

INTL 190

Spring 2010

The Politics of Cooperation

Mo, 12-2.50pm

<http://www.polisci.ucsd.edu/~cjschneider/courses/INTL190/INTL190.html>SSB 104

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DESCRIPTION: The end of World War II has brought about a dramatic increase of international cooperation around the globe. States have found various ways in which to develop and sustain international cooperation which can be bilateral, regional, or multilateral and informal versus formal. Why do states cooperate? How can we understand the bargaining outcomes? And why does cooperation fail sometimes?

This course explores the possibilities and limits for international cooperation in different areas and examines how institutions and the distribution of power shape bargaining outcomes in the international arena. We will explore theoretical explanations for how and why international cooperation evolves and look at several empirical cases. Historical case studies and a class-room simulation will help us to learn the principles and dilemmas of international cooperation.

REQUIREMENTS: Your grade will be based on class participation (20%), participation and presentation in the simulation (30%), and research paper (50%).

Course Participation. Your participation in seminar discussions is important and mandatory. Given that this is a seminar which is heavily based on our class discussions, regular and active participation is expected. You are expected to show up to class prepared to engage with the material assigned.

A note on attendance: Though I have no formal attendance policy, that is I don't actually take attendance, participation in this class is essential. For one, it counts for 20% of your grade. It goes without saying, well apparently it doesn't, that you can't participate if you don't attend. If you miss 2-3 classes you will likely have jeopardized your participation grade. If you miss more than 2-3 classes, your overall grade is likely in danger.

In-class Simulation. We will simulate a international cooperation problem related to current efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change. Details will be provided as we approach that date. This will count for 30% of the final grade. It is expected that your participation in this simulation will reflect your familiarity with the material assigned to that date. You will be required to submit a short written synopsis of the character you will adopt in the simulation before the simulation. This will test your knowledge of the actor, his/her interests, constituencies, etc. as they would impinge on her/his participation in a decision-making context and will count towards your In-Class-Simulation grade.

Research Paper. The final paper will be **due on Wednesday, June 9th at 12pm (noon)**. Grading will be based on the clarity of the position taken, concise writing, well reasoned support

of the argument, and inclusion of concepts from the relevant literature covered in the course. Late essays will incur a 20% grade penalty for each day after the deadline. The essay should be typed, with at least 1-inched margins all around, typeface of at least 11 point, and between 20-25 pages in length.

Academic Dishonesty. You are expected to do your own work. Students caught cheating on exams or plagiarizing their essays will receive a failing grade for the course and will be turned over to the dean of their college for administrative sanctions.

Grade Appeals. You can expect to be graded solely on your academic performance. This includes clarity of thought, knowledge of the material, composition, spelling, and grammar. Students who believe to have received an incorrect grade or a grade based on non-academic criteria should formally appeal it to me. The appeal will consist of a single typed page that identifies the problem and presents a reasoned argument that the grade fits the appeal criteria listed above.

SCHEDULE: This is a list of topics we shall cover.

WEEK 1: THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

WEEK 2: CONTEXTS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

WEEK 3: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS I: POWER AND NORMS

WEEK 4: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS II: TWO-LEVEL GAMES

WEEK 5: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS III: ISSUE-LINKAGE AND SIDE PAYMENTS

WEEK 6: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS IV: COMPLIANCE

WEEK 7: COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

WEEK 8: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION

WEEK 9: SIMULATION: INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

WEEK 10: SIMULATION: INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

READINGS: The course readings will be drawn from a number of articles which are available from the course webpage. The webpage also provides the schedule of readings for each week.

Week 1: THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

- Oye, Kenneth, 1985: Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. *World Politics* 38(1):1-24.
- Helen Milner, 1992: International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weakness, *World Politics* 44(3): 466-496.
- Alexander Wendt, 1992: Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46(2): 391-426.

Week 2: CONTEXTS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Updated: March 14, 2016

- James D. Morrow, 1994: Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information, *International Organization* 48(3): 387-423.
- Arthur Stein, 1982: Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, *International Organization* 36(2): 299-324.

Week 3: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS I: POWER AND NORMS

- Thomas C. Schelling, 1960/1980. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (chapter 2).
- Richard H. Steinberg, 2002: In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, *International Organization* 56(2): 339-374.
- Frank Schimmelfennig, 2003: The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, *International Organization* 55(10): 47-80.
- Jeffrey Lewis, 1998: Is the 'Hard Bargaining' Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 36(4): 479-504.

Week 4: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS II: TWO-LEVEL GAMES

- Robert D. Putnam, 1988: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, *International Organization* 42: 427-460.
- Helen Milner, 1997: *Interests, Institutions and Information* Princeton: Princeton University Press (chapter 4).
- Emanuel Adler, 1992: The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control, *International Organization* 46(1): 101-145.

Week 5: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS III: ISSUE-LINKAGE AND SIDE-PAYMENTS

- Robert T. Tollison, Thomas D. Willett, 1979: An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations, *International Organization* 33(4): 425-449.
- James K. Sebenius, 1983: Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties, *International Organization* 37: 281-316.

Week 6: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS IV: COMPLIANCE

- James D. Fearon, 1998: Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, *International Organization* 52(2): 269-305.
- George W. Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom 1996. Is the Good News about Compliance Good News About Cooperation? *International Organization* 50: 379-407.

Week 7: COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 1998: Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1): 3-32.
- Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, 1999: The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, *International Organization* 53(4), 699-732.
- Miles Kahler, 1992: Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, *International Organization* 46(3): 681-708.

Week 8: THE UNITED NATIONS, HUMANITARIAN CRISES, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

- Philip Gourevitch, 1998: *We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With our Families*, New York: Picador.
- Eric Voeten: Why no UN Security Council Reform? Lessons for and from Institutional Theory

Week 9: SIMULATION I: PRESENTATIONS, CIRCULATION OF BACKGROUND PAPERS, NEGOTIATIONS

- **Background Papers and Policy Briefings Due**

Week 10: SIMULATION II: NEGOTIATIONS, RESOLUTION, DE-BRIEFING, DISCUSSION: R2P

- R2P documents (see class web page)