (0.090)	-0.110 (0.090)	-0.111 (0.090)	-0.109 (0.089)	-0.177** (0.023)
Distance from Parliament	-0.101 (0.091)	-0.102 (0.094)	-0.104 (0.093)	-0.104 (0.094)	-0.104** (0.023)
Distance from Status Quo	0.181** (0.092)	0.180* (0.093)	0.179* (0.093)	0.179* (0.093)	0.106** (0.021)
Distance from Council Mean	-0.447** (0.133)	-0.450** (0.133)	-0.448** (0.133)	-0.446** (0.136)	-0.484** (0.036)
Agriculture Council		-3.084 (5.606)	-3.122 (5.625)	-2.928 (5.523)	
Ecofin Council		3.459 (6.057)	3.372 (6.074)	3.908 (6.039)	
General Council		3.306 (12.030)	3.321 (12.112)	3.468 (11.878)	
GDP (log)			-0.443 (0.624)		
Relative Salience				0.044 (0.049)	
Constant	72.756** (12.890)	70.006** (9.856)	74.714** (9.874)	72.440** (9.431)	81.745** (2.591)
Observations	1506	1506	1506	1506	1506
chi	724.78**	168.74**	162.03**	167.15**	

DV: Bargaining Success
Specification: Multilevel model
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Table F-19.: Bargaining Success – Robustness Checks

F.8. Full Tables for Interaction Effects – Bargaining Success

Table F-20 provides the full estimation results for the interaction graphs that are discussed in the Chapter. Model 1 includes the interaction between *Election* and *Saliency*. Model 2 includes the interaction between *Election* and *Unemployment*. Model 3 includes the interaction between *Election* and *Voting Power*. Model 4 includes the interaction between *Election* and *Number of Elections*. Model 5 includes the interaction between *Election* and *Distance from Council Mean*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Saliency	Unemployment	Voting Power	Claimants	Divergence
Pending Elections (6 Months)	-0.571 (2.170)	-2.698 (2.743)	2.509 (1.808)	2.213* (1.324)	-0.271 (1.781)
Saliency	0.040 (0.053)	0.051 (0.052)	0.050 (0.052)	0.050 (0.053)	0.050 (0.052)
Interaction Term	0.047 (0.040)	0.619* (0.334)	-0.114 (0.289)	-0.194 (0.339)	0.074 (0.063)
Position Defense	20.841** (4.707)	20.898** (4.712)	20.876** (4.712)	20.882** (4.712)	20.772** (4.703)
Voting Power (%)	-0.118 (0.232)	-0.123 (0.230)	-0.090 (0.255)	-0.119 (0.234)	-0.122 (0.233)
Distance from Commission	-0.111 (0.090)	-0.111 (0.090)	-0.110 (0.090)	-0.110 (0.090)	-0.111 (0.090)
Distance from Parliament	-0.102 (0.093)	-0.102 (0.093)	-0.102 (0.094)	-0.102 (0.094)	-0.103 (0.093)
Distance from Status Quo	0.180* (0.093)	0.179* (0.093)	0.179* (0.093)	0.180* (0.093)	0.180* (0.093)
Distance from Council Mean	-0.449** (0.133)	-0.451** (0.133)	-0.449** (0.133)	-0.450** (0.133)	-0.465** (0.134)
Unemployment (%)		-0.097 (0.314)			
Number of Elections				0.617 (1.055)	
Constant	69.852** (10.203)	70.063** (10.563)	69.168** (10.300)	68.447** (10.600)	69.873** (10.278)
Observations	1506	1506	1506	1506	1506

DV: Bargaining Success
 Specification: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression model
 Robust standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Table F-20.: Bargaining Success – Full Interaction Models.

G. Appendices for Chapter 8 (The Waiting Game)

G.1. Model Specification – Legislative Delay

The dependent variable is measured as the time (in days) to final adoption of a legislative proposal. Since the distribution of the dependent variable is not normal, thereby violating a central assumption of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, I use survival analysis as my estimation method. The most common survival estimator is the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model. This specification is popular because it does not assume a specific parametric form of the survival function.

The Cox proportional hazard model assumes that the base hazard increases or decreases with observed variables by a constant proportional amount. I use Schoenfeld residuals to reject the proportionality assumption. To avoid misspecification, I apply a nonproportional Cox hazard model (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001; Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn, 2003). The nonproportional Cox model takes into account that the impact of the independent variables vary over time by interacting them with a function of time.

I use the Grambsch and Therneau test to analyze whether the proportional effects assumption was violated in each of the explanatory variables (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994). I include time interaction effects for any case in which the assumption does not hold. The main estimations use a function of time $_t$. This accounts for the non-proportional effects of the covariates.

For any covariates for which the proportional assumption does not hold, the interaction effect indicates that the effect of the variable on the hazard rate changes over time. The impact of the variable is therefore a result of the combined effects of the individual coefficient as well as the coefficient on the interaction between the variable and time (Golub and Steunenberg, 2007; Hertz and Leuffen, 2011). One could also simply include the interaction effects without the base effects, but the advantage of my approach is that I can analyze both the base effect as well as the change in the effect over time.

G.2. Descriptive Statistics – Legislative Delay

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Election in 60 days	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
Election in 30 days	0.34	0.48	0.00	1.00
Close Election (60 days)	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Number of Elections	1.56	1.04	0.00	5.00
Qualified Majority	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00
Cooperation Procedure	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Codecision Procedure	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
EU-9	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00
EU-10	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
EU-12	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
EU-15	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Number of Pending Acts	510.67	133.42	0.00	696.00
Preference Heterogeneity	52.63	6.26	37.80	71.50
Proposal for a Directive	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Summer Vacation	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00
N	32891			

Table G-21.: Decision Making Output.

G.3. Time Varying Coefficients for the Main Estimations

	(1) 60 days	(2) 30 days	(3) # Elections
Election	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Cooperation Procedure	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Codecision Procedure	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Number of Pending Acts	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Preference Heterogeneity	-0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Proposal for a Directive	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Summer Vacation	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	32784	32784	32784
Wald Test χ^2	6790.76**	5946.60**	6586.52**

DV: Duration of Legislative Process

Specification: Nonproportional Cox Hazard Model

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Table G-22.: Time Varying Coefficients The models report coefficients of the time-varying coefficients for the main estimations that are presented in the book.

G.4. Electoral Delay Estimations for the Four Big EU Countries

	Model 1 (Germany)	Model 2 (France)	Model 3 (UK)	Model 4 (Italy)
Election in 60 Days	-0.417** (0.029)	0.134** (0.033)	-0.210** (0.038)	-0.380** (0.033)
Qualified Majority	0.457** (0.021)	0.458** (0.021)	0.461** (0.021)	0.457** (0.020)
Cooperation Procedure	-1.128** (0.044)	-1.127** (0.043)	-1.126** (0.043)	-1.107** (0.043)
Co-decision Procedure	-0.997** (0.041)	-1.008** (0.041)	-1.016** (0.041)	-1.018** (0.042)
EU-9	2.231** (0.160)	2.163** (0.161)	1.982** (0.162)	1.826** (0.161)
EU-10	1.421** (0.129)	1.384** (0.128)	1.270** (0.129)	1.044** (0.130)
EU-12	0.965** (0.101)	0.841** (0.102)	0.792** (0.103)	0.613** (0.104)
EU-15	0.354** (0.071)	0.338** (0.072)	0.324** (0.071)	0.286** (0.072)
Number of Pending Acts	0.003** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)
Preference Heterogeneity	0.012** (0.002)	0.011** (0.002)	0.014** (0.002)	0.016** (0.002)
Proposal for a Directive	-0.881** (0.032)	-0.886** (0.032)	-0.882** (0.031)	-0.889** (0.031)
Summer Vacation	-1.220** (0.122)	-1.239** (0.122)	-1.205** (0.122)	-1.200** (0.122)
Ivc				
Election in 60 Days		0.001** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Cooperation Procedure	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Co-decision Procedure	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Number of Pending Acts	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Preference Heterogeneity	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Proposal for a Directive	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Summer Vacation	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	32784	32784	32784	32784
Wald Test χ^2	4090.707	4154.383	3903.157	4091.701

DV: Duration of Legislative Process

Specification: Nonproportional Cox Hazard Model

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

	Model 1 (Germany)	Model 2 (France)	Model 3 (UK)	Model 4 (Italy)
Close Election in 60 Days	-1.105** (0.079)	-0.232** (0.039)	-0.932** (0.107)	-1.160** (0.074)
Qualified Majority	0.457** (0.021)	0.460** (0.021)	0.453** (0.021)	0.444** (0.020)
Cooperation Procedure	-1.126** (0.044)	-1.133** (0.043)	-1.093** (0.043)	-1.070** (0.044)
Co-decision Procedure	-0.996** (0.041)	-1.008** (0.041)	-1.007** (0.041)	-0.993** (0.041)
EU-9	2.344** (0.162)	1.930** (0.163)	2.082** (0.159)	1.582** (0.160)
EU-10	1.620** (0.130)	1.288** (0.129)	1.370** (0.127)	0.829** (0.129)
EU-12	1.114** (0.103)	0.810** (0.102)	0.909** (0.101)	0.411** (0.104)
EU-15	0.386** (0.071)	0.321** (0.072)	0.340** (0.071)	0.320** (0.072)
Number of Pending Acts	0.003** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)
Preference Heterogeneity	0.013** (0.002)	0.012** (0.002)	0.011** (0.002)	0.012** (0.002)
Proposal for a Directive	-0.885** (0.032)	-0.886** (0.032)	-0.882** (0.031)	-0.884** (0.032)
Summer Vacation	-1.233** (0.122)	-1.257** (0.123)	-1.169** (0.122)	-1.158** (0.121)
tvc				
Cooperation Procedure	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Co-decision Procedure	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Number of Pending Acts	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Preference Heterogeneity	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Proposal for a Directive	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Summer Vacation	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Close Election in 60 Days		0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	32784	32784	32784	32784
Wald Test χ^2	4074.05**	3898.61**	4141.36**	4521.58**

DV: Duration of Legislative Process

Specification: Nonproportional Cox Hazard Model

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

G.5. Additional Robustness – Legislative Delay

	Model 1 (Directives)	Model 2 (Post 1990)	Model 3 (Size)	Model 4 (No TVC)
Election in 60 days	-1.054** (0.075)	-1.022** (0.028)	-0.715** (0.022)	-0.877** (0.019)
Qualified Majority	0.342** (0.069)	0.317** (0.025)	0.431** (0.020)	0.452** (0.021)
Cooperation Procedure	-0.787** (0.096)	-1.041** (0.063)	-1.068** (0.042)	-0.829** (0.035)
Co-decision Procedure	-1.052** (0.097)	-0.979** (0.044)	-0.925** (0.040)	-0.594** (0.030)
EU-9	1.495** (0.382)			1.414** (0.167)
EU-10	1.212** (0.296)			1.259** (0.135)
EU-12	0.891** (0.232)	0.895** (0.112)		0.737** (0.103)
EU-15	0.443** (0.171)	0.471** (0.082)		0.346** (0.075)
Number of Pending Acts	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.002)
Preference Heterogeneity	0.023** (0.008)	0.030** (0.004)	0.028** (0.002)	0.022** (0.002)
Proposal for a Directive		-0.695** (0.042)	-0.853** (0.032)	-0.561** (0.022)
Summer Vacation	-2.497** (0.321)	0.122 (0.155)	-1.226** (0.122)	-0.882** (0.070)
Number of EU Members			-0.072** (0.006)	
tvc				
Election in 60 Days	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	
Cooperation Procedure	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	
Co-decision Procedure	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	
Number of Pending Acts	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	
Preference Heterogeneity	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	
Proposal for a Directive		0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	
Summer Vacation	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7490	17615	32573	32784
Wald Test χ^2	1200.13**	5172.64**	7013.71**	6516.00**

DV: Duration of Legislative Process
 Specification: Nonproportional Cox Hazard Model
 Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05

G.6. Do Governments Adjourn Adoptions until after Elections?

The empirical analysis in Chapter 8 provides evidence that governments indeed aim to delay the adoption of legislative acts before national elections, but

the specification of the model does not allow us to analyze whether the delay indeed shifts the adoption of a proposal *until after the election*. If governments successfully delay the adoption of legislative proposals, then one would expect a decline in legislative output just before national elections. To analyze this important question in greater depths, and to triangulate my argument about strategic delay, I now analyze whether national elections reduce the amount of legislative output before elections.

To test for electoral cycles in decision-making output, I aggregate the EULO data set to count the number of legislative acts that are adopted in a given month (*Legislative Output (Month)*). For the purpose of analysis I include all decisions, regulations, and directives that were adopted by the EU. Figure G-21 presents the dependent variable graphically using box plots. On average, the EU adopts 38 proposals in a given month, but *Legislative Output* varies dramatically even within a 12-month period. Between 1976 and 2009, annual legislative output varied between 0 and 168 acts. Legislative output peaks with 168 acts which were adopted in December 2001.

I want to analyze whether the EU's legislative output is affected by opportunistic delay. My main independent variable is the election period. Since the level of analysis is not the proposal, but the month, I aggregate the election indicators to the monthly level. Each month sees the adoption of about 39 proposals, but most proposals are adopted at different days within each month. Consequently, some proposals within a given month fall within the 60 (or 30) days of an election while others do not. I calculate a variable that measures the number of proposals within each month that fall within 60 days (or 30 days) of a national election as share of total proposals within any given month. The variable *Proposal, Election 60 days (%)* takes values between 0 and 100, with an average of 3%. This implies that for some months there are no imminent elections for any of the proposals (value of 0), for some months all proposals are close to elections (value of 100), and on average about 3% of proposals in any given month are close to national elections. The average number of proposals affected by elections is lower when we calculate the same variable for elections that are 30 days apart (the average share of proposals is 2.6%).

If national elections really lead to a delay of legislative adoptions until after the elections, we should observe that the number of adopted proposal is lower before national elections and higher after national elections. The data structure does not allow me to test a direct post-election effect, but I can analyze whether the average number of days to the next election for proposals within a given




Figure G-21.: Tides in Legislative Output in the EU, 1976-2009. The graph depicts box plots of the number of legislative acts adopted in each month between 1977 and 2009. *Source:* EULO and own calculations.

month has an effect (*Time to Next Election (avg)*). I would expect that the further away the next election, the greater the number of legislative adoptions.

I also add a number of control variables to the model estimations, following previous work (Leuffen, 2008; Hertz and Leuffen, 2011). *QMV (#)* codes the number of proposals that are decided with qualified majority voting each month. According to previous research, QMV procedures should expedite decision-making; the more proposals are decided by majority in a given month, the less able EU governments to veto decisions until after the election. I further include dummy variables to test for the effect of enlargements from the EU-9 to the EU-25. *Directives (#)* counts the number of proposals that are pending directives in each month, and *Acts Pending (#)* counts the average number of acts that are pending in the legislative process in any given month. *August* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the month of August, when most European politicians are on vacation. *Cooperation (#)* and *Co-decision (#)* are the number of proposals that are decided under the cooperation and codecision procedure in each month, respectively. Finally, I include a variable on the heterogeneity of EU member state preferences (Hertz and Leuffen, 2011), which analyzes the range of all government positions in the Council, based on a left-right dimension.

Table G-23 presents the main results of a negative binomial event count regression with year fixed effects. Model 1 is the main model which includes *Proposal, Election 60 days (%)*, that is the share of proposals that fall within 60 days of an election in any given month. Model 2 analyzes whether *Time to Next Election (avg)* has a positive effect on legislative output, and Model 3 replaces the main election indicator with an indicator of the proportion of proposals within a given month that fall within 30 days of an election (*Proposal, Election 30 days (%)*). The models fit the data well. Using the Wald test, I can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero.

All election variables have the expected effect. The number of adopted legislative acts in any given month decreases when elections are upcoming at the national level. In particular, the coefficient indicates that as the share of proposals that are negotiated close to elections increases in any given month so does the number of adoptions decrease. The effect is negative for both election indicators in Models 1 and 3. The interpretation of coefficients in a negative binomial event count regression is not straightforward, so I display the marginal effect of *Proposal, 60 Days Before Election (%)* graphically. Figure G-22 graphs the predicted legislative output in each month for different

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Proposals Within 60 Days of Election (%)	-0.051** (0.010)			
Time to Next Election (avg)		0.001** (0.001)		
Proposals Within 30 Days of Election (%)			-0.034** (0.006)	
Proposals Within 60 Days of Close Election (%)				-0.041** (0.005)
QMV (#)	0.011** (0.001)	0.012** (0.001)	0.011** (0.001)	0.009** (0.001)
9 Members	0.292 (0.394)	-0.632** (0.309)	-0.246 (0.228)	0.752** (0.237)
10 Members	-0.081 (0.177)	-0.160 (0.195)	-0.134 (0.183)	0.050 (0.199)
12 Members	-0.275* (0.155)	-0.347** (0.167)	-0.382** (0.163)	-0.335** (0.142)
15 Members	0.452 (0.363)	0.476 (0.407)	0.692* (0.392)	0.375 (0.344)
Directive (#)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Acts Pending (#)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Codecision (#)	-0.009** (0.003)	-0.011** (0.003)	-0.011** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)
Cooperation (#)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)
August	-1.005** (0.201)	-1.917** (0.133)	-1.462** (0.259)	-1.174** (0.222)
Preference Heterogeneity	0.006 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.001 (0.017)
Constant	3.007** (0.468)	2.876** (0.525)	3.070** (0.477)	3.294** (0.893)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	333	369	317	210
Pseudo R^2	0.155	0.144	0.144	0.152
Wald Test χ^2	887.682	711.456	747.849	786.825

DV: Number of Legislative Acts Adopted (Month)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table G-23.: Elections and Decision-Making Output. The models report coefficients of a negative binomial event count model with year fixed effects.

values of my main explanatory variable, holding all other variables constant. The effect of national elections is sizable: The EU adopts about 46 proposals each month if none of these proposals fall within an electoral period. This number falls to 39 proposals if 3% of proposals fall 60 days before national elections (the sample average). If 20% of proposals that are in the legislative process in a given month fall within an electoral period, then legislative output falls to 4 proposals. If all proposals fall within an electoral period, the model predicts that not even one proposal would be adopted in that month, though the change in marginal effects is insignificant if more than 60% of proposals are negotiated during an election period. Note, however, that most observations for *Proposal, 60 Days Before Election* fall between 0% and 9%. We would therefore expect a decrease in legislative output by between 6 and 18 proposals, on average. This effect is rather large given that the average number of proposals that are adopted each month is 39.

For *Election (30 days)*, the effect is slightly smaller: Holding all other variables constant, the EU adopts about 46 proposals in a month when no proposal is close to a national election, to about 23 proposals if 20% of them fall in an election period, and only about 2 proposals if all proposals are close to elections. The marginal effects for *Time to Next Election (avg)* can provide further information about the post-election period. The longer the time until the next election the greater the legislative output in any given month. The variable ranges from 9 to 308 days, with an average of 82 days. We are most interested in periods where the time to the next election is very long. For example, if elections are about 110 days away, on average, then the EU adopts about 44 proposals each month, more than the 39 proposals during the 60 day election period window. If elections are over 300 days apart then EU members adopt more than 57 proposals each month.

The decline in legislative output is partially compensated in periods where no elections occur, but as the findings indicate, elections lead to a total decline in legislative output. Turning to the control variables, the more proposals are decided by qualified majority, the greater the legislative output. Regulations are more likely to be adopted in a timely fashion than other acts, and the month of August sees very few adoptions. The codecision procedure also reduces legislative output. And whereas the enlargements of the 1980s decreased legislative output, there has been no effect in subsequent enlargement rounds.

In sum, national elections lead to a delay in the adoption of individual pro-




Figure G-22.: Elections and Legislative Output. The graph displays marginal effects of *Proposal, 60 Days Before Election (%)*. It graphs the predicted legislative output in each month (y-axis) for different values of *Proposal, 60 Days Before Election (%)* (x-axis), holding all other variables constant.

posals until after the election, and they have a significant effect on legislative tides in the European Union. Even controlling for a number of important determinants of legislative activity, elections can have a detrimental effect on the likelihood that decisions are reached in a timely fashion. The operationalization of the variable *Proposals, 60 Days Before Election (%)* allows us to shed more light on the effect of elections on legislative activity. It indicates that as the proportion of proposals that are negotiated closely before an election in any given month increases, legislative output decreases. The more proposals are negotiated before elections, the greater the effect of elections on legislative tides.

H. Appendices for Chapter 9 (The Waiting Game)

H.1. Two Alternative Explanations – Delay Case Study

In the case study, I argue that Angela Merkel’s decisions during the Greek debt crisis were motivated by electoral considerations. There are, however, two common alternative explanations of her behavior that I would like to address. The discussion is taken from Schneider and Slantchev (2017).

A Policy Blunder?

One possible explanation interprets the delay as a failure of German politicians to see past the cultural and ideological commitment to austerity, and a failure to understand how financial markets could spread the Greek malady to other vulnerable members of the Eurozone. As the former foreign minister Joschka Fischer put it, Merkel had made such a “complete mess” of the crisis that he could “not think of a situation since 1949 that [had] been handled so badly”⁵ Whereas the cultural affinity to austerity policies and the popular fear of inflation certainly did not make it easier for the German government to commit to a bailout, there are two problems with this explanation.

First, it requires one to maintain that Merkel had been singularly deluded when other governments, the EU Commission, and the IMF were all in agree-

⁵*The Independent*. May 23, 2010. “Euro crisis is melting support for ‘Iron’ Merkel.”

ment that the Greeks needed a bailout. European leaders urged Merkel not to delay the bailout to Greece, but to act in solidarity with other members of the Eurozone. Italian Foreign Minister, Franco Frattini, pointedly stated that there was a “moral duty to intervene as soon as possible.”⁶ It is difficult to see how Merkel and her ministers could have been so out of touch with market reality, especially in late April when they still maintained that Germany could refuse to aid Greece. In a highly critical article, Professor Horn argued that it had been foreseeable that the failure to provide unambiguously a backstop for Greece would incite further speculation, which would drive up the price of government bonds, making it impossible for the country to refinance itself through the markets despite the austerity measures.⁷ In other words, the German government’s “dive-like” behavior, its “submissiveness to the financial markets and its cowardice towards the tabloid press” brought about the very outcome it had been supposedly trying to prevent: a Greek bailout.

Moreover, if the German government did not care about Greeks, it presumably did care about the investments of German banks, whose exposure to Greece in the first quarter of 2010 was, at \$44.2bn (24% of the total exposure of European banks), second only to France’s \$71.1bn.⁸ As Alessandro Leipold, former acting director of IMF European department, noted, there were “intrinsically strong German interests” at stake.⁹ There is no doubt that the German government was aware of these highly risky entanglements.¹⁰ It is very implausible that it would not have acted upon this knowledge to prevent an almost certain spillover of the crisis to Germany just because of its cultural commitment to austerity; especially since this would have almost inevitably created the inflationary pressures that the government was determined to prevent.

Second, and crucially, the explanation cannot account for the clobbering

⁶*Agence France Presse*. March 22, 2010. “EU ups pressure on Merkel to aid Greece.”

⁷*Spiegel*, “Hesitation and Patronizing Advice: How Germany Made the Greek Crisis Worse”, April 27, 2010.

⁸Buiter and Rahbari (2010, Figure 4), <http://willembuiter.com/Greece.pdf>, accessed May 9, 2016.

⁹*New York Times*, “Already Holding Junk, Germany Hesitates”, April 28, 2010. The German Hypo Real Estate Holding held \$10.5bn of Greek debt, and since it was owned by the public after its own bailout in 2009, it was German taxpayers whose money was on the line.

¹⁰Not only did the German government know; it had already secretly acted upon these risks by providing bailouts to its entangled banks in 2008 and 2009 (Bastasin, 2012).

the voters in NRW delivered to Merkel's party. Suppose that the Chancellor had been just as convinced as the voters of the wisdom of the *schwäbische Hausfrau* strategy until the end of April but then underwent a rapid conversion. If Merkel had such a "road to Damascus" moment, then it is by no means clear why she could not have persuaded the voters of the wisdom of her new policy. After all, she had been the most hawkish Eurozone leader on Greece, and if she had suddenly come to the realization that a bailout was necessary to save the euro, the voters should have believed her. Only Nixon could go to China, and only Merkel could go to Greece. But the voters did not believe her... or else how does one explain CDU's abysmal performance at the polls?

One might be tempted to argue that the German voters punished the CDU because Merkel was inconsistent — first opposing the bailout, but then flip-flopping — or because her Machiavellian tactics had worsened the crisis, saddling Germany with six times the costs. Commenting on the fact that providing the bailout must have been obviously inevitable to Merkel, *Tagesspiegel* put it clearly:

The Chancellor, the master tactician, lacked the self-confidence and courage to follow her instincts and respond quickly to the crisis.¹¹

Jürgen Rütters, the Premier Minister of NRW, blamed the national government for its handling of the financial crisis.¹² Senior figures in the CDU openly said that they had lost confidence in Merkel's ability to lead and called on her to quit.¹³

This, however, was not how the Germans voters interpreted it. They remained unconvinced about the seriousness of the crisis. Polls in late April and early May showed that the majority of Germans opposed the bailout because they believed it was wrong to aid Greece. Surveys also revealed that they did not consider the crisis a top priority for Germany, and did not expect it to affect them adversely personally. These data point to a failure to carry the voters on the new policy, not to a punishment for not dealing with a serious crisis promptly.

¹¹*Der Tagesspiegel*. May 10, 2010. "Für die Regierung Merkel geht es ums Überleben."

¹²*The Times*. May 10, 2010. "Poll blow for Merkel amid anger over Greek bailout."

¹³*Daily Telegraph*. May 11, 2010. "Calls for Merkel to quit over Greek bailout.;" *The Times*. May 12, 2010. "Wounded Merkel's star fades amid acrimony and intrigue."

Since they did not consider a Greek bailout necessary, the *volte-face* of the ruling coalition was seen as wasting taxpayer money on foreigners when it was needed at home. As Ingrid Lange, a shop assistant from NRW, put it in a statement that described the general interpretation,

First the state had to rescue the banks and now they have to rescue Greece when our own economy is suffering. It's hard to make a decent living even with a job. The government should spend our taxes where they're needed.

This suggests that Merkel and the CDU lost not because they were blamed for not acting fast enough or because she had pursued an inconsistent strategy, but because the voters in NRW still believed that a Greek bailout was inappropriate.

At the beginning of this section, I cited Joschka Fischer, who delivered the blunt and unflattering verdict that Merkel had made a “complete mess” of the crisis. It is worth asking, however, what the alternative could have been. Since delaying after the credit downgrades seems to have been out of the question, the only plausible road not taken must have been acting sooner. With the priors of German voters strongly fixed against the seriousness of the crisis, this would have resulted in an electoral punishment at least as bad as the one that actually happened. In fact, without Merkel holding the line in the face of serious criticism by other Eurozone members, the slide in public opinion polls would have continued. It is also arguable that had Merkel jumped on the bailout bandwagon early on, it would have been even more difficult for voters to believe that the action had been warranted. The delay deepened the crisis so much that even the massive bailout proved insufficient to stabilize the Eurozone. Ironically, by allowing the consequences to reveal themselves, Merkel probably made it possible for Germany to participate fully in the subsequent two bailouts. Thus, the unfortunate downgrades and the panic they caused triggered the drastic reversal that made a mockery of the otherwise solid strategy Merkel had been playing. To her credit, however, when it became clear that further inaction would cause grave harm to the German economy, Merkel abandoned the electorally-motivated strategy to do the right thing despite knowing full well that the voters would not see it that way.

A War of Attrition?

A second possible explanation centers around a potential distributional conflict as the source for the delay. Accordingly, Merkel was holding out for better terms, both from the Greek government and from the fellow Eurozone members. The former had to commit to even more drastic austerity measures, while the latter had to agree to terms that would not prejudice the credibility of the threat to let future spendthrifts sort out their own problems. The peculiar insistence on IMF participation — long opposed by other Eurozone members — must be seen in that light, as that organization had a lot of experience of imposing unpopular reforms on recipient countries.¹⁴

The Chancellor defended herself by arguing that her government had to hold out for satisfactory terms, but that the “last resort” had been reached. It now had to act to save the euro, which was the foundation of German prosperity, and whose collapse would have incalculable consequences for Europe and beyond. As she put it,

The price of our attitude was to be criticized for being hesitant or being slow. But such a price, ladies and gentlemen, the federal government will gladly pay if it ensures the right decision in the end.¹⁵

Let us set aside the fact that from a political perspective this was the only argument Merkel could have advanced in her defense: she could neither own up to a colossal mistake nor fess up to a misfired electoral ploy.

The war of attrition logic can certainly contribute to explain the initial phase of negotiations. As the crisis worsened in early 2010, Greece was increasingly willing to accept tougher austerity measures as demanded by the German government. The problem with this explanation is that Germany had already achieved all of its stated goals in principle with the March 25 agreement, and in practice with the April 11 decision to make the rescue mechanism fully operational.¹⁶ The IMF had been involved since the March agreement, and

¹⁴The was *not* about the distribution of costs amongst the creditors. Each EU member’s contribution to a bailout were pre-determined by the ECB key.

¹⁵*Bundesregierung*, “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zu den Euro-Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen,” May 19, 2010.

¹⁶*Spiegel Online*, “The Greek Bailout Plan: Merkel’s Risky Hand of Brussels Poker”, March 26, 2010. *Spiegel*, “An Aid Package in the Billions: Merkel’s Bluff Called in Poker over Greece,” April 12, 2010.

Schäuble himself had indicated in an interview that the outline of the austerity program had been decided in mid March.¹⁷ Moreover, Merkel had already dropped the insistence on market rates for the loans in the April 11 agreement. As Frank Schäffler, the deputy finance spokesman for Merkel's coalition partner FDP, characterized it at the time, "Germany buckled under the pressure – we shouldn't kid ourselves that such loans are anything but subsidies."¹⁸ Finally, Bastasin (2012, 70) explains how the "shallow text" of the February 11 agreement, with its emphasis on the defense of the stability of the monetary union, had been a "crucial strategic coup for Merkel" because it allowed her to deflect a potential bailout challenge by the Constitutional Court.

While it is true that the Greek government announced a third wave of cuts in conjunction with the May 2 deal, one cannot argue that Merkel had delayed to obtain its formal commitment. The Chancellor herself claimed to have done so because without Athens announcing new austerity measures, giving aid "would have had the opposite effect" to calming markets.¹⁹ The irony of this statement in light of the reason the markets had gone berserk cannot be overstated.

In fact, it was because of this that the press and the opposition had speculated that Merkel's tough line had been a domestic kabuki theater at least since March.²⁰ That is also why Steinmeier, accused Merkel of playing a double game between Brussels and Berlin, "Madame No – that was a huge hoax."²¹ He also dismissed the notion that the delay had been a part of some coherent plan to create a better policy. As he told Merkel, "You drifted around like a windsock. Then in retrospect you call that your strategy. Your double game has cost us an enormous amount of trust and respect in Europe."²² The allegation of *ex post* rationalization is also supported by the fact that the German government only belatedly (after April 28) started to insist on the importance of the crisis for Germany itself.

This explanation also has a flaw in the logic of the strategy itself given that it was being played in an electoral shadow. Merkel *could* have denied that the Greek crisis posed a problem for Germany in an attempt to signal that her

¹⁷Deutschlandfunk April 22, 2010.

¹⁸*Bloomberg*, "Germany Says Greek Aid Probably Needs Parliament Vote," April 14, 2010.

¹⁹*Agence France Presse*, "Merkel defends foot-dragging over Greece," May 5, 2010

²⁰*Rheinische Post*, "Heute geht es auch um Merkels Zukunft," May 8, 2010.

²¹*XN Press*, "Steinmeier: Nur Geld überweisen, reicht nicht," May 3, 2010.

²²*Agence France Presse*, "Merkel defends taking time over Greece," May 5, 2010.

government had little incentive to act unless all its stringent conditions had been met. This might have increased the credibility of the threat, but since she had done it so publicly, it also signaled to the German electorate that a bailout was unnecessary. Judging from the opinion surveys and the prevalent opinion in the press, the voters seem to have believed her. But if Merkel knew a bailout was coming and was merely stalling for terms, this would have been a silly thing to do because the bailout would certainly upset the voters. A more profitable strategy would have been to indicate that a bailout was necessary and outline the conditions Athens had to satisfy to obtain it. Of course, Merkel later claimed that this had been precisely what she had done, except that somehow nobody had understood her that way: not the IMF, not her fellow European heads of state, not the domestic opposition, not the press, and not the voters.²³

²³*Spiegel*, “German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble: ‘We Cannot Allow Greece to Turn into a Second Lehman Brothers,’” April 19, 2010.

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