Global Governance, Authority, and Leadership

David A. Lake
University of California, San Diego
November 2013

Memo Prepared for the Workshop on
“Global Governance and the Neglected Issue of Leadership, ”
Global Governance Programme, European University Institute,
Florence, Italy, December 12-14, 2013.

First draft; please do not quote or cite.

Leadership is like pornography. As Justice Potter Stewart famously wrote of the latter, we know it when we see it – though a satisfactory positive definition remains elusive. Political theorists since Machiavelli and business consultants eternal have attempted to capture the essence of the leadership, distill it into rules, and impart the art of leading to their listeners. They have largely failed, for at least two reasons that invoke a sense of humility when entering onto the subject. First, leadership is a trait or characteristic possessed by individuals or entities, but is often context specific. An individual might rise to the occasion and lead in one circumstance – discovering a quality in herself that she may not have known she possessed – and follow in another. We think individuals possess more or less potential for leadership, but we really have no true idea. Second, leadership is an inherently social or relational construct. As the old canard that “every leader needs followers” suggests, it is the led -- the followers -- who actually confer leadership on individuals. A person may claim to be a leader, but in the absence of others willing to follow the assertion is merely egotistical preening.

David A. Lake is Gerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. Email: dlake@ucsd.edu.
Although many conceptions abound, I begin from Nannerl Keohane’s (2012, 19) recent summary that “leadership is all about: providing solutions to common problems or offering ideas about how to accomplish collective purposes, and mobilizing the energies of others to follow these courses of action.” Governance, in turn, is the structure and process of wielding authority within a society, including both formal-legal authority in established political institutions and informal authority vested in individuals, groups, and organizations outside “government” strictly defined. Global governance is the structure and process of wielding authority between and over nation-states. Leadership in global governance is the creation and use of political authority or legitimate power to accomplish collective aims. It takes three main forms. First, charismatic leadership arises when legitimacy is conferred by society on a particular individual because of some special attribute that he or she possesses. Second, entrepreneurial leadership develops when some individual or entity identifies and fills a governance niche, providing previously unfulfilled services that contribute to social order. Such entrepreneurial leaders acquire authority up to the extent of the value they add to social welfare. Third, transformational leadership requires an individual or entity to identify and build an alternative basis for legitimacy. This task is rendered difficult precisely because of the social nature of authority.

This essay, at present, represents more a thinking through of these complicated issues than a theory and test of any sort. It is more a brush clearing exercise than a well-developed research article. I proceed in three major steps. First, I review the concept of governance, locating it as a broad form of political authority. Second, I then explore the concept of authority in some detail. This foundation is necessary for an more detailed
investigation of the nature and practice of leadership. Finally, I explain in somewhat more depth and provide examples in global governance of the three types of leadership already highlighted. This section is, admittedly, less developed and somewhat uneven. If this project proceeds and this paper matures into something more substantial, I intend to examine cases of leadership in global governance in more detail. The conclusion briefly outlines the research agenda for each type of leadership identified.

**Global Governance**

As a concept, global governance has been used in many different ways. For my purposes, governance is the exercise of authority by an actor over some limited community. Authority can be wielded by governments, of course, but also by families, clans, religious orders, professional associations, and a host of other actors. Public authorities in the form of modern states are unique in that they create obligations for the community over which they rule that are rendered into law and enforced by a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, although that is not the only form of enforcement applied. Supranational authorities take a similar public form in that they create law, even when they rely on national governments to enforce it. Private authorities also create obligations that—though they lack the status of law—are equally binding on members of a community and typically enforced by exclusion. Governance thus subsumes and is broader than mere government (public or legal authority), a characteristic on which nearly all definitions agree (Young 1994, 15-16). Global governance, in turn, is the set of actors that wield authority across national borders, including states that exercise authority over other states (hierarchy), international organizations that possess authority over their
member states (supranationalism), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations that exert authority over communities located in two or more states.

This conception of global governance differs from others in two key respects. First, it limits governance to authority relationships. Some definitions are considerably broader and nearly synonymous with all of international politics. The Commission on Global Governance, for instance, defines its purview as

the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest (Governance 1995, 4).

If the concept of global governance is to be useful, in my view, it should be limited to actors and relationships that possess at least a measure of authority than spans national borders (Rosenau 2002, 72). Non-authoritative relations are already better described through the analytic constructs of cooperation and conflict, transnational relations, and intergovernmentalism. We gain little by lumping these disparate interactions under the label of global governance.

Second, global governance and authority more generally need not be Pareto-improving. Some definitions restrict global governance to collection action that aims and ideally succeeds in resolving common problems. The Commission on Global Governance, as above, defines cooperation as the goal of governance. Similarly, in another a widely cited definition, Young limits governance to

the establishment and operation of social institutions (in the sense of rules of the game that serve to define social practices assign roles, and guide interactions among the occupants of these roles) capable of resolving conflicts, facilitating cooperation, or, more generally, alleviating collective-action problems in a world
of interdependent actors, reducing conflict, and facilitating cooperation (Young 1994, 15-16).

Some forms of governance may be observed more frequently in interactions that are Pareto-improving, although this is speculative since we currently lack metrics for “counting” instances of governance and cooperation. But authority can also be used to benefit a leader or her supporters at the expense of others in the relevant community. Authority is always wielded by someone for some purpose: sometimes it is used to increase the welfare of everyone in a community, sometimes to redistribute welfare from the community to the leader (and her supporters), and sometimes for both ends simultaneously (Krasner 1991). We should not presume that authority is always used nobly, fairly, or in the interests of all within a community subject to its obligations.

Scholars of global governance have been reluctant to highlight the concept of authority, I suspect, for fear of being dismissed by others committed to the assumption that international relations is inherently anarchic. If governance is the exercise of authority, and international politics is by assumption devoid of authority, then there can be no such thing as global governance. As a result, even those who see global governance as central to contemporary international politics often cloak their analyses in euphemisms that describe it more generally as cooperation so as to open a space in which its effects can be observed. As a discipline, we have been wearing blinders of formal-legalism that mask the possibility of authority between and over states. Shedding these blinders is an important step in seeing global governance for what it is, a set of authority relationships.

Political Authority and Governance

Authority is a negotiated, dynamic relationship between a ruler and the ruled that is premised on the provision of social order by the former in exchange for compliance
and legitimacy by the latter. It is an inherently social construct, dependent on the conferral of rights by the ruled as a collective on the ruler. Legitimacy arises when large numbers of individuals recognize the authority of a ruler; although we may attach a normative valence to the concept, its normativity actually follows from the large-scale recognition of authority. Existing social norms, however, condition the nature of the appropriate social order the ruler must provide and what are and are not appropriate actions for the ruler to take in providing social order. Multiple units within any society, including international society, can exercise authority, typically in separate, layered but sometimes overlapping domains. Authority becomes “vested” or institutionalized when social groups invest in assets specific to particular authority structures and, thus, develop an interest in the preservation of that structure.

**Political Authority Defined**

Political authority is a form of power in which a “ruler” exercises power legitimately or rightfully, that is, in accordance with the beliefs of the “ruled” about the appropriateness of her commands. Importantly, unlike coercion which can be strictly dyadic, authority can only be understood as a social relationship involving a ruler and a community of two or (commonly many) more subjects. More precisely, authority is defined by three interrelated conditions, each of which is necessary to distinguish authority from other forms of power, especially coercion. When all three conditions are met, rule and the exercise of power can be regarded as *legitimate* or rightful.

First, the ruler is recognized by the ruled as having the *right* to issue certain, limited commands. All authority is limited both by the community to which it applies and, importantly, by the range of actions by the ruled that are subject to appropriate regulation.
Although absolutist monarchs and totalitarian governments may claim in principle authority over all social interactions within a community, in practice the ruled reserve some realm of “private rights” or autonomy beyond the reach of the ruler—even if this encompasses only “everyday acts of peasant resistance” that are regarded as appropriate by the community (Scott 1985). In all cases, rulers can rightfully command some actions but not all possible actions by the ruled. A ruler can prohibit subjects from stealing from one another, for instance, but typically lacks support for commands to seize the assets of members of the same community, unless those members have been previously “demonized” or vilified as “outsiders.” When rulers issue commands that go beyond what is regarded as rightful by the community, they act coercively or illegitimately. When rulers shoot protestors, for example, they are often criticized by their people for overstepping the bounds of their authority. This implies, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the same ruler can be both authoritative in issuing one command and non-authoritative or coercive in issuing another. Such transgressions often call the authority of the ruler as a whole into question, but many rulers are able to withstand occasional violations of their legitimate powers. Authority is always specific to action and context.

Second, the right of the ruler to issue certain commands implies a correlative duty or obligation for the ruled to comply, if possible, with those rules. As Richard Flathman observes, “If A has authority X, those persons who are in A’s jurisdiction therefore have an obligation or obligations Y.”¹ In accepting this obligation, the community “surrenders judgment” and acknowledges the force of A’s command. Thus, rightful rules are binding on the community because they are, in fact, rightful. This constitutes the primary

¹ Flathman (1980, 35). See also Pitkin (1966). For views that challenges this obligation, see Greenawalt (1987) and Reiman (1972).
difference between coercion and political authority. Although it may be prudent to comply with the demands of a mugger applying superior force, his demand is not rightful and the victim has no obligation to hand over his money. Coercion is regarded by neither the perpetrator nor the victim as legitimate. Indeed, communities typically reject that such extortion can be acceptable under any circumstances. Conversely, we commonly recognize that governments have a right to seize a portion of our income or assets as taxes, and that we have an obligation to pay. As taxpayers, we may complain, seek out loopholes, and begrudge the government its due, but we generally accept the state’s claim on our resources. As with the mugger, assets are transferred from taxpayer to the state but, in the case of taxes, the extraction is regarded as rightful or legitimate. It is the duty to comply with the ruler’s commands – or, alternatively, the legitimacy of those commands – that renders authority and coercion conceptually distinct.  

Third, although individuals may have a duty to comply with rightful rules, members of a community may still choose to violate those rules—just as individuals may defy the threats of a mugger. Indeed, rules are most valuable precisely when individuals have incentives to act differently or “defect,” and a duty to comply does not automatically supersede these incentives. Thus, the second condition implies a further correlative right by the ruler to enforce her commands in the event of individual noncompliance. As John Day (1963, 260) notes, “those who possess authority in political

---

2 This distinction between authority and coercion is nicely captured in Waltz’s first and third dimensions of political structure. The first dimension is the ordering principle, or the way in which the units stand in relation to one another. In Waltz’s conception, this refers to the authority relationship between the units, embodied in the difference between hierarchy and anarchy. The third dimension is the distribution of capabilities, often mistaken for the distribution of power. Capabilities matter for Waltz because they create opportunities for coercion: more capable states can impose their will on others, up to and including eliminating states as independent entities; less capable states suffer the wills of others. Waltz (1979, 118). Waltz remains true to his realism in emphasizing power; but in a way that is not widely appreciated his dimensions of political structure are defined by different forms of power.
life, the rulers, are authorized not only to make laws and take decisions, but also to use coercive power when necessary to ensure obedience to those laws and acquiescence in those decisions.” In an authority relationship, individuals choose whether to comply with a ruler’s commands but are bound by the right of the ruler to discipline or punish their noncompliance. Many drivers exceed the speed limit, for instance, but if caught they accept the right of the state to issue fines or other punishments for breaking the law.

Enforcement, in turn, can take many forms. Although it is often associated with violence, following Weber’s definition of the state, rulers can use a variety of tools to punish rule violators. Physical punishment, whether as incarceration or fines, aims to reduce the gains from and, thus, the incentive to defect. A second and perhaps even more common form of enforcement is exclusion, wherein the defiant member is denied in whole or part the benefits of being a part of a community. Exclusion is a type of punishment, but is often overlooked in discussions of authority due to the inordinate focus on legitimate violence in Weber’s definition of the state. Hunter-gather societies ostracize individuals who cannot or will not obey the elders (Boehm 1999). Parents threaten to disown their unruly children. Religions shun or excommunicate sinners, and threaten apostates and non-believers with eternal damnation. Professional associations expel incompetents and rule transgressors (e.g., law associations “disbar” wayward members). Even states deny or revoke citizenship and deport undesirables. Indeed, so common is exclusion as a means of enforcement that we have developed a rich vocabulary for this practice. Sanctions that bar the violator from some benefit provided by the ruler or the community, such as the ability to trade with other members, are another common tool of enforcement that stops short of complete ostracism. Governors
also enforce their authority by “naming and shaming” violators; this blow to the offending party’s reputation often has the same effect as more formal sanctions in limiting it from enjoying the full benefits of participation in the community. Exclusion in whole or part from a group can be an enforcement mechanism equal in power to the legitimate violence wielded by a state.

Political authority and, specifically, the right to punish noncompliance ultimately rests on the collective acceptance or legitimacy of the ruler’s right to rule. As Thomas Hobbes himself recognized, “the power of the mighty (the Leviathan) hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people.” Flathman (1980, 29) develops this point more fully, arguing that enforcement “is impossible without substantial agreement among the members of the association about those very propositions whose rejection commonly brings coercion into play.” If recognized as legitimate, the ruler acquires the ability to punish individuals because of the broad backing of others. In extremis, an anarchist may deny any obligation to comply with the ruler’s laws, but if the larger community of which he is part recognizes the force of those commands and supports the ruler’s right to punish him for violating them, then that anarchist -- though he would have no moral obligation to accept the legitimacy of the ruler -- can still be regarded as subordinate to and bound by the ruler’s authority (Flathman 1980, 30). Similarly, rulers can enforce specific edicts even in the face of opposition if the general body of commands is accepted as legitimate by a sufficiently large number of the ruled. In both cases, the ruler’s capacity to enforce her rule rests on the collective affirmation and possibly active consent of a sufficient

---

3 Quoted in Williams (2006, 265).
4 The distinction between coercion and authority is muddled even here, suggesting how for even the most thoughtful theorists it is easy to blur the concepts. In my terms, “coercion” should read “enforcement” or “punishment.”
portion of her subjects.\(^5\) Because a sufficient fraction of the relevant community accept
the ruler and her edicts as rightful, the ruler can enforce her will against individual free
riders and even dissidents. Knowing that a sufficient number of others support the ruler,
in turn, potential free riders and dissidents are deterred from violating the rules, and overt
enforcement is rendered unnecessary or, at least, unusual.

Political authority is, thus, fundamentally a social construct in that the rights and
duty that stand at its core are not defined by the ruler herself, or by individual subjects,
but rather by the community who, collectively, recognize certain rights and duties. The
social nature of authority helps resolve the apparent contradiction that, from the
perspective of a collectivity, compliance with authority is voluntary, but from the
standpoint of any particular individual, compliance is mandatory. Even as individuals
obligate themselves to follow the commands of the ruler, they choose collectively
whether to accept the ruler’s authority (Day 1963, 268).\(^6\) In this way, authority is the
alchemist’s dross through which pure coercion is transformed into legitimate power.
From the perspective of the collectivity of subordinates, compliance with authority is
voluntary, as subjects confer rights on the ruler. But from the standpoint of any individual
subordinate, compliance is the result of “compelling social pressures” rooted in that

\(^5\) Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, 133), Bernard (1962, 169). What constitutes a “sufficient portion” is a thorny
issue that likely varies over different contexts and societies. I intentionally do not try to define sufficiency
here. The notion is similar to selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith 2011), but broader. Sufficiency is not just a minimum winning coalition from within the selectorate,
but includes all those citizens who must recognize as rightful and at least acquiesce in the selectorate itself.
Note that individuals who reject the legitimacy of the ruler are not necessarily mistaken in their beliefs or
are bound by the community because the latter “knows better.” Rather, legitimacy is a variable, that
increases (becomes more legitimate) the larger the portion of a community that accepts the rulers
commands as rightful.

\(^6\) A long philosophical debate exists between those who argue that authoritative commands are “protected
reasons” that should prevail regardless of the recipient’s present desires (Raz 1979, esp. 23) and those who
maintain that the duty to comply can be overridden by another moral duty or other reasons (Ross 1930, 89;
Smith 1973, 951; Kagan 1989). Separating the individual from the community helps, I think, resolve this
conundrum. Individuals weigh reasons when deciding whether to follow commands, and one important
reason is whether the community of which that individual is part accepts the command as rightful.
collective practice. As Peter Blau (1963, 312) writes, “the compliance of subordinates in authority relationships is as voluntary as our custom of wearing clothes.”

**The Dynamics of Governance**

Social constructs, like authority, are often quite “sticky” and slow to change. Precisely because any individual’s adherence to a belief depends on other’s adherence to that same belief, change happens only when a large number of individuals simultaneously change their positions or such a change is precipitated by an intervention into the network of belief holders (Mackie 1996; Bicchieri 2006). Political authority is nonetheless malleable. It is not a constant but a variable that exists in greater or lesser degrees in different times and places. Most important, authority varies in strength, measured by the maximum divergence between the ruler’s command and the preferences of the ruled under which the latter will still comply. The ruler is weak when she is limited to commanding only that which the ruled would do anyway. The ruler is strong when the ruled are willing undertake costly actions at her behest. At the same time, authority is never absolute. There is always some command that the ruler could issue that the ruled would defy. Operationalizing authority, of course, is not easy for reasons that follow from this implication. In equilibrium, the ruler will request only that which she expects the ruled will consent to do; whether the ruled would have wanted to undertake the action anyway, or did so only at the ruler’s command, is difficult to discern without an investigation of the preferences of the ruled, which are typically hard to uncover.

Yet, even when ruler and ruled understand their rights and duties, political authority is always a product and site of political struggle. Both ruler and ruled may contest at the margins the rights and duties -- and privileges and limits -- of their
relationship. What it means to be authoritative and what rights both the ruler and ruled may legitimately possess are continuously renegotiated. The Constitution of the United States, for instance, has changed radically over time through judicial interpretation even though the document itself has seldom been amended. The legitimate powers of the United States federal government have grown at some margins at the expense of its member states through progressively more expansive interpretations of the interstate commerce clause in the Constitutions. It has also contracted at other margins through more expansive interpretations of the right to privacy, which limited the rights of states to regulate abortion. Similarly, the legitimate powers of males within households varies dramatically across societies, and have been greatly reduced in the developed democracies over time as new norms of gender equality have developed. Acts of non-compliance by subordinates designed to test the ruler’s tolerance, and acts of discipline by the ruler to demarcate those limits, are inherent parts of this struggle.

Since rules matter to political outcomes, including who wins and who loses on particular issues, fights over outcomes often get displaced onto fights over rules and procedures – in other words, onto who holds authority over what. Losers almost inevitably decry the process that produced the adverse result, and try to change the rules so as to alter the outcome. Winners try to preserve or even amend the rules to lock-in their gains. Indeed, since rules often shape outcomes in similar ways across multiple issue areas or over time in repeated interactions, political fights over rules often have more at stake than in any specific instance and tend to be especially brutal and bitter. Even if the parties might not wage political battle for a “one-off” issue, they may be sufficiently motivated by changes in rules to fight long and hard over their provisions. As
these battles get fought out, the structure of authority within a community evolves slowly and, sometimes, changes rapidly in a form of punctuated equilibrium (Krasner 1984).

Importantly, political authority can, over time, reshape the community over which it is exercised, increasing or decreasing its legitimacy. Rules matter. They induce members of a community to act differently than they otherwise might. This is, at one level, precisely why a community will subject itself to authority in the first place. In turn, individual members of a community adapt themselves, their actions, and their portfolios of assets to the particular set of rules under which they expect to live.

Actors acquire a wide variety of assets in everyday life. Individuals buy property, pursue an education, develop specialized knowledge and skills suited to particular occupations, and save for old age. Collectively, communities invest in infrastructure and specialize in different industries or economic sectors. Some assets will be generic, easily switched with little loss in value from one use or regime to another. Other assets will be highly specific to a particular authority relationship and the policies it produces, and they can redeployed to other uses or used under alternative regimes only with substantial loss in value. As actors invest in such authority or policy specific assets, they become dependent on the authority structure that produces a particular order and, in turn, acquire incentives to support the ruler and suppress possible dissidents who would overturn it. In this way, the ruled reinforce the ruler’s authority.

Within the United States, for example, farmers have considerable clout within Congress because of their broad geographic dispersion. They are also dependent on government subsidies. If these socially inefficient subsidies were withdraw, crop prices would fall, land values would decline, and some now-poorer farmers would be forced to
shift to new occupations and acquire new skills and assets. To forestall the decline in the values of their human and physical capital, farmers fight hard to maintain their current subsidies and would fight even harder to preserve their representation in Congress, were it ever challenged. The same holds for Social Security, the “third rail” of American politics. Having premised their entire lifetime consumption and savings patterns on a what is, essentially, a federal income transfer, mature Americans will fight any substantial changes to the program and any institutional reforms that might weaken their political clout over the setting of benefits. In both cases, interests have become vested in specific policy regimes and this serves to change their policy preferences. While some workers might not have supported Social Security when it first formed, having paid into the system and, more important, premised their own lifetime savings pattern on the expectation that they would receive payments upon their retirement, those same workers today likely have a very different view.

The effect of vested interests can also be seen at the community level in the contrast between liberal market economies (LMEs) and organized market economies (OMEs)(Hall and Soskice 2001; see also Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). LMEs have large private spheres of authority, rely more on market-based allocation systems, and offer fewer social protections. In turn, both firms and workers develop flexible economic strategies that discourage investments in specific processes or skills, creating a large pool of “generic” capital and labor that flows (relatively) easily across sectors. Having invested in flexible production and skills, however, society has little motivation to press government for policies that encourage long term holding of assets, apprenticeship programs tailored to long term employment contracts, and other features common in
OMEs. Adapted for flexibility, changing policies are of less import, in turn, and the political arena is characterized by institutions that if they do not amplify at least do not dampen political swings, such single-member electoral districts and majority party rule. The economy and its political actors are vested in a particular, self-reinforcing mode of production. Liberal markets beget more liberal markets. OMEs, by contrast, have larger public spheres, rely less on market forces, and have more counter-cyclical social protection programs. Both firms and workers expect to be engaged in long term relationships, so both have incentives to invest in specific skill and asset acquisition. Having invested in high skill-oriented production, in turn, both firms and workers have incentives to press government for a steady flow of equally well-trained workers and counter-cyclical social programs that will tide them through market downturns and sustain investment in these specific assets. Since policy instability would threaten to undermine these incentives, the political system is structured for centrisism, either through proportional representation electoral systems or coalition governments in which centrist parties are pivotal. Organized markets beget organized markets.

A final example of this important point is successful cases of international statebuilding, especially the occupation of Germany following World War II.⁷ The authoritarian and later fascist regimes that governed modern Germany suggest infertile soil for the growth of democracy and economic liberalism. Nonetheless, following the delegitimation of the old regime through defeat in two wars and occupation by the Western powers, foremost the United States, a new authority structure was imposed on Germany led by moderate Christian Democrats. Faced with this new regime, Germans quickly accommodated themselves to the new rules, learned strategies of democratic

⁷ For a retrospective on statebuilding in Germany, see Dobbins (2003, Chapter 2).
politics, and integrated their economy into Europe and the world. With its citizens having accommodated themselves to this new regime, Germany today appears quite stable, weathering even the difficulty of integrating East into West in the 1990s. Who has authority over what continues to be a subject of negotiation, both within Germany between citizens, states, and the federal government and outside Germany in its relations with the European Union and the United States, which continues to exercise some authority over its foreign and security policies (Lake 2009).

Political authority is always political. This statement might seem trite, but its truth has often been ignored. Often treated as a higher order principle, authority is the product of the pushing and hauling of many political actors, including public authorities in the state, private authorities, and the mass of individuals who comprise society. Although authority is always negotiated and dynamic, it is also “sticky” and robust to change. Not only are the rights and obligations that stand at its core are inherently social or collective, and thus difficult to alter, but as we have just seen individuals and even private authorities make decisions and investments premised on a particular set of authority relations and corresponding rules. Having made these relationally specific commitments, the actors are themselves different, with different interests, and will now within limits protect the current rights and obligations by which they are bound. Authority is ever changing, but the forces or resistance are strong – creating a continuity that sometimes blinds observers to the extent of actual change over time.

**Leadership in Global Governance**

The social nature of authority conditions the nature of leadership in all forms of governance. The central task of any person or entity that aspires to leadership is to use
authority to fulfill better the need for social order, and thereby earn legitimacy, even while bound by previously vested interests and social norms that sustain the old order. A leader must do better what others have done before, fill new niches of governance that increase social welfare for at least some parties, or reconfigure the basis of legitimacy in a way that permits new uses of authority. Having an alternative vision of the future is not enough. Leadership requires the ability to appeal to and mobilize followers who regard the authority used to pursue that vision as appropriate and rightful. This conception of authority and governance suggests three main types of leadership. These types are non-exclusive, in that any individual or entity that succeeds in leading may draw upon more than one type simultaneously, but they follow from different problems of authority.

**Charismatic Leadership**

Charismatic leadership rests on some attractive trait or quality of the individual or entity seeking to lead, which might include a warm and engaging personality, a handsome or telegenic face that communicates resolve, or rhetorical skills used to persuade others. For governance, the most important characteristic of a charismatic leader is likely to be trustworthiness, or the belief by subordinates that a leader will act on their behalf in ways consistent with explicit and implicit promises. We trust a leader when they act for our advantage “as expected.”

Granting authority to another party is an awesome decision. In doing so, the subordinate confers on the ruler the right to make and enforce commands and incurs a duty to comply with those commands. If these rights and duties are legitimate or broadly accepted by society, the subordinate is literally “at the mercy” of the ruler. Thus, in considering a grant of new or expanded authority to any ruler, subordinates will yield up
their autonomy only if they are confident that the ruler will fulfill her end of the bargain by providing the desired social order and, in turn, not abusing her powers. To ensure against opportunist behavior by the ruler, subordinates typically demand some institutional checks and balances. The greater the checks and balances, the greater the authority the ruler will generally possess.

Rulers who are perceived as sharing the goals of their followers and trusted by subordinates may be accorded greater authority, all else constant, or similar levels of authority under looser oversight and enforcement. That is, rulers who by some personal attribute are trusted by society will be accorded greater authority or more autonomy in the use of their existing authority than rulers who are distrusted. Trusted rulers in short, have greater potential for leadership, if they choose to exercise it.

Charismatic leadership, like all forms of leadership, is rare; indeed, were it an everyday occurrence, it would not deserve any special analytic status. The reputation of politicians as self-serving egoists in, perhaps, not undeserved. Charismatic authority in global governance today is most evident in NGOs that rely on their perceived virtue to sustain their roles as providers of humanitarian assistance (e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross) or third party monitors (e.g., Amnesty International). Although sometimes led by visible, high-profile, and trusted individuals, NGOs equally rely on their status as non-profit entities and their ideological commitment to particular causes to signal trustworthiness. Composed of principled individuals, often sacrificing higher incomes in pursuit of some cause, NGOs rely on an image of virtuous action to build trust

---

8 On the other hand, partisans are typically willing to delegate more authority to leaders who share their political views and less authority to those who do not. See Epstein and O'Halloran (1999, ).

9 On other signals of intent and NGOs, see Gourevitch et al. (2012, ).
with members and donors who expect their money, time, or volunteer effort to be administered and used to benefit the intended recipients.

One well-known example of charismatic leadership within a transnational movement was the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), led by Jody Williams. In 1997, the ICBL and Williams were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their work in support of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (known as the Ottawa Convention). The Norwegian Nobel Committee applauded the ICBL for moving the ban from “a vision to a feasible reality” and acclaimed the organization as a model for international disarmament and peace. Signed by 158 countries, the Ottawa Convention prohibits land mines and mandates the clearing of existing mine fields. The convention entered into force in March 1999 and became binding under international law for its signatories. Only 38 countries remain outside of the treaty entirely, including China, Egypt, Finland, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States. In the ICBL, we can see how a global network of committed activists successfully mobilized public opinion, created a new international norm prohibiting the use of dangerous weapons, and then converted that norm into international law under a convention negotiated and signed by states.

Williams was the founding coordinator of the ICBL and led the organization from early 1992 to 1998. In that capacity, she was the chief strategist and spokesperson for the ICBL, which she developed from a staff of one – herself – to an international network of 1,400 NGOs from over 90 countries. NGOs. Williams is widely credited with the success of the campaign, manifested in her sharing in the Nobel Prize with the organization she
created. Although she has subsequently been criticized for, perhaps, exaggerating her role in what was a worldwide effort, most acknowledge her leadership in the movement and credit her personal commitment to the issue with its success. This is a case where charismatic leadership appears to have at least contributed to a significant change in global governance.

**Entrepreneurial Leadership**

At any moment in time, the structure of global governance is incomplete, filled with holes. Areas where social life might be improved by rules may go unrecognized. Collective action problems may stifle governance innovation. Technology may create the need for new rules even before a constituency that might support those rules exists; nascent industries for whom rules must exist before investors can build firms, for instance, are never strong lobbyists for favorable rules. Existing authorities may jealously protect their “turf” or fail themselves to reach Pareto-improving bargains. There are any number of reasons why governance may be incomplete.

Entrepreneurial leaders identify unfilled governance niches and craft new structures and rules that improve social welfare, thereby legitimating their claim to rule-making authority. They do this in the face of more or less opposition from existing authorities who either claim the ability to make rules in the niche, though they have not done so, or likely have already failed to agree on rules that will benefit all parties. The entrepreneurial leader must not only see the niche but craft a strategy that has to date failed others.

Credit rating agencies are an example of entrepreneurial leadership in global governance, even though their founding and growth occurred over the course of a century.
As trans-regional trade began to increase in the United States in the early 19th century, merchants needed some way to evaluate the credit of other merchants they did not know and might never meet. Mercantile rating agencies arose to fill this need, publishing periodic guides on the ability of individual merchants to pay their debts. By the early 1900s, especially following the financial crisis of 1907, the mercantile rating agencies greatly expanded to include securities. John Moody began publishing a guide to railroad bonds in 1909, expanding to industrial firms and utilities in 1913. This was followed by Poor’s Publishing Company in 1916, Standard Statistics Company in 1922, and Fitch Publishing Company in 1924.

The ratings produced by these firms, in turn, enabled a tremendous growth in financial markets and allowed for significantly greater liquidity. Previously, the United States, like Germany, had a main banking model in which investment banks loaned directly to firms or marketed their securities to a small community of wealthy investors (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). Transactions costs were high and limited the market to professionals who followed firms closely. As the standard ratings took hold, these transactions costs fell dramatically. A potential investor no longer needed to know a lot about a particular company, only its rating. This “democratized” the financial market, allowing a greater range of investors to enter and, equally importantly, increasing the capital available to firms. By the 1990s, the services provided by the CRAs expanded once again to include sovereign debt.10

---

10 Ratings for sovereign debt began in 1927 but become important only in the 1990s. (Sinclair 2005, 139; Langohr and Langohr 2008, 134). For a general historical introduction, see Olegario (2003). Today, more than 745,000 securities from over 42,000 issuers representing at least $30 trillion are rated by 150 CRAs spanning 100 countries. (Langohr and Langohr 2008, 23). There are, however, only 2.5 “big” CRAs, S&P, Moody’s, and the French firm Fitch.
Credit rating agencies now wield considerable private authority within and increasingly over states (Sinclair 2005, 63-68). The benefits to credit issuers are sufficiently large that they have been (since the late-1960s) willing to pay substantial fees to the CRAs for their services (typically two percent on sovereign debt issues) (Sinclair 2005, 139) and, more important, subject themselves to and comply with standards set by the raters. Ratings come in different levels, largely defined by risk (Langohr and Langohr 2008, Chapter 2). To earn better ratings, which allow the issuers to borrow money at lower rates, the credit issuers must meet ever stricter standards that the raters and, in turn, the financial markets associate with less risk for investors. These standards and what it takes to earn any particular rating are subjective. Although drawing on quantitative information, the ratings are not probabilities of default nor necessarily predictive. Rather, drawing on all available information, the ratings are merely summary (ranked) descriptions of benchmark measures of risk (Langohr and Langohr 2008, 78-84). For corporations, the standards set by the CRAs include acceptable debt-equity ratios, cash flow-to-interest ratios, accounting practices, business models and practices, expectations of future earnings, and more (Sinclair 2005, 34; Langohr and Langohr 2008, 257-273). Developed in the context of publicly traded shares on independent financial markets, prevalent in the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, these same standards are now being applied broadly to companies in many different countries. The often criticized homogenization of “corporate” America and now the world is heavily influenced by the requirements for different rating levels set by the CRAs (Sinclair 2005, 121). For sovereign states, CRAs look especially at GDP per capita, real GDP growth,

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{11}}\text{For an alternative that emphasizes the resilience of different models of corporate governance, see Gourevitch and Shinn (2005).}\]
the inflation rate, external debt relative to export earnings, level of economic development (industrialized or not), and default history. More subjective but key factors include the stability and legitimacy of political institutions, popular participation in the political process, orderliness of leadership succession, transparency in economic policy, security, geopolitical risk, market orientation, income distribution, competitiveness of private sector, goods and capital market openness, unionization, fiscal policy, government debt burden, and other economic indicators (Langohr and Langohr 2008, 288-289). Central is the strict separation of economic and financial institutions from “political” institutions (e.g., central bank autonomy) (Sinclair 2005, 137). The CRAs also take quality of government and leadership into consideration in assessing overall risk (Sinclair 2005, 33-34, 136-137). These indicators are obviously weighted towards liberal, market-oriented democracies, and push borrowers to adopt policies and procedures that conform with this political model in order to earn better ratings.

CRAs enforce their authority by exclusion, including the outright refusal to rate certain investments. The rating agencies also enforce standards by penalizing issuers with a low rating, a form of partial exclusion of “naming and shaming.” Both unrated instruments and low-rated instruments cost the issuer more in terms of higher interest rates. The CRAs also guard against ex post opportunism by constant surveillance of previously rated credit instruments and revisions of their ratings. “Downgrading” a bond can impose considerable costs on investors, who now hold a less valuable instrument, and the ultimate issuer, largely in the form of higher interest rates. For instance, when Canada in 1995 was placed on a “watch list” by Moody’s for a possible downgrade, a fairly mild

---

12 Ninety percent of the variance in sovereign debt ratings can be accounted for by these six factors. Langohr and Langohr (2008, 287).
rebuke, the value of the Canadian dollar fell and interest rates on Government of Canada bonds sold in domestic and foreign markets increased substantially (Sinclair 2005, 141). Likewise, Moody’s caused a stir in financial markets in early 2010 when it merely hinted that growing U.S. government debt might someday threaten its AAA rating. The rating agencies can impose large and costly punishments on issuers who fail to comply with their standards.

In short, by creating standardized categories, the CRAs converted unique securities into more easily tradable assets that fuel now the archetypical “arms-length” market. Neither the deepening of financial markets nor the creation of private authority for the CRAs was never envisioned as a goal by John Moody and his early competitors. Rather, Moody and others simply saw a governance niche that, once filled, both grew and locked in the authority of the CRAs. As this case suggests, entrepreneurial leadership does not necessarily require seeing all the way down a game tree to an end state -- if that is ever reached. In all cases, however, entrepreneurial leadership identifies governance niches and provides useful services that create constituencies dependent on those gains and who are, thus, willing to back, follow, and enforce the rules.

Transformational Leadership

Transformational leadership is the most challenging form for would-be leaders and the most interesting one for analysts. It neither rests on some quality of individuals, though that may contribute to transformational success, nor on filling a now unoccupied governance niche. Rather, leaders can transform the basis on which authority rests or

---

create an alternative conception of legitimacy that justifies new (or contracted) powers by a ruler. When successful, transformational leadership literally changes the structure of legitimate power in society or, in our case, global society.

As explained above, authority is a complex equilibrium in which a syndrome of rights and duties are mutually constituted and intersubjectively shared among members of a community. This equilibrium rests on a fundamental exchange of social order for compliance, but the terms of any this exchange vary for many reasons, including the coercive power of the state and the organization of society. Social norms are both a language for communicating the intersubjective understanding of rights and duties and a constraint on the equilibrium exchange. Any authority relationship must be consistent with pre-existing social norms, though authority itself can be used to reshape or even radically change those norms over time. Thus, the ruler may possess the right to issue commands 1-7, say, but not possible commands 8-n, and this right is both understood in terms of and constrained by social norms A, B, and C. Liberal states, for instance, have relatively circumscribed authority that rests on norms of personal liberty, equal opportunity, democracy, and more. Totalitarian states, by contract, have more expansive authority that is often justified by norms of collective welfare that trump individual rights.

Transforming authority involves renegotiating the rights and duties of both ruler and ruled and, typically, either replacing one or more relevant social norms with others that justify and legitimate a different stance or redefining the meaning of current norms. The task for any leader seeking to transform governance is to change collective beliefs about what are appropriate and inappropriate actions by the ruler. Even if norms are nothing more than ways of communicating beliefs about the rights of the ruler, a
transformational leader must, at a minimum change the terms of the “debate” or the terms in which the community talks to itself and justifies the authority that governs it. To the extent that norms exert an autonomous constraining effect on authority, a transformational leader needs to appeal to different norms or redefine existing norms. Thus, if the current equilibrium is as above, a transformational leader must alter the range of commands that are regarded as rightful or legitimate from 1-7 to 1-9 (or 1-5), and this may require changing social norms from A, B, and C to C, D, and E. Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, for instance, were transformational leaders who contracted the regulatory power of the British and American states, respectively, shifting the normative foundation of government from norms of social equality to norms of personal liberty and responsibility and free enterprise. As these examples attest, not all transformational leadership expands governance. But importantly, transformational leadership does require “changing the debate” on governance in some fundamental way.

Transformational leadership in global governance is also rare. Such leaders arguably include U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who though he failed to sell the League of Nations to his own citizens did promote the norm of national self-determination that transformed the meaning and nature of sovereignty in the modern world; Eleanor Roosevelt, who is often credited with crystallizing the principles of the New Deal into a set of fundamental rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – although only a handful of them became what we would today call “human rights” (Wong 2012); and Jean Monnet, who from the ashes of World War II helped craft and implement the idea of Europe as a community.
A contemporary example, to be examined in more detail in a fuller paper, is the principle of the Right to Protect, or R2P, which promises to constrain the rights of states relative to their citizens and establish new rights of intervention for the international community or its agents. If R2P takes hold— as it appears it will— it will constitute a significant transformation in global governance.

Westphalian sovereignty entails three core principles; 1) the sovereign possesses ultimate or final authority over the people and territory of a given realm, 2) sovereignty is indivisible, and 3) external actors cannot possess or exercise authority over the people and territory governed by the sovereign. The third principle is a corollary to the first two. If to be sovereign means that one is the ultimate authority in a single, hierarchically-ordered domain, it necessarily implies that no one else can exercise authority in that same area or over the same people. By extension, no other power can intervene legitimately in the “internal” affairs of a sovereign state. The principles of sovereignty are, of course, violated frequently in practice, enough to lead Stephen Krasner (1999) to describe the concept as an “organized hypocrisy.” Nonetheless, sovereignty has been used as a political program to justify the consolidation of authority in states against traditional authorities (e.g., clans) within societies and external authorities (e.g., former colonial states).

R2P is the first modern assault on Westphalian sovereignty. Recent interventions have been treated as post-colonial exceptions or justified on an ad hoc basis. R2P attempts to create a principled foundation for new authority by the international community to intervene in the “internal” affairs of otherwise sovereign states. It begins from the premise that sovereignty is not a right enjoyed by all states but also entails
responsibilities by states to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity – all defined in previous international law -- and ethnic cleansing.

When states cannot or will not fulfill these responsibilities, R2P asserts the right of the international community to intervene, with military coercion used only as a last resort. In essence, it rehabilitates an older conception of sovereignty that required states to demonstrate a minimal level of control over their territory and people and combines this notion with emerging international humanitarian law (see Jackson 1990). As with all transformational leadership, it shifts the normative foundations of authority from one set of principles to another.

This transformation was led by the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established by the Canadian government in 2000. Following the genocide in Rwanda, Annan first asked when does the international community have the right to intervene to protect vulnerable populations? The ICISS was established to examine this question and, it was hoped, provide an answer, which it elaborated in its final report released in December 2001 (Evans and Sahnoun 2001). Despite historical support for the principles of sovereignty by many of its members, and affirming once again the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, the African Union was an early backer of the concept, declaring in its Charter enacted in 2002 that the “protection of human and peoples rights” was a principal objective of the new organization and that the Union had the right “to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”


Within the course of only a few years, R2P has emerged as a transformational principle of international affairs. Invoked by France in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008, when the Burmese government refused external assistance, and by Russia in the Russia-Georgia war on August 2008, which Moscow described as a genocide, R2P was most salient in the NATO’s enforcement of a no-fly zone in Libya during the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime in 2011. Although UNSC Resolution 1973 did not invoke the principle by name, it justified the intervention almost entirely in its terms. Whether R2P will become an established norm of global governance, however, remains an open question. Nonetheless, it is a remarkable example of how pressing international needs to resolve governance failures combined with an astute reconfiguration of social norms can lead to significant alterations in how the globe is governed.

Conclusion

Evaluating the role of leadership in global governance – or anywhere else, for that matter – is always difficult. Great men and women histories of great world events abound, but separating the role of individual “leaders” from circumstances is hard. If not George Washington, perhaps another general might have fought the Revolutionary War even more successfully and another politician might have navigated the treacherous shoals of early American politics equally well. If not Abraham Lincoln in the U.S. Civil War, perhaps another leader might have made similar choices and ultimately held the country together. At the level of individuals, demand tends to create its own supply.
The role of particular leaders, however, is different from the role of leadership. Leadership requires a welfare-improving vision of society and the ability to mobilize new or reconfigured communities to support that vision in the face of social interests vested in the status quo. This is a topic amenable to social scientific research.

Charismatic leadership requires trust. Research can attempt to identify the conditions under which followers trust their leaders, and the qualities of leaders in general that inspire trust by the people. This is a narrower and more concrete agenda than studying great men or women whose greatness is often measured only by the very events we want to explain.

Entrepreneurial leadership fills ungoverned niches. Scholars can begin to identify niches where governance is rewarding to both society and rulers but thwarted by barriers to entry. In studying such leadership, the focus should be on how latent or even, in the case of new niches created by emerging technologies, non-existent groups are mobilized to alter the balance of political power within global society. Success often depends on building new constituencies out of “raw material” that has yet to be unearthed.

Transformational leadership reconfigures authority and the social norms on which it rests. Here, the study of leadership can draw upon the now well established literature on transnational advocacy networks, norms cascades, and the diffusion of ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). It remains an important question, however, of how and why some principled ideas become norms while others do not (Wong 2012), and how collectives of individuals suddenly and rapidly take up new norms as the foundation for governance (Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994). The Arab Spring and subsequent events only remind us how unpredictable and turbulent such
transformations can be, but they also highlight the need to understand how authority is transformed.

References


Dobbins, James, et al. (2003). *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA, RAND.


