Explaining International Order
Why Rules?

- Rules are general commands enforced by threats of punishment.
- Rules can be coercive (illegitimate) or authoritative (legitimate).
  - Legitimacy is determined by the target of the rule
  - Attempt to limit Iran’s nuclear program v. rules of WTO
- Rules used to facilitate cooperation or structure bargains
- Rules are efficient when relations are frequent or iterated.
Cooperation

**Figure 2.1** *Cooperation*

**Figure A.2** *The Prisoner’s Dilemma*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Both prisoners get out and split the loot.</td>
<td>A1 goes to jail; A2 goes free and keeps all the loot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>A1 goes free and keeps all the loot; A2 goes to jail.</td>
<td>Both go to jail and split the loot later.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When Is Cooperation Beneficial and Defection Costly?

- Aggregation
- Specialization and Exchange
  - Specific Assets
    - Portfolio Investment
    - Primary products (e.g. Planation Agriculture and Mining)
    - Forward Operating Bases for military/launch sites
    - “Strategic” locations
Cooperation and Bargaining

**FIGURE 2.3** Cooperation and Bargaining

- State B's Welfare
- State A's Welfare

- B gets $1000, A gets $0
- A gets $200, B gets $200
- A gets $1000, B gets $0

Pareto Frontier
Why Rules?

- Facilitate cooperation
  - Provide information
  - Reduce transactions costs
- Define bargains
  - adjudicate disputes
- Dominant country wants rules that favor its interests and limit what others can do.
  - Will bind itself to rules only as necessary to control others.
Governance

- Imposing and implementing rule is costly.
  - Control others
    - Monitor behavior
    - Impose rewards and punishments
  - Select and support collaborating leaders
  - Accept limits on your own freedom of action
Forms of Power
Coercion v. Indirect Rule
Domestic Politics: Contest Function

\[ x_q = \frac{\pi}{\pi + (1 - \pi)} a \]
Interests: The Dominant State
Coercion: When $p$ is high and $c_D$ is low

$$W_D = p(1 - c_D) + (1 - p)(x_q - c_D)$$
Coercion: When p is low and c_D is high

\[ W_D = p(1 - c_D) + (1 - p)(x_q - c_D) \]
Indirect Rule: International Contest Function

\[ x_i = \frac{\pi + \gamma}{\pi + \gamma + (1 - \pi)} \]
Indirect Rule Compared

Indirect rule

Domestic politics

Coercion

A offers

\[ x, y \]

D offers

1

accepts

\[ x, y \]

D offers

0

rejects

D offers

D fights

D offers

D does nothing

\[ x_q \]

D offers

N offers

D wins

D offers

D loses
But Why Do We Disagree?

- Conceptions of Interests
  - Material interests
  - Different values

- Expectations of costs and success using different strategies

- When confronted with a foreign policy “problem,” we debate alternative courses of action

- But we do not completely shed our notions of interests or expectations
Mental Models of Politics

- We are “intuitive” political scientists
  - Carry innate and socialized notions of political interactions
- Our intuitions are refined by theory and practice
  - Experienced decision makers are more strategic than naive decision makers
  - Certain deference to “experts”
- We do not understand where these intuitive mental models “come from”
Mead’s Ideal Type “Schools”

- Hamiltonians: National interest requires integration into global economy
- Wilsonians: National interest in promoting democracy and U.S. values abroad
- Jeffersonians: National interest is protecting fragile democracy at home
- Jacksonians: National interest limited to the physical security and economic well-being of the American people
Dimensions of Variation

Engage the world

Interests are material

Interests are values

Seek autonomy

Hamiltonians

Wilsonians

Jeffersonians

Jacksonians
Promoting international commerce and economic prosperity are highest aspirations

Relatively optimistic: trade is not zero-sum, thus international cooperation is possible and mutually beneficial

Use international institutions when possible, but not against using force when necessary

Would support confrontation with Iran as a “rogue” state, but cautious not to disrupt region

 Presidents: T. Roosevelt, Taft, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Ford, Bush 41
Wilsonians

- U.S. should promote democracy and human rights abroad
  - Make the world safe for democracy
  - Democratic peace
- Relatively optimistic: everyone can (and should be) democratic
- International institutions are critical for cooperation
- Limit Iran through multilateral cooperation (JCPOA)
- Presidents: Wilson, FDR, Johnson, Carter, Clinton, Bush 43, Obama
Jeffersonians

- Protect freedom/liberty at home above all else
- U.S. is “shining city on a hill,” but the rest of the world is corrupt. Pessimistic about change, even through international institutions
- Military threatens democracy at home
  - Foreign engagement and especially wars expand the role and power of the military/president at expense of the people
- On Iran, President overstepped his legitimate constitutional powers
- Examples: Eisenhower?
Jacksonians

- Security and prosperity at home are paramount
- World is an unsafe place (relatively pessimistic); U.S. must defend its honor/reputation
- International institutions are corrupting
  - Military force breeds respect and should be primary instrument of statecraft
- Assassination of Soleimani justified retaliation
- Examples: Reagan, Trump
Conclusion

- Schools condition how we
  - Define our interests
    - Distance between \( d = 1, b = 0, b < a < d \)
  - Estimate the utility of using military force
    - Probability of victory, costs of fighting
  - Estimate the reliability of the allied group
    - Can group A be trusted to deliver promised policy at reasonable governance cost?
  - Estimate policy if the country decides for itself \( (x_q) \)?

- Hard to know answers because we do not observe the counterfactuals. Reasonable people can reasonably disagree.