

ware productions and European-type artistic sculptures. For example, while the wooden sculpture *The Old Monkey* by Takamura Kōun (1852–1934), exhibited at the Chicago Fair, is considered an epoch-making masterpiece in the history of modern Japanese sculpture, Suzuki Chōkichi's works have been categorized as arts and crafts and thus automatically excluded from the category of the fine arts.²⁶

To conclude, I will formulate a final question. Between the *japonisant* interpretation of Hokusai as the greatest Japanese artist and Japan's official neglect—or between the *japonisant*'s high estimation of the Meguro Buddha and its total neglect by Japanese specialists—which view should we trust as authentic in discussing masters and masterpieces of Japanese art?

I think this is a misleading question, for the gap between the two is itself a cultural and historical product. Underneath the truth of the canon in history lies the historical making of the canon as a truth. The cognitive gap in the recognition of a Hokusai or the Meguro Buddha is no exception. The canonization of masters and masterpieces is by no means an ahistorical, true-or-false problem. We should rather recognize in this cognitive gap the historical importance of a Hokusai or the Meguro Buddha as a “sociological phenomena” (as Fenollosa put it), which we have to analyze in the international context of the hermeneutic debate on aesthetic evaluations.

Henri Focillon added a new preface to the second edition of his *Hokusai* in 1925. He wrote: “From the works of philosophers, poets and artists of all Asia, the Japanese Okakura rescued a continuity that is probably fictive but none the less ingenious as a structure; the continuity of an organic thinking, as a common heritage, constituting the patriotism of the continent encouraged by a race always in tension, holding their virtues tightly.”²⁷ Focillon was trying to reconcile the cognitive gap that I have been analyzing in this chapter. While following the French *japonisant* tradition with regard to Hokusai, at the same time Focillon found an affinity between his own idea of “*la famille spirituelle*” in art history and Okakura's vision of Asia as a fictional entity of the common consciousness.

The cognitive gap in the recognition of masters and masterpieces should be understood as a continuous mirror effect. Created by the crossing between the Western gaze and the Oriental response, masters and masterpieces in Japanese art are asked to play a role defined by the uncertain superimposition of the Western category of fine arts and the fictional identity of the Oriental.

Nature—the Naturalization of Experience as National

Stefan Tanaka

THE USE of nature is a powerful device for authorizing the veracity of one's position. What is “natural” is accepted as timeless and passed on. Yet nature is not singular, nor is it unchanging. Many years ago, Arthur O. Lovejoy cataloged the multiplicity of meanings he found in the word “nature” and noted its tendency “to slip more or less insensibly from one connotation to another, and thus in the end to pass from one ethical or aesthetic standard to its very antithesis, while nominally professing the same principles.”¹ It is in this slip-page—the reliance on a principle of sameness that occludes its excess of meanings—that nature (or more accurately natures) was integral to the definition of a Japanese society during the Meiji period.

The transformation—or modernization—of Japanese society in this period is an often repeated story. Yet despite its centrality, it is little understood except within the very terms of the transformation itself. A fundamental problem in discussions on this transformation have been a conflation of self and other into bipolar frameworks—for example, tradition/modernity, Japan/West, rational/emotional. What is ignored is the replotment (as opposed to elimination and replacement) of external forms. In my recent readings on society during the Meiji period, I have been struck by the presence of a radical heterogeneity during the early Meiji period. Karatani Kōjin points to a nature formerly veiled by diverse prohibitions and significations: the realm of spirits, the outside of the village or household.² Strangers (*ijin*)—outsiders, itinerants, demons, spirits, and ghosts—lived within and apart from communities. Foreigners were those from another culture, which could have been a different region of the archipelago, a different class, or a different country. And the environment was constituent of society, not separate from it. Tsuda Sōkichi, describing the variability of ideas of nature, recognizes the aristocratic longing in Genroku culture for nature as escape and solitude but notes that “nature” was located in the small and dainty rather than the awesome and sublime

(more common in the twentieth century). The singularity with which we use nature as an external form that signifies or symbolizes a "Japan" did not exist.

There are myriad issues that are part of the construction of a modern society, but certainly one of the most critical is the tool of history as a means of reconfiguring this relation between man and nature. Michel de Certeau writes,

It appears to me that in the West, for the last four centuries, "the making of history" has referred to writing. Little by little it has replaced the myths of yesterday with a practice of meaning. As a practice . . . it symbolizes a society capable of managing the space that it provides for itself, of replacing the obscurity of the lived body with the expression of a "will to know" or a "will to dominate" the body, of changing inherited traditions into a textual product or, in short, of being turned into a blank page that it should itself be able to write.³

If we look, we can find a related process in Japan beginning with the Kokugaku recentering of the world around a mythical origin of Japan and then the modern transformation from the mid-nineteenth century.

This essay is part of an inquiry into the delineation of social forms into natures and Nature—that is, the transformation of practices, what we now call "myths of yesterday," into textual products, the "practice of meaning." An overriding characteristic of intellectual writings of the Meiji period is the concern with the "managing of space that [it] provides for itself." However, it is not a management of a business or of government but of knowledge—or constituting, knowing, and thus managing social forms and the environment. In this sense, history, too, is a central agent that turns experience into those blank pages that can then be molded into prescribed forms. History is one of the technologies of modernity; it helps create what Henri Lefebvre has called the "alternative reality" of modernity: "Within this reality an alternative reality emerges, another world within our own. What alternative reality? What other world? Technology and control over nature."⁴

Lefebvre proposes a relation between nature—or, more accurately, natures—and history. The environment or narrative of national unfolding is neither nature nor history. The natures and history that concern me are the products of the practice of the "making of history," where nature and history today are but textual products of the will to know and a will to dominate. In his article "Japanism" (*Nihonshugi*), Takayama Chogyū points to such "managing the space":

For the sake of our nation-state (*kokkei*) I will advocate a Japanism—thoroughly considering the characteristics of our country's (*bonpō*) culture, investigating the historical relationship of religions and morals, pointing to the general principles of human (*jinhū*) evolution, recognizing the laws of the interrelation between particular and universal in the progress of the nation-state (*kokkei*) and world develop-

ment, and furthermore, seeing clearly our country's founding spirit and special national (*kokuminteki*) nature.⁵

In Takayama, as in our writings of history today, there is a separation between the given and the created, or nature and culture. This separation has always existed in some form, but the mode of separation in modernity leads to an inversion of earlier meanings. What had been natural—that is, the "myths of yesterday"—are turned into something historical, while what had been social is removed to some abstract and detached realm, such as universality, science, or nature. This inversion—typically rendered within categories of the modern, nature, and tradition, thus remaining within the epistemology of modernity—is where history occults itself, pretending to continuity, immutability, and change. The very transformation described by Takayama suggests that sameness is tied to abstractions that govern social organization and the transformation itself.

On the one hand, progress—the "general principles of human evolution"—becomes a transcendent law that provides for a social organization that is no longer human based or experiential. Science becomes an abstract, universalistic norm rather than a very powerful but still historical concept that has been articulated, changes over time, and changes according to employment. Even though it is conceived of and constructed by humans, it claims a transcendent, universalistic quality that moves laws beyond humans, beyond questioning of its very historicity.

On the other hand, change is constantly grounded in abstractions such as "our country's culture," "general principles of evolution," "founding spirit," and "special national nature." In other words, another nature, that of an immanent national form, is also described as natural and beyond questioning. In other words, this was a period when the world was inverted, where the local, phenomenal, and eschatological practices and habits were turned into texts and where abstractions—new rules, principles, and essences—ordered society.

Alterity

The story of Shuten Dōji, or the *sake*-drinking child demon that terrorized Kyoto around the end of the tenth century, unbelievable as it is, is indicative of an epistemology quite alien to us today; it is a space of experience, an eschatological world where the inexplicable is attributed to a hidden humanlike world that mirrors the visible world. The relation between nature and humans (culture) was quite different from ours. For example, according to lore, because Shuten Dōji was a child genius, he was expelled from the human world. Like other spirit mediums, some mental or physiological difference rather than a

variation of the human body is evidence of spirit possession. Shuten Dōji's abode in the mountains (Oeyama) is typical of early societies on the archipelago for which mountains bore sacred value and were often sites for the souls of dead and angry spirits.⁶ Ultimately, in this world the cosmos was active; it was not a vast open, always silent space but a world in which all things possessed a spirit that was capable of being acted on and acting on mankind. In short, nature was neither separate from the human nor controllable.

Shuten Dōji marks out a site of difference, of a radical Other. He is not the boundary, however, for he exists in both worlds, easily entering Kyoto to kidnap his victims and returning to his mountain palace. Time is not the principal marker. In this world, past and present are not clearly demarcated. Shuten Dōji is a ghost of the dead (as a child) and is haunting the present (as a ghost); he is more than two hundred years old yet still a child, and the woman washing clothes has been there for more than two hundred years. This "alter," or other, provides agency for the unknown: "horror and shuddering, sudden fright and the frantic insanity of dread, all receive their form in the demon."⁷ In pre-Meiji society there was less a fear of death than today, and more the belief that the dead become spirits was more widespread. Hori states that "people were afraid of spirits of the dead, who preyed upon them. All social and personal crises . . . were believed to be the result of the vengeance of angry spirits of the dead."⁸

Exorcism

This is the world that Kant believed would be eliminated through enlightenment. In his terse, elegant essay, "What Is Enlightenment?" he writes that "enlightenment is mankind's exit from its self-incurred immaturity." The Meiji period was one in which politicians and intellectuals sought to remove themselves, the people, and Japan from what they believed to be that self-incurred immaturity. Inoue Enryō's work on psychology (before the spread of clinical and experimental work led to a separation of psychology from philosophy) was part of this effort to lead the masses away from their anachronistic beliefs. The early application of Inoue's psychology was directed against ghosts (or more broadly the strange and fantastic). His *fushigi kenkyūkai* and his *yōkaigaku* were a part of this desire to know and to change through education, that is, to eliminate an element of that self-incurred immaturity.

A fundamental distinction within Inoue's work is the separation between humans and nature. One of the central problematics of Meiji intellectuals—indeed of all nonmodern places confronted by scientific/rationalistic thinking—was delineating the proper relation between humans and nature. While Inoue sees humans as a part of nature, he differentiates between the natural

and human worlds. Although he considers humans a part of the natural world, he also distances the human from natural: "The human world is between the natural and the mysterious worlds."⁹ Humans have the ability to understand more than their immediate surroundings, to discern those invisible principles in nature and the mysterious worlds. No longer is nature integral to their lives; it is now separate. The mediating organ is the human mind.

Proof is in ghosts, the mental images (*shinzō*) that people formulated to connect and explain the interaction between society and nature: "The ghost of the mental image, even though a provisional ghost that is no more than one type of ghost belonging to the natural world, is connected in our minds (*kokoro*) to the external world (*gaikai*) and organizes the human world. Moreover, when one uncovers a true ghost through interaction with the internal world (*naikai*), this mental image straddles false and true ghosts."¹⁰ Thus, depending on the level of knowledge, people have formulated and learned of images and objects that explain the inexplicable and make sense of society. Ghosts filled varied and unpredictable roles: the humanlike agent who brought both good and evil, of whom people were fearful, and from whom they derived pleasure and fortune. Ghosts were truly alter, the external and internal that constantly shifts back and forth. For Inoue, they are an example of that immaturity, the failure to properly understand the many modes by which phenomena should be apprehended.

As suggested previously, Inoue's conceptual framework shifts from an eschatological order to a developmental process. He connects human knowledge with the idea of progress, *shimpo*, a concept common during this period and, of course, integral to modernity. He writes: "What we do not know does not signify the strange and unknown (*michi*). It means that when we experience the strange and unknown, even though we do not know it today we will know [it] in the future."¹¹ In other words, most ghosts and mysterious happenings are strange only because people's knowledge of the universe has not progressed enough to understand the causes.¹² For example, spirit possession was blamed for illness, abnormalities, or delusions, before current advances demonstrated the externality of disease; ghosts were blamed for eclipses in the ancient period, when knowledge of astronomy was limited; and a giant catfish was the cause of earthquakes.¹³

These beliefs constitute one of those sites that history transforms. Ghosts—part of the space of experience when knowledge was based on what one sees, on habits and customs—are severed from the present and located as part of the past, as superstitions that emerged because of insufficient knowledge of the universe. For Inoue, stories of ghosts become a window into past knowledge and beliefs, but the stories are also a window to those beliefs that must be eliminated for society to advance. To relegate ghosts to the past, Inoue places

them in various categories that can be explained by science. In addition to psychology, he lists botany, zoology, human physiology, chemistry, physics, geography, and astronomy. These disciplines are the scientific counterpart of his ghostly categories through which he believes the truly inexplicable could be separated from the understandable.¹⁴ He concludes, "Thus when one researches false ghosts, one can know the secrets of the human world (*ninogenkai no himitsu*); when one researches provisional ghosts, one investigates the secrets of the natural world; and when one researches the real ghosts, one can surmise the mysterious world."¹⁵ Ghosts, then, are silenced—or exorcised—from society into a series of understandable explanations that follow a universal (scientific) principle. These categories serve as containers for Inoue's collection of stories gathered on his travels, a "gesture of setting aside, of putting together, of transforming certain classified objects into 'documents.' . . . This gesture consists in 'isolating' a body—as in physics—and 'denaturing' things in order to turn them into parts which will fill the lacuna inside an a priori totality."¹⁶

In short, the ghosts now become denatured documents, anachronistic and superstitious beliefs of the past. In the language of my introductory statement, ghosts are turned into textual products that Inoue knows and, thereby, dominates. Such control of ghosts as documents eliminates their alterity in favor of an otherness as the past. As the superstitious or primitive earlier state, this past reinforces both the advanced (enlightened) nature of the present and the continuity of a new space, the nation—Japan. The potential for Inoue's psychology, especially the separation of human from nature and spirits from nature, is to begin the separations that turn heterogeneous and interactive forms into related but singular objects that we "know" and thus "dominate"—in short, the beginning of the process by which past practices are turned into the blank pages on which society can manage "the space that it provides for itself."

Blank Pages: Human (Japanese) Natures

Inoue argues that a principle cause for the immaturity of people is their lack of development. To us today, this sounds commonsensical. Inoue's idea, however, is historical; education and childhood were very different in pre-Meiji society. The naturalness of Inoue's argument is a result of the removal of historical forms from time as society is historicized. That is, chronology, or History, facilitates a certain kind of shift in which newly formulated (or reformulated) objects and ideas are given normative or timeless status. We need only remember Marx's phrase, popularized by Marshall Berman—"all that is solid melts in the air"—to be mindful that modernity simultaneously calls for mobility and stability. A condition of modern, enlightened society is constant change

and improvement. Yet an equally important condition is stability, and certainty. Two common ideational and historical forms that are used to establish that stability are nature and the nation.

Both nature and history come together in the idea of a human nature. Carolyn Merchant points to this conjunction: "Theories about nature and theories about society have a history of interconnections. A view of nature can be seen as a projection of human perceptions of self and society onto the cosmos. Conversely, theories about nature have historically been interpreted as containing implications about the way individuals or social groups behave or ought to behave."¹⁷ The description of nature is related to one's concept of human relations—order, interaction, hierarchies, relation to natural resources—in other words, the political economy of society and, in the late nineteenth century, the nation-state. The question of the inherent characteristics of humans was one of the principal issues that intellectuals focused on during the Meiji period. They were interested in defining the relation between the individual and one's sociality, and by extension to the international world; thus, the notion of progress raises the question, Is it natural or historical that Japanese are deemed inferior? Human nature becomes that timeless singularity described through the particularity of a national experience, while aspects that formerly constituted a part of nature become distinct but still connected to the whole; for example, the various forms of belief in supernatural being(s) become categories of knowledge, separated as religion, folk belief, or superstition/magic, while nature, too, is separated from humans as the environment—something to control or enjoy but separate from the rational world that increasingly comes to define daily life. Miyake Setsurei (1860–1945) and Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944) are two quite important and influential intellectuals who engaged in this inquiry into what is truly natural—and not an artifice that seems to be natural. They share a belief in the separation of nature from culture, yet their differences suggest different Japanese "natures."

The Writing of Nature

Miyake Setsurei's two essays written in 1891, "Shinzenbi Nihonjin" (Japanese: Truth, Goodness, Beauty) and "Giakushū Nihonjin" (Japanese: Lies, Evil, Ugliness) are examples of this inquiry into human nature.¹⁸ "Truth, Goodness, Beauty" has often been cited as an example of a traditionalist turn among intellectuals around the 1880s; few, however, refer to the other essay, especially in English. Another way to characterize these essays, however, is as inquiries into the relation between cosmos, society, and humans. First, truth (*shin*)—to discover an ideal—reason and justice—beyond the particularity of Western universalism. It requires the full investigation of all sides of things. Second,

goodness (*zen*)—approaches Miyake's attempt to eliminate the monologic potential of truth. It is a self-critical quality in which one should doubt the correctness of one's own position when applied to others. (Truth and goodness suggests an acceptance of rationality, an idealism that thought leads to a perfect society.) And third, beauty (*bi*)—to find a universal that is prior to such human agency, yet embedded in the human, and cannot be measured or known only through the phenomenal. These three ideals can also be rendered as universal principles, cultivation, and an aesthetic spirit, or universal, history, and nature.

The three ideals combine to provide the means by which humans reach what Miyake argues is the ultimate goal—the achievement of happiness (*enman kōfukū*). Miyake's focus on attaining happiness through the mediation of truth, goodness, and beauty suggests the modernness of his ideas; it recalls a Hegelian idealism that assumes the perfect society can be reached only through rational thought. Miyake concludes, "I have no doubt that if we understand the general development through which past art objects have unfolded (*shin'in*), we can fulfill our hopes for the future."¹⁹ Above all, Miyake accepts rationality as the basis for knowledge, mechanization and technology as a means for development, progress as the temporal orientation, and the nation-state as the organizing unit. He was well aware, however, that acceptance of progress as prescribed by Western enlightenment is a framework that elevates the West as the norm.

If we improve the country by becoming completely Western—importing culture and texts, customs and habits even to the complete adoption of clothes, food, and drink—lamenting only that we do not have the skill to emulate rapidly, the result is a dragonfly state (*seitōshū*); one sees a Japan of foreigners not the Japan of Japanese, and those sites are only the beauty of mountains and scenes of water. But when they look at our pitiful people, they are compared with mediocrity and the vulgar servants in their own country. Thus, emulation turns the country into only an inferior Western one (*ōbei*) and the people into inferior Westerners; in the end it only increases the inferior tribes among Westerners.²⁰

To move beyond this particularity, truth is a transcendent principle, what Miyake calls reason and justice (*right*). It was not the denial of any particular past but the search for vast information, recognizing the multiplicity of viewpoints: "In collecting the many divergent facts which one acquires from different circumstances and experiences, analyzing the differences and similarities, and distinguishing between right and wrong, the tendency toward reason is the great way to Truth." Before Truth can be understood, data from the Orient must be taken into consideration. "In other words, for Japanese the urgent task which cannot be put off for one day is to use the new materials of the Orient and discover new reason and principle (*right*)." ²¹

Adding the Orient, however, does not lead to a utopic balance. Instead, Miyake sought to understand this relation between the universal and particular in relation to Japan (rather than to accept what had been presented from Western sources) by rephrasing the separation of the human from its social and natural environment. Miyake's strategy describes social development by separating the way peoples apprehend experience into characteristics (*tokushōku*) and ability (*tokanō*)—in other words, the innate and historical qualities of cultures. This analysis bears some similarities to Herder's belief in both the universal and the particular. Herder states:

And is [taste] not to be explained by the times, customs and people? And does it not thus always have a first principle that has just not been understood well enough, just not felt with the same intensity, just not applied in the correct proportion? And does not even this Proteus of Taste, which changes anew under every stretch of the heavens, in every breath it draws in foreign climes; does it not itself prove by the causes of its transformation that there is only One Beauty, just like Perfection, just like Truth?²²

Like Herder, Miyake believes that an inquiry into the particular, the accumulation of knowledge about one's cultural and physical development, would lead to an understanding of cultural difference within the same conceptual world. Because all humans are basically the same and have the same ability, differences between Westerners and Japanese are not inherent. Different cultures, however, apprehend and use phenomena differently. In the case of Japan, social and bureaucratic structures impeded the full exercise of abilities in the archipelago. Miyake describes Europeans as losing more and more of their special characteristics as the years have passed. The United States and Europe, according to Miyake, were about to sink into chaos; they had become overly mechanistic.²³

Miyake's comments point implicitly to abstract, external forces. One is the idea of science: the gradual application of technology to society. The second is a notion that some guiding force is necessary to keep societies orderly in the face of such change. Like Herder, Miyake locates this force in beauty. He cites as examples beautiful sites such as mountains, rivers, lakes, the ocean, the high heavens, and the small moon when looking at Mikasayama (east of Nara), and the melodious voices of the plovers that migrate to Awaji island; the comfort of the inns along the major roads; historical objects such as the architecture of Todajji, Hiei, and Osaka castles; artifacts such as helmets, swords, and statues; paintings by Hōgen Motonobu; and poetry beginning with Hitomaru.²⁴ Miyake's use of Nature as the basis for the formulation of society is not unusual; others, such as Okakura Tenshin and Takayama Chogyū, wrote extensively on beauty and Japanese society. Indeed, Okakura, considered the modern "dis-

coverer" of Japanese art, writes that art is the best source for understanding Japan's spirit; it transcends the phenomenal and is the closest representation of a universal human spirit. Takayama too sees in beauty a spiritual ideal, prior to human intervention. He states: "Because the aesthetic life is the fulfillment of innate human needs, life itself already possesses absolute value." ²⁵ Miyake's happiness, Okakura's human spirit, and Takayama's fulfillment of innate needs define a human nature that is located in the body, both collective and individual.

Miyake and Takayama were quite critical of the pristine beauty advocated by Okakura and Fenollosa. While beauty for Miyake is manifested through certain objects, he argues that the objects have merit not because they are extolled as art or sublime but because they embody a concept of beauty (*bijutsu no shibui*) without which he finds only vulgarity and superficiality.

Miyake's notion of Japanese beauty is not the majesty, simplicity, mystery (*yūgen*), or melancholy characteristics that most reiterate when thinking of a Japanese aesthetic (see, e.g., Keene, "Japanese Aesthetics"). Miyake complains: "In sum, art in our country today uselessly produces exterior ornamentation. There is no synthesis of interiority and exteriority. In other words it is as if both artists and viewers have abandoned without reflection the concept which should be the basis of beauty." ²⁶ He does not deny that some of these objects are art, but he does question whether it constitutes the whole. Miyake is lamenting the objectification of art, in which "Japanese nature" becomes defined and known only through certain objects of art, as if it expressed a concept of beauty and is reiterated only because people have been told it is so, not because of any understanding.

In his discussion of ugliness, Miyake begins with an allegory of flattery and delusion: When an insincere man lavishly compliments a woman's beauty, despite her ordinariness, she becomes convinced that she is beautiful and adorns herself with gold and a conspicuous obi. (He frequently uses the word *mekki*, "gilding.") In other words, she becomes fixated with a superficial spirit (*gaikei seishin*) and vulgarity (*birō*). ²⁷ He makes clear the analogy to art, where the flattery of Westerners who have helped Japan "save" art spurred certain Japanese to accept a narrow and superficial ideal. Japanese, he says, should not listen to foreigners (such as Fenollosa and Bigelow), whose interest in Japanese art Miyake likens to a temporary infatuation with new things. ²⁸ For Miyake, beauty is in the familiar and intimate experiences of everyday life, whether of the elite or the commoner. ²⁹

This is one of the areas in which history obscures its own historicity. Now intellectuals were contending to define a nature that would support their view of history. The tactic was to identify others' ideas as "historical" and claim the "true" or "real" nature for oneself. What is interesting is the use of nature as a

grounding for certainty in the construction of a historical, ever-changing national identity. First, this formulation was made much easier because Inoue was exorcising ghosts and spirits from mountains, rivers, and villages. The separation of spirits from environment and the intervention of science turned nature into an externality. Nature became another object separated from the human, ready to be admired and exploited. This is evident in a related reconfiguration, the founding of the discipline of geography in Japan through the efforts of writers such as Nishi Amane and Shiga Shigetaka.

As something admired, it "explained" the ways that people have coalesced into a particular Japanese culture. It provided that certainty that could retain and activate a memory of the past, but it was not the past of Inoue's ghosts. It was the removal of pasts from their sociospatial site for an atemporal ideal. Miyake criticizes Okakura's sublime aesthetic because it was consistent with orientalism. Instead, he seeks to locate it in beautiful sites of the everyday. This is almost a contradiction. Because all were appealing to the visual, Miyake failed to make the separation he intended. His was a sophisticated argument, but the mnemonic eliminates complexity for the simple and the sensate. Mary Carruthers cites psychologist George Miller: "Some of the best 'memory crutches' we have are called 'laws of nature,' for learning can be seen as a process of acquiring smarter and richer mnemonic devices to represent information, encoding similar information into patterns, organizational principles, and rules which represent even material we have never before encountered, but which is 'like' what we do know, and thus can be 'recognized' or 'remembered.'" ³⁰ Because nature is something that we all "know," its mention presents a mnemonic for common understanding. What I have called human nature in Japan becomes merged with Nature. Although rooted in different meanings, they combine to speak for the nation, while the slippage, of which Lovejoy warns us, facilitates the naturalization of the nation and the occultation of its historicity.

Dominating the Japanese Body

Inoue Tetsujirō also wrote widely on the relation between universality and the particular. Unlike Miyake, however, Inoue uses the idea of will (*ishi*) as the basis for separating humans from knowledge and morals, or nature from history. For Inoue, human will (*ningen no ishi*) is that common source of mankind, the nature from which society emanates. According to Inoue, "there is a thing called will in humans, and when one possesses will there is definitely purpose." ³¹ The connection of purpose to will leads humans beyond a survival instinct where purpose and the accumulation of experience endow humans with a progressive nature. "However, by gradually accumulating experience,"

Inoue writes, "the power of will develops on its own, and humans always try to establish purpose beyond the present." Will is the force that separates human nature from nature. Without will (as in animals, which are limited by their endowed capabilities), there is no progress: "When the complete human being is not led by will, there is no development as a human being."³² In other words, will establishes a horizon of expectations as an innate part of human beings.

For Inoue, will is a universal inherent in all humans and is the basis of a progressive spirituality rooted in ethics rather than rationality. Inoue states: "In the regulation of humankind, there is a gradual movement—the extrication from narrow religions to the adherence to a general spirituality. I see this as today's new religion."³³ Individual development comes from gradually overcoming nature, nurturing the spiritual abilities (*reimyō na seinō*), or a general spirituality, through which one overcomes the material and corporeal.³⁴ It is through strong will "that one has sufficient power to control one's carnal desires with spirit. . . . It is the power to control a fleeting emotional desire without succumbing to it for a future goal."³⁵ In the natural world, there is inevitability; in the human world there is selection and what should or must be. The identification of the inner self, then, facilitates the separation of man from culture or, more accurately, the inversion of "inherited traditions" (which had once been common sense) into "textual products" (anachronistic historical ideas and institutions).

Inoue is best known for his criticism of Uchimura Kanzō, which is frequently cited as evidence of his anti-Christian conservatism. His criticism of Christianity, however, is part of a broader endeavor to expose the specific socio-historic conditions of institutionalized religions and ethics that are at odds with his notion of modern society. For Inoue, religions and ethical systems such as Buddhism, Christianity, and Confucianism are artifices that make claims to a transhistorical force that grounds their doctrines. Inoue was quite aware that, to paraphrase Kant, they are institutions that are also responsible for the self-incurred immaturity of Japanese. He does not deny their moral and ethical contributions, only that adherence to religion does not ensure ethical behavior. Instead, he argues that morals are prior to religion; "morals are more encompassing; they are much broader than each religion. It is something that exists in all humankind."³⁶

This shift that separates humans as autonomous beings is fully modern. However, Inoue did not accept the potential for an unrestricted self-interest that accompanies this release of the individual. For Inoue, there is will and ultimate will, that of the good for a whole: "That final goal, in other words, an ultimate goal that unifies individual goals, is the ideal. This ideal is the source and basis of morals."³⁷ Thus, instead of a will that sees the individual as the

basic human unit, Inoue argues for the fundamental sociality of humans. In this naturalization of human sociality, Inoue recognizes the diversity of individual wills, but they are combined and superseded by an ultimate will, or the "ultimate ideal as a human being." In other words, it is natural for individuals to work for this common goal. He states, "Because for society the ultimate ideal of mankind (*jinnrit*) is to strengthen brotherly feeling and gradually to strengthen mutual love, one must clarify more the common characteristics of all mankind."³⁸

At the end of his discussion on the relation between will and nature, Inoue concludes that the ultimate will in Japan is *bushidō*. By nurturing and gradually developing the ultimate will that appears in the form of *bushidō*, Japanese can reach the ideal; this, he believes, is strength of Japanese people. He does not deny the historicity of *bushidō* but essentializes a part—the spirit of acting decisively at the risk of one's life—as the whole. While religions are anachronistic, *bushidō* becomes tied to Japanese human nature as a new "ethical religion" that transcends the human. For Inoue, that spirituality has existed in the everyday throughout Japanese history. In the end, Inoue's appeal to the body—masses and everyday—served as a way to essentialize the idea of a collective body. Despite his claims, however, it is an idea that determines the body rather than an idea that emerges from it. Ultimately, this human nature restricts the realm of individual action supposedly made possible by modernity.

By giving this sociality (*daisshi*) greater weight than individual will, Inoue relies on a historical idea to authorize what de Certeau calls a naturalization of social relations. This, too, is one of those sites of slippage; because everyone has a conception of nature, history, as part of a natural form, occults itself. The social becomes both historical and timeless. Inoue presents the ultimate will as transcendent of man, yet it is used to reconstitute society where past and present, East and West provide archives for a narrative of the nation-state. The simultaneous separation of pasts, now data, from the present and the prioritization of a social will as natural provide the moment for the return of certain pasts as a transhistorical idea. By incorporating pasts into this human nature, Inoue naturalizes the nation. He does recognize the historicity of the nation and nation-state; he cites imperfections such as the anti-Japanese immigrant movements in the United States. While these are merely political events, data of the nation-state, the reintegration of pasts into these natures (the general will) gives particular moments meaning as manifestations of this spirit and nature. The historical, when part of this general will, becomes evidence of the Same, that is, evidence of a natural condition.

One way to naturalize this newly formulated body is through the idea of childhood. I will mention only a few of the most relevant effects of the transformation of childhood and children.³⁹ Childhood becomes a "practice of mean-

ing" that replaces the "myths of yesterday." The "innocent" child serves as that new connection between nature and human or past and future—what Lefebvre calls "mysterious connections with the eternal."⁴⁰ In a sense, this historicization of society makes History possible. By conflating ontogeny with phylogeny, the child also "proves" the nation as always existing. The child is a visual reminder; it embodies the physiology of a group of people and cuts across other divisive categories that had existed, such as class (hereditary), wealth, or region, as well as new categories, such as class (economic), knowledge, or putative ability. Difference is now altered into temporal hierarchies of the Same—that is, through the diachrony of human growth and progress—and childhood signifies the immanence of ethnicity or race. While orienting society around a diachronic epistemology, the child is also a visible form (body and images), the "like us," that facilitates the construction and maintenance of a national "we." Inoue describes the centrality of childhood for the construction of a national body: "If all children receive this national education (*kokuminteki kyōiku*), there is no doubt that our land will coalesce into one country."⁴¹ The combination of learning and children turns the child into an experiential site for a reconfigured space, the nation-state.

This brings out one way that ghosts, nature, and children are part of the same process. The society formulated by the end of Meiji was quite different than the worlds that reiterated the story of Shuten Dōji, in which world, ghosts, nature, and children were part of the spirits; each manifested the racial heterogeneity of nonmodern society. Ghosts permeated societies; nature was alive with spirits; and children, too, were "among the gods until seven." In each case, these transmitted forms of knowledge are transformed, given different temporal markers that domesticate them in a way that reinforces the unity of Japan. These alters were first separated from the modern present as past, objectified through scientific discourse, and reintegrated into a human nature to give particular moments meaning as manifestations of a universalistic idea. Ghosts become evidence of the immaturity of a progressing nation and are relegated to the realm of superstition and folklore. Nature takes on an atemporal condition that, because it is unchanging, has always centered a national sensibility, now evident in the fine arts. And childhood embodies through every individual the idea of development, the sameness of the Japanese body, and the hope for (and control of) the future of the nation-state. Each has served as a critical constituent element, obscured because they are deemed "natural," in the maintenance of a Japanese "we."

The effect of this reduction of alterity to an other of the same was a reorientation of the archipelago into a natural unit, Japan. No longer was society organized around social connections; now abstract ideals oriented the social. Interiority had become the abstract idea of the nation directly tied to the phe-

nomenal—the body and natural sites. The connection of the human and the environment as Japanese was used to invert previous social structures, such as regions and locales, and to place them as secondary to the nation. The individual—now citizen—was directly tied to the nation-state. Variation and difference were now permitted only within the Same. Thus, at the end of his 1895 *Shuten Dōji*—an adaptation of the traditional tale and one of the first modern children's books published in Japan—Iwaya Sazanami writes:

In the story, Shuten Dōji of Oeyama is a demon, but there were no demons in that world; being an allegory, actually scary thieves like demons who stole and hid in the mountains. Raikō, along with the Four Warriors (Shitennō) and Hōjō Yasutomo received orders from the gods and skillfully subdued them. Stories are stories, reality is reality; children you must not mix them up.⁴²

Just as Raikō subdues the *sake*-drinking child, rationality has subdued the heterogeneity of society.

Acceleration and Contrasts

I will end with the following statement by Pierre Nora:

The acceleration of history: let us try to gauge the significance, beyond metaphor, of this phrase. An increasingly rapid slippage of the present into a historical past that is gone for good, a general perception that anything and everything may disappear—these indicate a rupture of equilibrium. The remnants of experience still lived in the warmth of tradition, in the silence of custom, in the repetition of the ancestral, have been displaced under the pressure of a fundamentally historical sensibility. Self-consciousness emerges under the sign of that which has already happened, as the fulfillment of something always already begun.⁴³

Nature provided an idea that in Bruno Latour's words had "the properties of being mobile but also immutable, presentable, readable and combinable with one another."⁴⁴ It served as the grounding that would arrest the slippage into modernity. The folk and folklore, landscapes, and the Japanese body (constantly redeveloped through the child) provide that mobile property. These are the "already begun," concepts that are constant because of their attachment to nature. As such, nature was enabling; it facilitated the formulation of a modern notion of a Japanese society. However, by orienting experience according to a certain past, now defined within various natural categories, Nature (in all its ambiguous and multiple meanings) obscured a critical part of Japan's transformation, the reorientation of everyday life according to various abstractions that used the *sensate* to occult the separation of experience from life.

11. Karaki Junzō, *Beruzū, Mōai, Kōkernu. Vachuban Shō*, MBZ, vol. 49, pp. 377–378.
12. Mori Ōgai, "Mōsō," in *Ōgai Zenshū*, vol. 8, pp. 203–204.
13. See *Philosophen Lexicon*, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1949), pp. 449–454.
14. Mori Ōgai, *Shinbiron*, in *Ōgai Zenshū*, vol. 21, p. 26.
15. See E. Hattmann, *Die deutsche Ästhetik seit Kant. Erster historischer-kritischer Teil der Ästhetik* (Berlin, 1887). See also M. Schasler, *Kritische Geschichte der Ästhetik. Grundlegung für die Ästhetik als Philosophie des Schönen und der Kunst* (Berlin, 1872).
16. *Ōgai Zenshū*, vol. 23, pp. 5–6.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 1–87.
18. See A. Schwiegler, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Umrisse-Ein Leitfaden zum Übersicht* (1887).

Chapter 11: Cognitive Gaps in the Recognition of Masters and Masterpieces

1. Kitazawa Noriaki, *Me no Shindan* (Tokyo: Bijutsu Shuppansha, 1989). See also Nishikawa Nagao, "Nippongata Kokumin-Kokka no Keisei," in *Bakumatsu Meiji-ki no Kokumin Kokka Keisei to Bunkashokuyō* (Tokyo: Shin'yōsha, 1995).
2. Inaga Shigemitsu, "De l'Artisan à l'Artiste au Seuil de la Modernité Japonaise ou l'Implantation de la Notion de Beaux-Arts au Japon," *Sociologie de l'Art* 8 (1995): 47–62; Inaga Shigemitsu, "Bijutsu no Tasha to Shite no Nihon, Nihon no Tasha to Shite no Bijutsu," international symposium on *The Other in Art History*. December 1996 (forthcoming).
3. Inaga Shigemitsu, *Kaiga no Tasogare: Le Crépuscule de la Peinture. La Latte Postume d'Édouard Manet* (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 1997), deals with this issue by taking up the case of the mythological making of Manet's modernism.
4. Théodore Duret, "L'Art Japonais, les Livres Illustrés, les Albums Imprimés, Hokusai," *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, 2e pér., 1883, pp. 113 ff.; republished in Théodore Duret, *Critique d'Avant-garde* (Paris: Charpentier, 1885).
5. Louis Gonse, *L'Art Japonais* (Paris: Quatin, 1883), pp. 289–290, 270.
6. William Anderson, *The Pictorial Art in Japan* (London: Sampson Law, 1886), pp. 98–99.
7. *Ibid.*

8. I already presented portions of the following analysis in part 1 of my paper "Impressionist Aesthetics and Japanese Aesthetics, around a Controversy," *Kyoto Conference on Japanese Studies*, International Research Center for Japanese Studies, vol. 3 (Kyoto: The Japan Foundation, 1994), pp. 307–319, although in a different context.

9. Ernest Fenollosa, "Review of the Chapter on Painting in *L'Art Japonais* by L. Gonse," *The Japan Weekly Mail*, July 12, 1884.

10. Louis Gonse, *L'Art Japonais* (1883), pp. 272–273. See also Louis Gonse, *L'Art Japonais* (rev. ed. 1926), p. 90, which, although considerably enlarged, repeats the same quotation without modification.
11. Edmond de Goncourt, *Hokousai* (1896), preface.
12. Kigi Yasuko, *Hayashi Tadamasu to Sono Jidai* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1987); Brigitte Koyama-Richard, "Hayashi Tadamasu et l'Art Décoratif de l'Ère Meiji," *Journal of Human and Cultural Sciences* 28, no. 2 (1997): 121–163.
13. Yamaguchi Seiichi, *Fenollosa*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1982), pp. 267–276.
14. Kobayashi Bunsichi, "Postface," in Hanjūrō Iijima Kyoshin, *Katsubika Hokusai Den*

(Tokyo: Hōsūkaku, 1893). On Philippe Burty, see Gabriel P. Weisberg, *The Independent Critic Philippe Burty and The Visual Arts of Mid-Nineteenth Century France* (New York: Peter Lang, 1993).

15. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Nouvelle acquisition française, 2240 ff. 245–253. Shigenori Inaga, *Théodore Duret*, vol. 3 (Lille: Atelier Nationale des Thèses, 1989), p. 598, gives a detailed account of this dispute.

16. S. Bing, "La Vie et l'Oeuvre de Hokusai," *La Revue Blanche*, Nos. 64–65 (1896). The correspondence of Hayashi Tadamasu to Edmond de Goncourt on this affair is transcribed and noted by Giovanni Peternolli, "The Unpublished Letters of Hayashi Tadamasu to Edmond de Goncourt," in *Ukiyo-e Geijutsu*, pp. 62–63 (1979). See also Nakajima Kenzō, ed., *Letters of Edmond de Goncourt to Hayashi Tadamasu* (Tokyo, 1930, private ed.).

17. Satō Dōshin, "Kindai Shigaku to Shite no Bijutsushi no Seiritsu to Tenkai," in *Nihon Bijutsu Shi no Suimiyaku* (Tokyo: Perikansha, 1993), pp. 146–170.

18. National Museum of Nara, *Nara Koharitsu Hakubutsukan no Meibō: Masterpieces from the Collection of the Nara National Museum* (1997); Takagi Hiroshi, "Nihon Bijutsushi no Seiritsu Shiron," *Nihonshi Kenkyū*, no. 400 (1995): 74–98; also included in Takagi Hiroshi, *Kindai Ten-nōei no Bunkashiteki Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1997).

19. My translation from the Japanese.

20. Nōshōmushō, Kōhon Nippon Teikoku Bijutsu Ryakki (1901), French translation, Commission Impériale du Japon, *L'Histoire de l'Art du Japon*, trans. Emmanuel Tronquois (Paris: Maurice de Brunoff, 1900). For the English revised edition, see The Imperial Museum, *A History of Japanese Arts* (Tokyo: Ryūbin-kwan Publishing, 1913), where the section on "Architecture" is entirely separated and put at the end of the volume by Itō Chūta.

21. Takashina Erika, "Kuroda Seiki's Portrait of Okakura Tenshin: New Light on the Inspiration and Theme of *Chi Kan Jō*," *Bijutsu-shi* 139 45, no. 1 (1996): 31–43.

22. Okakura Tenshin, *Tenbin Zenshū*, 4 vols. (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1980). See Inoue Shōichi, *Hōryūji he no Seishinshi* (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1994). However, Ojita Yasunao advances the hypothesis that the Pan-Asian vision in Tenshin's original conception of *L'Histoire de l'Art du Japon* was replaced by the more nationalistic interpretation of the Mito School of National Studies in the final version published under the direction of Fukuchi Mataichi. See Ojita Yasunao, *Nihonshi no Shisō* (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1997), pp. 31–102.

23. Kuroita Katsumi, ed., *Tokken Kokubō Mokuroku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1927).

24. Satō Dōshin, *Nihon Bijutsu Tanjō* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1996), p. 218; see also Satō Dōshin, *Meiji Kokka to Kindai Bijutsu* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1999).

25. Bernard Frank, "L'Intérêt pour les Religions Japonaises dans la France du XIXe siècle et les Collection d'Émile Guimet," in *L'Age du Japonisme* (Tokyo: Société Franco-Japonaise d'Art et d'Archéologie; Kinokuniya, 1983), p. 13.

26. Exhibition Catalogue, *Umi no Watatta Meiji Bijutsu* (Tokyo: Tokyo National Museum, 1997).

27. Henri Focillon, *Hokousai* (1914, 1917) (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1925), rev. ed., preface, p. iii.

Chapter 12: Nature—the Naturalization of Experience as National

1. Arthur O. Lovejoy, "'Nature' as Aesthetic Norm," in *Essays in the History of Ideas* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1948), p. 69.

2. Karatani Kōjin, *Origins of Modern Japanese Literature*, trans. and ed. Brett de Bary (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 88.
3. Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History*, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 6.
4. Henri Lefebvre, "What Is Modernity?" in *Introduction to Modernity* (London: Verso, 1995), p. 181.
5. "Nihonshugi," in *Meiji Bungaku Zenshū*, vol. 40 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1970), p. 23.
6. Hori Ichiro, *Folk Religion in Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 141–179.
7. Quoted in Stephen A. Diamond, *Anger, Madness, and the Daimonic* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 63.
8. Hori, *Folk Religion in Japan*, p. 72.
9. "Yōkaigaku to Shinrigaku to no Kankei," in Nakao Soo, *Hosai Ronshū* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1902), p. 97.
10. The mental image, provisional ghost, and false and true ghosts are some of the categories of Inoue's taxonomy of the mysterious and fantastic. "Yōkaigaku to Shinrigaku to no Kankei," pp. 97–98.
11. Quoted in Miyata Noboru, *Yōkai no Minzokugaku, Nihon no Mienai Kākan* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), p. 50.
12. "Yōkaigaku to Shinrigaku to no Kankei," pp. 89–90.
13. Onda Akira, "Inoue Enryō no Shinrigaku no Gyōseki," in *Inoue Enryō no Gakuri Shisō*, ed. Shimizu Tadashi (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Inoue Enryō Kinen Gakujutsu Shinkō Kikin, 1989), p. 416.
14. "Yōkaigaku to Shinrigaku to no Kankei," p. 100.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
16. Certeau, *The Writing of History*, p. 73.
17. Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990 [1980]), p. 69.
18. Miyake Setsurei, "Shinzenbi" and "Giakushū," in *Miyake Setsurei Shū, Gendai Nihon Bungaku Zenshū*, vol. 5 (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1931).
19. Miyake, "Shinzenbi," pp. 233–235.
20. Miyake, "Giakushū," p. 257. For a discussion of such hierarchical categorization, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 'Indian' Pasts," in *Representations* 37 (winter 1992): 1–26.
21. Miyake, "Shinzenbi," pp. 223, 225–226, and 227.
22. Quoted in Robert E. Norton, *Harder's Aesthetics and the European Enlightenment* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 73–74.
23. Miyake, "Shinzenbi," pp. 218–219.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
25. Takayama Chogyū, "Biteki Saikatsu o Ronzu," in *Meiji Bungaku Zenshū*, vol. 40, p. 82.
26. Miyake, "Giakushū," p. 256.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
28. Miyake, "Shinzenbi," p. 238.
29. In the words of Arthur O. Lovejoy, "the 'natural' as that which is most congenial to, and

immediately comprehensible and enjoyable by *each* individual—this conceived not as uniform in all men, but as varying with time, race, nationality, and cultural tradition." "Nature as Aesthetic Norm," p. 73.

30. *The Book of Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1–2.
31. Inoue Tetsujirō, "Shizen to Dōtoku" (speech given on April 26, 1908, published in his *Shakai to Dōtoku* [Tokyo: Kodōkan, 1915], p. 714).
32. *Ibid.*, p. 743. In contrast, Katō Hiroyuki argues that it is not creativity that differentiates humans from animals but the level of that creativity. See his *Shizen to Rinri* (Tokyo: Jitsugyōsha no Nihonsha, 1912), pp. 19–20.
33. Inoue, "Shizen to Dōtoku," p. 735.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 721–722.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 748–749.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 734.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 719–720.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 728–729.
39. For a more detailed analysis, see my "Childhood: The Naturalization of Development into a Japanese Space," in *Cultures of Scholarship*, ed. Sally Humphries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
40. Lefebvre, "What Is Modernity?" p. 171.
41. Inoue, "Chokugo Engi," in *Shiryō Kyōka Chokugo*, ed. Katayama Seiichi (Tokyo: Kōryōsha Shoten, 1974), p. 156.
42. Quoted in Sarake Akihiro, *Shuten Dōji Iban* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1977), pp. 189–190.
43. "Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux des Mémoires*," *Representations* 26 (spring 1989): 7.
44. "Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands," *Knowledge and Society* 6 (1986): 7.

Chapter 13: *Coincidentia Oppositorum*

1. Sasaki Ken'ichi, *Evanikku no Jigen: "Nihon Tetsugaku" Sōbi no Tame ni* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1998), pp. 59–67.
2. My reading of Ōnishi is based on his *Man'yōbū no Shizen Kanjō* (Feelings for Nature in the *Man'yōbū*) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1943). This title is hereafter abbreviated as *MISK*.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 49–51.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 42–45.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 68–71.
6. About Apollo, Nietzsche writes:

Apollo is at once the god of all plastic powers and the soothsaying god. He who is etymologically the "lucent" one, the god of light, reigns also over the fair illusion of our inner world of fantasy. The perfection of these conditions in contrast to our imperfectly understood waking reality, as well as our profound awareness of nature's healing powers during the interval of sleep and dream, furnishes a symbolic analogue to the soothsaying faculty and quite generally to the arts, which make life possible and worth living. . . . In an eccentric way one might say of Apollo what Schopenhauer says, in the first part of