

ontological priority (p. 13), but then on the next page he writes that all the logics have a complementary relationship. I do not think we know the answer to this question, but it would be useful to imagine the scope conditions for the various logics, or at least mull over when we would most and least expect each logic to obtain.

One assumption of the practice turn that does have vast empirical support is the notion that much of what we do is habitual, automatic, and nonreflective. Pouliot mentions this literature in passing (pp. 24–26), but neurocognitive science deserves more attention, and not only because it establishes that we really do perceive, feel, and act before we think but because it offers what is rarely offered in social science: an empirically grounded set of microfoundations undergirding a fundamental assumption. Moreover, it offers methodological benefits, in that it provides scholars of the practice turn with testable implications for the ways that actors respond to the world. Neurocognitive research also might suggest some scope conditions for the operation of both the automatic and reflective parts of the brain, and so offer some preliminary purchase on disentangling the different logics, as well as their likely domains of operation.

Pouliot should be applauded for devoting an entire chapter to constructivist methodology. But he has a methodological problem not of his own making. The best, if not only, way to study the implicit knowhow that is the centerpiece of the practice turn is ethnography and/or participant observation. He rightly promises that he will concentrate on “what practitioners actually do when they interact on the diplomatic floor” (p. 7). But he cannot deliver on that promise because he had no access to the practices and deliberations he describes. While conducting 69 interviews in six countries and reading secondary sources is laudable, it really does not test the propositions that follow from the practice turn. It was impossible to get at the taken-for-granted doxa of diplomatic practitioners with these techniques.

Finally, beyond the theoretical advances Pouliot has made in this text, he has also offered a unique interpretation of the relationship among NATO, the United States, and Russia after the Cold War. In short, he argues that the Soviet Union and the West were out of phase because their respective habitus were moving in two different directions. While the West in the 1990s and beyond was increasingly emphasizing the importance of domestic democratic governance as a criterion for being a legitimate player in international politics, Russia, after 1992 at least, increasingly understood the world in Realpolitik terms. The creeping expansion of NATO and the European Union to the East, understood in the East as the natural progress of democratization and liberalism, was understood in Moscow as continuing efforts to squeeze them out of Europe.

It is unclear, however, whether the logic of practice was necessary to yield these empirical findings. The evidence

Pouliot presents certainly supports his narrative of events, but absent a more systematic consideration of alternative accounts, it is very hard to know whether other approaches might have written the same story.

Nevertheless, I would say that Pouliot has written one of the first words in IR’s practice turn. In so doing, he has raised more than a few thorny issues, theoretical, methodological, and empirical, that will doubtless be an impetus for a broader discussion in the field.

Conflict, Negotiation and European Union

Enlargement. By Christina J. Schneider. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 228p. \$98.00.

doi:10.1017/S1537592711003136

— Uwe Puetter, *Central European University*

Christina J. Schneider has written an interesting book on European Union enlargement. The study introduces the process of enlargement as one of negotiating and resolving distributional conflicts between the potential winners and losers of EU expansion. Unlike many other more recent books on the EU published in the wake of the historic 2004 and 2007 enlargements this one seeks to take a broader perspective. It studies the process of EU expansion in historical perspective and makes reference to all five major enlargements.

The author identifies the major mechanisms through which the EU resolves redistributional conflicts occurring in the context of enlargement. This involves, in particular, readjustment of the EU’s system of internal financial transfers and the temporary suspension of some components of the EU’s comprehensive catalog of market freedoms for disadvantaged member states. The latter mechanism is characterized as discriminatory or differentiated membership and identified as the key political instrument in resolving conflict over enlargement. Schneider selects the free movement of workers, the infamous common agricultural policy, and the EU’s structural and cohesion policies as the most contested policy areas in the context of enlargement rounds, studying each of them in greater detail and with reference to various historical instances of expansion. The study pursues a multimethod approach and contrasts findings across time and policy fields.

Schneider argues that it is through the adjustment of financial commitments and promises, as well as the legal framework for market access, that enlargement becomes possible in a union in which each of the existing members enjoys the privilege of vetoing any potential extension of the EU beyond its existing scope. This broader insight is behind most rationalist accounts on enlargement. It is here where the book—though taking a broader perspective on enlargement—directly connects with the contemporary debate about the specific circumstances of the EU’s eastern enlargement. For example, it takes issue with Frank Schimmelfennig’s critique of the limited

potential of rational choice approaches to explain that Eastern European enlargement apparently succeeded despite quite fundamental reservations on the part of some member states, which feared that costs would not eventually be outweighed by the benefits of EU expansion. In Schneider's words: "The problem is that the constructivist and the asymmetric interdependence explanations both fail to apply their own insights to the enlargement decision itself. That is, they assume that the decision to widen the Union was reached before the EU entered accession negotiations" (pp. 51–52). Crucially, she treats the negotiation of the EU's eastern enlargement as an open process that was not preempted by the Copenhagen summit decisions in 1993.

The book is driven by the idea to defend and define a rationalist research agenda in the field of EU enlargement studies. This is also how we get into the study. It is as if only a rationalist account could provide access to the puzzle of EU enlargement, and Schneider insists that it is possible to bring the analysis of particular historical instances of EU enlargement, including that in the East, to a successful end within such a framework, and not with qualifying or abandoning the premise that the explanation of all enlargement dynamics can be boiled down to a cost–benefit analysis. This is not only a critique of nonrationalist approaches in the field of enlargement studies. First and foremost, it is about Schneider's fellow rationalist scholars and their (partially failed) attempts to unravel the process of negotiating the EU's expansion. She reviews and critiques the strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature, making this effort productive for the construction of her own conceptual framework. Here is a book driven by theory that is not self-sufficient in this regard but that informs empirical research. In turn, the empirical insights contribute to a review and refinement of the theory itself.

A key outcome of Schneider's analysis is an enhanced understanding of the aforementioned idea of differentiated membership. This has been the key instrument of the block's eastern enlargement. In other words, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements deprived the new members temporarily of some of their core membership rights. One major example is the introduction of transition periods for the full implementation of the free movement of labor between the new member states and some of the old member states. This arrangement has expired only recently. Schneider highlights that in historical comparison, the mechanism of temporary discrimination had never before been so central to enlargement negotiations. The reason is located in the previously available option of expanding the Union's budget and, thus, the ability to compensate those fearing to lose out in terms of the distribution of the EU's financial transfer mechanisms. The accession of Spain and Portugal and the related increase of the common budget are referred to as the key example. As this option was not available in the case of eastern enlargement, the principle

of discriminatory membership became the crucial mechanism. A similar trade-off between different available response mechanisms in dealing with enlargement scenarios is thus also expected for the future. In this way, the study reveals the dynamics of resolving redistributive conflicts surrounding EU enlargements, the choice of instruments, and the unfolding of the negotiation process in terms of the respective roles of the existing and acceding member states, as well as of those who initially fear particular costs and those who expect to be better off through enlargement.

This is an important book on EU enlargement and integration theory and it is highly commendable. Precisely because it emphasizes the importance of a stringent rationalist explanation, the book is an interesting read for both rationalists and those who challenge them. The question, however, remains whether enlargement happened despite the existing redistributive conflicts and their successful management in the enlargement negotiations, as we should state after having read this book, or because of a much more fundamental political commitment to uniting Europe after decades of conflict, division, and the lack of a perspective for a common future. What is certain—and nobody will doubt it after having read Schneider's book—is that there is no EU enlargement without distributive conflicts and appropriate mechanisms for addressing them. Most importantly, there are ways of further explaining and theorizing the underlying political dynamics of such redistributive conflicts in this ever-growing Union.

It may well be, however, that these dynamics thrive and develop on the basis of other underlying political decisions and considerations. To put it differently, eastern enlargement may well have been based on a fundamental, normative, political commitment that largely set the path toward eventual accession but by no means prevented member states from forcefully looking after their interests as they estimated gains and losses. In the end, the relative importance of such considerations is an empirical question that will not be decided by theoretical debates. However, without theories of integration or, more precisely, enlargement, there is no productive empirical research on EU integration. Schneider defends the rationalist corner of EU enlargement studies, and her book has the potential to encourage further theoretical and empirical research.

Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? What History Teaches Us about Strategic Barriers and International Security. By Brent L. Sterling. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009. 372p. \$32.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592711003148

— Tony Payan, *CASEDE*

When one takes up this book, it is almost impossible to reach quickly for the last pages and wonder if there is that