Multiethnic Korea?
Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea

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Korean Multiculturalism in Comparative Perspective

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When someone from South Korea and someone from Europe both say, “I live in a multicultural society,” do they mean the same thing? We argue that multiculturalism, usually understood in the West as the equal recognition and inclusion of persons of different groups in public life, has taken on different meanings in Korea (and, indeed, in the wider industrialized East Asia) and in Europe. Our larger point is that the emergence of multiculturalism in South Korea (henceforth Korea) should be understood in a comparative perspective. More specifically, the extent of the multicultural transition of nation-states in Asia is limited in comparison to Europe as their multicultural policies have been shaped by the economic goals that are characteristic of “developmental states” (Wong 2004).

In terms of demographics and policies, multicultural developments in Korea bear a greater similarity to other developmental states in East Asia than to Southern European states that also became migrant-receiving states in the past few decades—about the same time as Korea. As recent countries of immigration, Korea, Japan, Italy, and Spain have begun to depend on migrants because of the needs occasioned by labor market shortages,

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1 The authors would like to thank fellow participants of the Multiethnic Korea workshop for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Jack Jin Gary Lee would also like to acknowledge the Asia Research Institute (ARI) at the National University of Singapore and the Tan Kah Kee Foundation for their support. While both authors contributed to the argument presented in this chapter, Lee took the lead in drafting and writing it.

2 Nora H. J. Kim (chap. 3) maps the discourse of multiculturalism in the Korean mass media, highlighting three different perspectives on the issue of ethnic diversity in Korean society. Similarly, Jun (chap. 4) and Abelmann et al. (chap. 5) reveal how the Korean state's institutionalization of tamunhwa, i.e., multiculturalism, through civil society organizations and the education system, respectively, has led to ambivalence and, sometimes, confusion about state-driven multiculturalism among social actors who are tasked to educate Koreans and migrants about ethnic and cultural differences.
structural economic demands, and demographic imbalances (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004). As such, they form the core of our comparisons to understand Korea’s recent multicultural turn. We also include Singapore and Taiwan, as they shed light on the institutional dynamics of multiculturalism in Korea despite their colonial histories of migrant settlement.

To examine these regionally oriented differences, we explore variations in policies and outcomes concerning the settlement of three groups of migrants in our cases: guest workers, marriage migrants, and asylum seekers. We view their settlement as factors leading to multiculturalism in industrialized states in the twenty-first century. In this regard, we are concerned with the question of migrant settlement because it reveals the limited though still significant nature of multiculturalism in Asia. As Kim (2007) and Lee (2008) have demonstrated, the emergence of multiculturalism in Korea governmental discourse has been linked to the increase of international marriages between Korean men and foreign women. This official recognition and accommodation of the “multicultural family” contrasts with the temporary status of guest workers who do not have rights of family reunification. (Kim 2007, Seol and Skenrty 2009a). Thus, rights to settlement demarcate the boundaries of multiculturalism prior to policies of immigrant integration. To conclude, we will compare the significance of ethnic return migration as it is a salient feature of Korean immigration policy. Because coethnic preferences in admissions policies are a contradiction of multiculturalism, their existence further underscores the ambivalence of Korea’s multiculturalism.

Will Kymlicka (2005) identifies trends toward liberal multiculturalism in Western democracies in their treatment of minority nationalisms, indigenous peoples, immigrant groups, and “memics,” long-term residents who are excluded from the polity. Our focus on guest workers, marriage migrants, and asylum seekers roughly corresponds to the latter two groups. With regards to immigrants and metics, Kymlicka (2005) observes that Western countries have mostly adopted race-neutral admissions policies, instituted public support for immigrant-based ethnocultural diversity, and granted legal status and even citizenship to irregular migrants, refugees, and guest workers who have become de facto settlers. In Southern Europe, states have implemented repeated regularization programs in response to the de facto settlement of undocumented migrants (González-Enríquez and Triandafyllidou 2009). This has been a systemic feature of the Spanish and Italian immigration regimes. Whereas the Korean government did implement a regularization program by making temporary E-9 Non-professional Employment visas available to most undocumented foreigners in 2003, this has not been repeated (Kong et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2004). Before this, “amnesty” in Korea simply meant the temporary suspension of fines for overstaying to encourage voluntary repatriation (Seol and Skenrty 2004). As He and Kymlicka (2005) recognize, the Western model of liberal multiculturalism and its group categories may not fit in Asia because of the differences in the nature of the groups involved. In this case, the regularization of undocumented foreigners reveals differences in the possibilities and likelihood of their long-term settlement in Korea and Southern Europe. Likewise, our purpose in this essay is to employ the comparison of immigration policies and their outcomes to better understand the ground-breaking yet still limited nature of Korea’s multiculturalism. We show that though Korean multiculturalism represents a great change with tremendous opportunities and challenges, this significance is best understood in relation to the Korean past, rather than to comparable migrant-receiving states in Europe.3

**Multicultural Developments: Demographic Comparisons**

How many foreigners of different ethnic origin are in Korea? How does this compare to other states? Are there regional differences? Seol and Skenrty (2009a) have pointed out that migrants make up much smaller proportions of the populations of Korea and Japan than comparably developed European countries like Italy, Spain, and Greece. Table 13.1 demonstrates this variation. Korea and Japan are most similar in terms of the proportion of migrants in their populations. Also, there are clear differences in terms of the magnitude and proportion of migrants between each of our East Asian and Southern European cases. There are also distinct regional differences. The proportion of migrants in all East Asian countries (0.4%); excluding

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3 For the purposes of comparison, we consider Singapore to be similar to the industrialized East Asian states of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan because of the state’s decisive role in economic development, in contrast, newly industrialized countries like Malaysia and Thailand have been more reliant upon foreign direct investment in achieving economic growth (Jomo 2003). Geographically, Singapore is part of Southeast Asia and is a member state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

4 This is an optimistic assessment. It may be reconsidered in light of the introduction of integration requirements for residency in Western European countries and the increasing restrictiveness of the European asylum regime beginning in the mid-1980s (Joly and Subir 2004).

5 As John Lie observes in his introduction to this volume, the South Korean state’s adoption of multicultural policies in the 2000s marked a dramatic departure in the self-understanding of South Korea as a monoethnic and monocultural society. In relation, Timothy Lim (chap. 2) argues that the emergent discourse of multiculturalism will likely effect changes in immigration policies in a way generally similar to developments in Western states such as Australia and Germany.
Table 13.1 International Migrant Stock (Estimates Based on Foreign-Born Population) *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Average Annual Rate of Change (%)</th>
<th>Average Annual Net Migration (Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1,967</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6,378</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>350.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4,463</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>330.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimates for Taiwan were not available.
** Estimates based on population of foreign citizens.

Singapore is markedly lower than Southern Europe (9.5%) (UN Population Division 2009). The downward decrease in migrants in Korea from 2005 to 2010 may be explained by the fact that migrant workers were not included in the official statistics. In fact, an upward trend is more likely. Drawing from Korean government statistics, Kong et al. (2010) show that international migrants in Korea have continually increased from 1985 to 2007. Foreigners made up 2.2% of the population in 2007, as compared to 0.6% in 1995 and 1.0% in 2000 (Kong et al. 2010). Even so, this is still much lower than Spain and Italy.

Among our East Asian cases, Singapore stands out as an exception. Migrants make up 40.7% of the total population. This is even higher than classic countries of immigration like the United States, Canada, and Australia (UN Population Division 2009; Reid 2010). While this is not surprising given that Singapore has been an immigrant society, Reid (2010) and Kaur (2006) have noted that contemporary migration to Singapore was separated by a period of interruption from the historical flows that populated the country when it was a British colony. Reid (2010) states that immigration rates in Singapore plummeted in the period of independence and nation building after World War II, but they have been allowed to increase significantly since the 1980s to maintain low-skilled labor costs and develop the economy. Kaur (2006) observes that this increase reflected some continuity with the past since many of the “new” sources, for example, from South Asia and Indonesia—were also sources in the colonial period. Notably, contemporary migration to Singapore has been marked by the same set of structural factors and historical conditions as the recent countries of immigration, Korea, Japan, Spain, and Italy. This is also the case for Taiwan. While U.N. Population Division figures do not include Taiwan, Taiwan governmental figures report that there were about 32,000 guest workers on work permits at the end of 2005. This is 3.1% of the total workforce in Taiwan (Lu 2011). Compared to Singapore, this places Taiwan closer to Korea and Japan in terms of the magnitude of its migratory flows.

We are concerned not only with the magnitude of international migration, but with the sources of migratory flows in understanding the demographic realities of multiculturalism. As Kong et al. (2010) state, the origins of international migrants in Korea are not “diverse”; 80% of them came from countries in Asia in 2007. This is similar to Japan, where foreign workers from countries in Asia accounted for 73.9% of registered foreign nationals in 2006 (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2008). In both countries, intraregion migratory flows have been significant in defining the ethnic composition of their multicultural societies. Although we do not have comparable data for Singapore, we observe a similar demographic trend; 94.9% of foreign-born Singaporean residents (Singapore citizens and permanent residents only) in 2000 were born in Malaysia, China, South Asia, and Indonesia (Reid 2010). A similar phenomenon may be observed in Taiwan. In 2008, 35.0% of migrant workers originated from Indonesia, 22.2% from Vietnam, and 22.1% from the Philippines (Lu 2011).

In contrast, we observe a more even distribution of migrant sources in Spain and Italy. Among legal foreign residents in Italy in 1999, 428,354 originated from Europe, 366,415 from Africa, and 209,230 from Asia (Calavita 2004). As for Spain, 40.4% of legal foreign residents in 2000 came from Europe, 29.2% from Africa, 22.5% from Latin America, and 7.9% from Asia (Cornelius 2004). While our figures for Spain and Italy may not be directly comparable with Japan and Korea, they provide plausible evidence that migrants in Southern Europe are significantly more diverse.

Table 13.2 illustrates the significance of intra-Asia migration in Japan and Korea. Aside from the United States, Brazil, and Peru, other countries in Asia have been the main sources of migrant flows into Japan and Korea.

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* Citing a similar downward trend in the migrant population in Korea from 2000 to 2005 in U.N. figures, Hugo noted that they did not include migrant workers, while comparable Korean government figures showed an upward trend (2008, 14).
Nevertheless, these figures also indicate that migrants from countries like China, the Philippines, and Vietnam have begun to outnumber historical foreigner communities like the Koreans in Japan and the Taiwanese in Korea. Not surprisingly, these new migrant groups have become symbolic markers of the multicultural turn in Japan and Korea.

Despite the emergence of these new migrant communities, the presence of ethnic return migration restricts the ethnic diversity brought about by international migration. As Kong et al. (2010) highlight, the large numbers of Chinese migrants in Korea is misleading. They estimate that about 65%

Table 13.2 Top Sources of Foreigners in Japan and Korea by National Origin*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>(57.7%)</td>
<td>(28.7%)</td>
<td>(26.9%)</td>
<td>(25.1%)</td>
<td>(32.5%)</td>
<td>(47.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>(19.9%)</td>
<td>(26.9%)</td>
<td>(19.3%)</td>
<td>(19.3%)</td>
<td>(17.8%)</td>
<td>(10.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>(15.1%)</td>
<td>(15.0%)</td>
<td>(8.6%)</td>
<td>(10.2%)</td>
<td>(5.7%)</td>
<td>(6.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>(8.6%)</td>
<td>(9.3%)</td>
<td>(10.2%)</td>
<td>(10.2%)</td>
<td>(5.3%)</td>
<td>(4.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>(2.7%)</td>
<td>(2.8%)</td>
<td>(7.0%)</td>
<td>(4.9%)</td>
<td>(4.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Foreigners 1,868,444</td>
<td>Total Foreigners 2,084,919</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*The figures for Korea were based on the total numbers of foreigners staying in Korea on 31 December of each year. Data for Japan was based on the total numbers of foreign nationals registered in Japan. While Korean statistics include American military service personnel (31,608 in 2007) (Kong et al. 2010a), the Japanese figures do not include American military personnel because they are exempt from Japanese visa laws and regulations under the Status of Forces Agreement.

of Chinese immigrants in Korea are ethnically Korean (Kong et al. 2010). In table 13.2, we can also detect the presence of ethnic return migrants in the rise in migrants from Brazil and Peru in Japan (the Nikkeijin) and in the migrant population from the United States in Korea (Korean-Americans). As we will demonstrate, both countries have turned to ethnic return migration as partial solutions to labor shortages, and, specifically in the case of Korea, bride shortages as well. In contrast, there is little evidence of large-scale ethnic return migration to Spain and Italy. Thus, ethnic return migration in Japan and Korea further limits the ethnic diversity of migration in comparison to our Southern European cases.

The comparisons of migrant populations provide a demographic basis for our argument that multiculturalism in Korea, while similar to other industrialized countries in Asia, is limited in extent and different from multiculturalism in Southern Europe. We find even more evidence when we examine the numbers of foreign children in schools in Korea, Japan, Spain, and Italy. Seol and Skrentny (2009a) have stated that this can be an indicator of current or potential migrant settlement. In their analysis, there were only about 1,574 foreign children in schools in Korea in 2005; this excludes the 8,000 children who are enrolled in foreign schools (Seol and Skrentny 2009a). If we examine their combined numbers in light of the total number of foreigners in Korea in 2005 (247,467, according to Kong et al. [2010]), foreign children composed a mere 1.3% of the population of foreigners. This is similar to Japan, where foreign children consist of only about 3.6% of all foreigners (Seol and Skrentny 2009a). Seol and Skrentny (2009a) add that the slightly larger Japanese figures need to be treated with caution as a large number of foreign children are either Nikkeijin or children of the displaced Koreans and Taiwanese populations who are officially defined as special permanent residents. In comparison, the numbers of foreign schoolchildren and their proportion of the foreigner population are significantly larger in Spain and Italy. In 2005, there were 608,040 schoolchildren in Spain (12.7% of foreigners) and 500,000 in Italy (20% of foreigners; Seol and Skrentny 2009a). These stark differences in the numbers of schoolchildren indicate the lack of migrant settlement in Korea despite the nascent multicultural transition. To understand this disjuncture, we turn to policies that constrain migrant settlement and shape the boundaries of Korean multiculturalism.

While we do not have the figures for Singapore, we speculate that they may lie in between our East Asian and Southern European cases. Since 1997, the Economic Development Board has led efforts to make Singapore into an educational hub, or "the Global Schoolhouse" (Huang and Yee 2005). These efforts have also been regionally oriented, targeting potential students in Asia (Huang and Yee 2005).
Guest Worker Policies: Differentiated Controls versus Ex Post Facto Regularization

We first examine guest worker policies comparatively to demonstrate the nature of multiculturalism in Korea. Simply put, a multicultural Korea does not include guest workers and their families. The E-9 Non-professional Employment Visa category, for guest workers only, allows for a single two-year extension of employment contracts. Also, the Employment Permit System (EPS) Act states that foreign workers need to go through a six-month "employment restriction period" after their final departure before they can be employed again in Korea (Ministry of Employment and Labor 2010). Instead of the possibility of de facto long-term residence, these regulations likely facilitate circular migration patterns where migrants may alternate between employment in Korea and their homelands.

Would migrants return to their countries of origin? Why would they do so given Korea’s structural dependence on cheap low-skilled labor? It is reasonable to doubt the feasibility of these regulations when the numbers of undocumented workers in Korea had consisted of almost 80% of the total foreign population as of late 2002 (Seol and Skrentny 2004; Yoo et al. 2004). South Korea has a structurally embedded demand for low-skilled labor that has been the result of labor market segmentation and low-skilled labor shortages among small- and medium-sized firms in industries like manufacturing, fishing, and construction (Seol and Skrentny 2004; Kim 2009). This has been compounded by the fact that Korea is an aging society where the total fertility rate has steadily plummeted to 1.08 in 2005, way below the replacement level of 2.1 (Kim 2009). Given these structural economic and demographic factors, it may seem plausible to foresee the settlement of undocumented migrants.

However, this ignores the policy factors that contributed to the emergence of undocumented migrants. Prior to the introduction of the EPS, Korea’s "foreign trainee" program had been modeled after Japan’s (Seol and Skrentny 2004). It was introduced and significantly expanded in 1991 and 1993, respectively, following pressure on the Ministry of Justice from the Korean Federation of Small Business (KFSB) (Seol and Skrentny 2004a; Kong et al. 2010). This program led to relatively large numbers of undocumented foreigners through foreign trainees’ overstaying their visas or running away from exploitative employers. However, the introduction of the EPS Act in 2003 has likely improved working conditions for legal foreign workers since it gives foreign workers and Koreans equal coverage under Korean labor laws (cf. Yamazaki chap. 9). The EPS Act was also accompanied by a one-time regularization of undocumented foreigners. As Kong et al. (2010) note, this led to the decrease in the proportion of undocumented foreigners among the foreigner population, and only 20.8% of foreigners were undocumented as of 2007. Under the EPS policy, policymakers installed a set of monetary incentives or safeguards, aiming to guarantee the successful conclusion of employment contracts and the subsequent return of foreign employees. The employer subscribes to a Departure Guarantee Insurance that consists of 8.3% of the worker’s monthly pay (Ministry of Employment and Labor 2010). The worker can claim this sum only if he fulfills at least one year of employment without abandoning his position. In contrast, foreign employees are required to purchase Return Cost Insurance to cover their return expenses (Ministry of Employment and Labor 2010). As such, these measures of the EPS discourage foreign workers from abandoning their legal status and becoming undocumented.

Beyond this change in policy factors, we also find evidence that migrant settlement has not occurred even with a relatively large proportion of undocumented foreigners. As Seol and Skrentny (2004) note, the Asian economic crisis in 1997 led to the departure of unemployed migrants; returning to their home countries was straightforward because they had not brought their families or settled. Given this lack of migrant worker settlement and the introduction of the EPS, guest workers are unlikely to become settlers and demand greater social inclusion as they have in Europe.

Moreover, the implementation of the EPS requires bilateral investment in a labor recruitment system. For instance, to be considered for employment under E-9 visa rules, foreigners need to pass a basic Korean proficiency test (EPS-TOPIK). They also need to undergo preliminary training in the Korean language and culture and in basic industrial training in their home countries. The test and preliminary training are both conducted through sending agencies located in the workers’ home countries. These requirements highlight the bilateral economic cooperation that underlies Korea’s Employment Permit System. As of 2010, Korea signed MOUs with fifteen countries (all within Asia) to supply low-skilled labor under the E-9 visa or the H-2 Working Visit Visa (for ethnic Koreans) (Ministry of Government Legislation 2010). The Korean government thus plays an active role in the importation and facilitated returns of low-skilled labor, which it can limit through industry-based quotas. Under these varied instruments of state control, we contend that guest workers are not a significant factor in the development of multicultural policies in Korea.

Nevertheless, structural economic and demographic factors have led to an unprecedented increase in migrant workers since the late 1980s, contributing to the emergence of a multiphistic Korean (Kim 2009). We distinguish the Korean experience with migrant labor from our
Southern European cases in two ways. First, the control of labor migration in East Asia is more differentiated and stratified according to the skill level of migrants. While the differentiated admission and settlement of labor migrants according to their skill levels is a global phenomenon, the controlled admission and return of low-skilled migrants in East Asia contributes to the relative lack of migrant settlement. This greatly limits the role of guest workers in the development of multiculturalism in Korea and the rest of Asia. In contrast, Southern European states have not implemented stringent mechanisms of control to the same extent. For instance, guest workers in both Spain and Italy have rights to family reunification with their spouses and minor children (International Organization for Migration 2008).

This brings us to the other key distinction. Both Spain and Italy have repeatedly employed regularization programs to respond to the persistent presence of undocumented migrants instead of establishing proactive labor migration policies (González-Enríquez and Triandafyllidou 2009). Ex post facto regularization programs characterize the Southern European approach to undocumented migrants, many of whom fulfill structurally embedded labor needs. In contrast, East Asian states, with the exception of Japan, have implemented work-permit schemes that allow the state to manage and control labor migration, and to sanction the presence of undocumented migrants.

While we have emphasized the broad similarities in labor migration systems in our East Asian cases, their historical trajectories demonstrate institutional dynamics that help explain the boundaries of multiculturalism in East Asia. Lu (2011) compares the emergence of labor migration policies in Singapore, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Critically, she finds that their development of policy has been influenced by the experiences of other states in the region, rather than by their emulation of the West. This parallels the demographic outcomes of their immigration policies. The diffusion of guest worker policies within our East Asian cases can be traced from the initial issuance of temporary work permits to Malaysian workers in Singapore in 1965 (Lu 2011). Kaur (2006) highlights the introduction of three instruments of control with the amendment of Singapore’s Immigration Act in 1988. Thus, the work-permit scheme, the foreign-levy scheme, and internal enforcement measures were put in place. According to Kaur (2006), the work-permit scheme differentiated workers according to their skill, race, and gender, while the foreign-levy scheme introduced levies on employers of foreigners to reduce the nation’s dependence on low-skilled labor migrants, and the internal enforcement measures that were introduced included penal measures for illegal migrant workers. Interestingly, this policy development also provided for an “amnesty” for illegal migrants, but amnesty was followed by deportation without other penalties (coping and/or prison terms) rather than settlement (Kaur 2006). Singapore’s policy was further institutionalized with the Employment of Foreign Workers Act 1990. This has been the basis of the state’s current policies, which provides different settlement and social rights to foreign laborers according to their skill levels and salary. In particular, the rights of foreign domestic workers are the most restricted. Because of the state’s perception of their “nature of work,” they are not covered by the Employment Act (unlike other low-skilled migrant workers), and they will be repatriated if they are found to be pregnant (Yeoh 2006). Furthermore, like other low-skilled workers, they may not bring family or marry Singaporeans, and they are subject to regular medical checks. Hence, Yeoh (2006) characterizes Singapore’s policies toward low-skilled migrant labor as a case of “structural (non)incorporation.”

While their physical presence is clearly indicated in the sanctity of the homes (one in seven households employ a foreign domestic worker) and in public spaces (as visible in the appearance of weekend foreign worker enclaves in conservation districts, parks, open spaces and leisure sites), their structural position within multicultural Singapore society is carefully excluded. (Yeoh 2006, 32, emphasis added.)

The “structural (non)incorporation” of foreign low-skilled labor contrasts greatly with the active recruitment and retention of skilled foreign professionals, entrepreneurs, and investors. Singapore’s foreign worker policies are highly institutional and subordinate to the state’s active pursuit of economic globalization (Yeoh 2006).

Singapore’s case is instructive for two reasons. Firstly, it has served as a successful model of state control over migrant worker flows for other Asian states. As Lu (2011) demonstrates, the design of Taiwan’s guest worker policies is not only similar to the Singaporean model; Taiwanese policymakers had studied Singapore’s policies (among others) in 1989 and recommended that Taiwan adopt Singapore’s control measures while simplifying its permit categories. Taiwan enacted the Employment Service Act in 1992. Like in Singapore, guest workers in Taiwan do not have rights to family reunification, and they could not marry or become pregnant until policymakers removed these restrictions by the end of 2002 (Lu 2011; Council of Labor Affairs [2001] 2014, 10). And, as Seol and Skrentny
have argued that the absence of supranational institutions that can pressure states to grant family reunification rights to migrants helps to explain the lack of migrant settlement in East Asia. However, supranational institutions have also exerted pressure on Spain and Italy to restrict immigration because of their position on the southern borders of the European Union. For instance, Finotelli and Sciortino (2009) point out that Act n. 39/90, the legge Martelli, introduced restrictive immigration measures, like visa requirements and sanctions for human trafficking, as part of Italy’s signing and ratification of the Schengen Agreement. The law demonstrated that Italy could prevent unwanted immigration into the Schengen space. Nevertheless, this law also created a “very liberal” regularization program in recognition of the need for migrant labor (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009). As such, Finotelli and Sciortino (2009) argue that Italian immigration policy has had to maintain an uneasy balance between the structural demand for low-skilled migrant labor and restrictive norms that stem from EU pressures as well as domestic anti-immigrant populism. These contradictory pressures have been compounded by deficiencies in the legal recruitment of foreign workers and weak internal controls (as compared to restrictive border measures) (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009).

We observe a similar dynamic in Spain. As González-Enriquez (2009) points out, the Spanish government’s fiscal austerity has led to periodic or individual regularizations as a “cheap model” of managing labor migration. Like Italy, the Spanish state relies on a quota-based guest worker system where employers recruit workers in their home countries. This creates problems for employers who cannot do so. Unlike East Asia, where the state (Korea) or private brokers operating under the framework of guest worker programs (Taiwan and Singapore) have acted as intermediaries, the Spanish state ruled out public investment in such infrastructure. While the introduction of a job-searching visa might be an alternative, González-Enriquez (2009) notes that this is not feasible partly because of pressures from other EU states to prevent unwanted immigration into the Schengen space.

10 In the European Union, family reunification is governed by the Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (Family Reunification Directive). In regards to non-EU migrants, it defines family reunification as “the entry into and residence in a Member State by a family member of a third country national residing lawfully in that Member State in order to preserve the family unit, whether the family relationship arose before or after the resident’s entry” (International Organization for Migration 2008).

11 The Schengen Agreement of 1985 constitutes an internal space in Europe where the free movement of persons is guaranteed, and where a single external border is applied to all signatory states. Italy and Spain signed the agreement in 1990 and 1991, respectively.
Thus, the Schengen Agreement, with its requirements for restrictive external border controls, has placed constraints on the ability of Spain and Italy to meet structurally embedded demands for guest workers. Nevertheless, these Southern European states have resorted to regularization programs to “manage” labor migration. In Italy, roughly 1.4 million migrants have obtained residents permits through such programs since 1986 (Pinto and Sciortino 2009). Similarly, Spain has regularized more than 1.1 million persons through seven extraordinary regularizations since 1991 (González-Enríquez 2009). Even so, this has not “solved” the problem of irregularity. An estimated 580,000 migrants (19 percent of the registered foreign population) had irregular status in Spain at the beginning of 2008, while the long-term irregular foreign population in Italy was estimated to be over 500,000 at the end of 2008 (GonzálezEnríquez 2009; Pinto and Sciortino 2009). What does this portend for multiculturalism in Spain and Italy? We have demonstrated that, compared to East Asia, guest workers in Southern Europe have had greater possibilities of settlement and more access to social rights. Therefore, we argue that though their rights are still restricted in many ways, their legal treatment fits into the liberal multicultural trend of greater recognition and inclusion (Kynilička 2005). In comparison, the “structural (non) incorporation” of guest workers in East Asia has excluded them in the making of multicultural policies. Instead, we turn to the East Asian path to migrant incorporation—marriage migrants and their multicultural families.

A Korean Path toward Multiculturalism: Marriage Migration and Social Integration

The rise in international marriages in East Asia since the early 1990s has been closely associated with the establishment of international trade and capital flows within the region. It has consisted mainly of men from more developed countries marrying women from developing countries in East and Southeast Asia. Based on available data estimates, Jones and Shen (2008) state that Taiwan (32%), Singapore (17%), Korea (14%), and Japan (5%) had the highest proportion of international marriages (out of all marriages) in East and Southeast Asia around 2005. However, the majority of these marriages were marriages between persons of the same ethnicity, e.g., marriages between Korean-Chinese (Chośńok) women and Korean men (Jones and Shen 2008). In Korea, the increase in international marriages began in 1992 with the normalization of relations with China (Lee 2008). Since then, marriages between Chośńok women and Korean men have accounted for the largest proportion of international marriages in Korea (Lee 2008). Initially, these marriages were promoted by local government groups who introduced Korean farmers to Chośńok women (Lee 2008). Similarly, state-arranged international marriages occurred in Japan in the late 1980s (Nakamura 2003). This initial wave of international marriages contrasts with the privately arranged (through commercial brokers or social networks) marriages that have subsequently characterized international marriages in East Asia from the late 1990s onward. Like labor migration, marriage migration has had a strong intraregional orientation. Jones and Shen (2008) identify China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia as the major countries of origin of marriage migrants in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and Singapore. In comparison, we know much less about international marriages in Spain and Italy. Hence, we focus on marriage migration and its relation to multiculturalism in Korea in comparison to other East Asian states.

In East Asia, marriage migration has been a salient feature of multicultural developments; this is particularly so for nations states that have created a single-ethnic, exogamous society, like Korea and Japan. Unlike guest workers, marriage migrants have settled and been incorporated in Korean society. Nevertheless, the terms of their social and political integration have been conditional upon their fulfillment of certain gender-based obligations. The legal status and rights of foreign spouses in Korea has been the subject of several policy changes, marking a tentative but gradual progression toward greater economic and social inclusion. One of the first changes was the granting of F-2 residence visas in 2002, which allowed marriage migrants to seek employment (Lee 2008). And, in 2005, marriage migrants who had not been naturalized could apply for permanent residency after two years of residence in Korea (Lee 2008). This would facilitate their daily activities and exempt them from the need to request extensions of stay. One key policy change affected the right to settlement of foreign wives. Previously, a foreign wife had to return to her country of origin (without her children) if she divorced her husband within the first two years of marriage (Lee 2008). This was changed in 2003 such that a foreign wife could extend her residence visa and apply for naturalization if (1) her husband was deceased or missing, (2) they had separated or divorced because of her husband’s actions, or (3) she had been the caregiver of their children.

Calavita (2007) criticizes the quota-based system of Spain and Italy for institutionalizing the economic marginality of regular and irregular migrants, stating that it underscores policies of integration.
or his parents. Despite this change, the legal status of the foreign wife was still defined through her past or present duties as a wife (especially in the second and third conditions). Lastly, foreign wives and their families were included in the social security system only in 2007 (Lee 2008).

The gradual inclusion of marriage migrants has constituted a pathway to multiculturalism for Korea. Crucially, the official adoption of multiculturalism as a policy was institutionalized through the Plan for Promoting the Social Integration of Migrant Women, Bracical People, and Immigrants, or the “Grand Plan,” as announced on 26 April 2006 (Kim 2007; Lee 2008). The plan identified the Ministry for Gender Equality and Family (MGEF) as the main coordinating agency for a set of social policies aimed at the comprehensive support and protection of foreign wives and their children, and at increasing Koreans’ acceptance of a multicultural society (Lee 2008). The Korean Immigration Service’s (2009) First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy echoes the Grand Plan in its section on “High-Quality Social Integration.” Notably, in both plans, the provision of social rights only extends to foreign wives and their multicultural children. No other groups were named as targets of the proposed policies despite the official recognition of Korea as a nascent multicultural society (Korean Immigration Service 2009). Kim (2007) criticizes the MGEF’s narrow definition of “multicultural families” in its “Research Report on the Preparation of the Multicultural Family Support Law.” She quotes the report:

The multicultural family refers to a family formed by a Korean citizen and a legally residing marriage migrant or foreign worker through matrimony, kinship, or adoption. Families created by the marriage between foreigners of different nationalities or denizens are excluded (Park and Cho 2007; cited by Kim 2007, 106).

In relation, the aims of this law are to acculturate foreign wives of Korean citizens as well as provide marital and child-care social services; as Kim (2007) adds, it has an assimilationist rationale (cf. Lim chap. 2). Notably, male foreign workers who have married Korean citizens are not the intended recipients of these benefits (Kim 2007). It is also the case that, except for any children they may already have, foreign wives are not allowed to bring family members to Korea.

Thus, Korea’s multicultural developments have been closely coupled to the settlement of foreign wives. Despite the liberal use of “multiculturalism” in official rhetoric, the institutionalization of multiculturalism in Korea has been unlike trends toward liberal multiculturalism in Europe. Marriage migrants have been recognized and included only as the wives of male Korean citizens, while their cultural identities and individual rights are secondary. Generally, Korea’s gradual integration of “multicultural families” has been similar to Taiwan’s treatment of female marriage migrants. The Taiwanese state began introducing inclusive measures after 2002, providing marriage migrants with relatively open access to employment, Mandarin courses, and inclusion in Taiwan’s universal health-care system (Wang and Belanger 2008). However, Wang and Belanger (2008) critique the fact that the Taiwanese state defined its questions about integration support measures according to traditional gender roles in a 2003 general survey. This revealed a salient assumption of Taiwanese policy-makers. The legal status of marriage migrants “is dependent on the patriarchal principle, thus a differential citizenship is created” (Wang and Belanger 2008, 98). In other words, migrants are recognized and included in the policy according to state’s ascription of their cultural roles and identities. With respect to the inclusion of marriage migrants, multiculturalism in Korea and Taiwan has been shaped by patriarchal assumptions about their place within the family (cf. M. J. Kim chap. 12).

In contrast, the Singaporean state has only recently begun to create social integration measures for the foreign spouses of Singaporean citizens. Since 1 April 2012, marriage migrants who are able to obtain the “Long-Term Visit Pass-Plus” (LTVP+) would qualify for some health-care subsidies at levels similar to permanent residents, and enjoy easier access to employment; persons with this status would also benefit from a longer duration of residence (Immigration and Checkpoints Authority 2012). Previously, marriage migrants were neither eligible for any health-care subsidies nor granted preferential access to the labor market as it was assumed that their (typically male) spouses would be responsible for supporting them. Nevertheless, this new status does not introduce these benefits as rights. Rather, it is a pragmatic measure designed to support Singaporean families with foreign spouses in a context where international marriages in Singapore have increased significantly from 2003 onward (National Population Secretariat 2009).

The integration of marriage migrants into Singapore’s multiracial framework is a subject for further research. In Singapore, multiracialism has been grounded in “the formal equality of the administratively homogenized racial groups” — Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others (CMIO) (Chua 2005, 185). This means that in policy, each group has equal standing. Nevertheless, as Lai (1995) highlights, this mode of classification is rigid, as a person’s racial category under the CMIO classification would determine the official designation of his or her mother tongue and belonging to an ethnic culture. In relation, further research may investigate the recognition and inclusion of marriage migrants and their children within Singapore’s multiracial system.

Ironically, because of an unwillingness to formally accept low-skilled
labor migration, Japan may be the closest of our East Asian cases to the experiences of Spain and Italy. Like these Southern European states, Japan’s situation exemplifies a large-scale “illegal immigration policy” (Morris-Suzuki 2009). In this regard, Korea’s immigration policy was similar to Japan’s before the EPS Act (Seol and Skrentny 2004). But, despite Korea and Japan’s common dependence on undocumented migrant labor, Seol and Skrentny (2009a) argue that the lack of family reunification rights for low-skilled migrant workers distinguished these two countries from the West. Simply put, rights to family reunification allow for the increased possibility of uncontrolled migrant settlement, leaving the door open to European-style multiculturalism. As we have demonstrated, Korea’s implementation of the EPS consolidated its control of low-skilled labor migration, effectively excluding guest workers from settlement and multicultural policies. In contrast, Japan’s maintenance of its “illegal immigration policy” may have inadvertently encouraged the development of a broader application of multiculturalism, one that included all foreigners.

We suggest that the lack of an effective guest-worker program to meet structurally embedded labor market needs and the presence of local integration initiatives may have fostered the increasing presence of undocumented migrant workers and encouraged the long-term residence of the Nokkejin. Together with the growing trend of international marriages, this increased presence of foreign workers in Japan and other demographic pressures have prompted some policymakers to consider the limited integration of low-skilled foreign workers, including the Nokkejin and marriage migrants. As Tai (2009) points out, the Japanese meaning of multiculturalism has been encapsulated in two idioms, tabunsha kaisei (multicultural living together) and sekaisuichu (people living their lives). While these ideas are not equivalent to European ideals of liberal multiculturalism, they represent broad notions of mutual accommodation between different persons. Tabunsha kaisei took on concrete meanings as local governments in Japan responded to the increase in foreigners in the 1990s by offering them basic public services (Tai 2009). At the same time, the Japanese central government had put in place measures that would increase the numbers of foreigners in Japan. In the 1990 revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law, the state added to the number of foreigner residence categories. This included a long-term resident status for returning coethnics from Latin America, the Nokkejin (Tai 2009). Also, Japan’s Technical Intern Training Program was implemented in 1993 through a decree from the Ministry of Justice (Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). These constituted a hierarchy of foreign labor—skilled foreign workers; the Nokkejin who had de facto permanent residence and open access to employment; foreign trainees and technical interns who were temporary and lacked protection by labor laws; and undocumented migrant workers at the bottom (Tai 2009).

Tai (2009) situates the Japanese government’s shift toward multicultural integration from 2005 onward. As she relates, several policy proposals and plans for the admission and integration of foreigners were expressed by different central government agencies. One landmark publication was The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ Plan for the Promotion of Multicultural Community Building. This plan was the first government document to use the term tabunsha kaisei, and it recognized the importance of local integration measures. Another report in 2006 by the Council for the Promotion of Regulatory Reform (CPRR), an advisory group to the prime minister, recognized the growth in the employment of foreign workers, including the Nokkejin, and problematized their working conditions and treatment; this included concern for the education of the children of migrant workers. Compared to Korea, Japan’s multiculturalism has focused on the limited social integration of both migrant workers and brides as foreigners. However, it is highly doubtful whether Japan will permit greater migrant settlement. Crucially, the implementation of integration measures at the national level has been tentative at best.

The Cost of Settlement: Refugees and Asylees

We have demonstrated the demographic limits and institutional boundaries of Korea’s multicultural developments in a comparative perspective. In particular, Korea’s pathway to a multicultural society has been shaped by the implementation of the EPS in 2003 and the national-level institutionalization of policies concerning the social integration of foreign wives in 2006. Korea’s policies and their outcomes, in their treatment of guest workers and marriage migrants, have been closer to other East Asian states than to our Southern European cases.

The question of migrant settlement as a pathway to multiculturalism should also take into account the recognition and admission of refugees. In this domain, the distinction in outcomes between East Asia and Southern Europe is slightly blurred by the case of Spain.

As figure 13.1 shows, the size of the refugee population in Spain (3,970) as of January 2010 was only slightly larger than Japan’s refugee population (2,332). In contrast, there were 54,865 refugees in Italy. This large difference between Spain and Italy may be explained in two ways. For one, Spain’s refugee admissions policy places more requirements on asylum seekers. In Spain, the “inadmissibility procedure” has been a key instrument of screening asylum applicants before the application process (Jubany-Baucells 2002). This additional stage has been effective in reducing the
Japan makes it more difficult for asylum-seekers to seek refugee status. Seel and Skrentny (2009a) point out that Korea’s refugee policy is administered through immigration law, which requires that asylum-seekers report their illegal presence to authorities who are also in charge of the repatriation of undocumented persons. This structure also authorizes the minister of justice to decide upon asylum applications at his or her discretion. The same structure exists in Japan. In Spain and Italy, asylum applications are processed through the Ministry of the Interior. The determination of refugee status is the responsibility of specialized bodies. In Spain, the Inter-Ministerial Commission on Asylum and Refugees is responsible for formulating a proposed decision for the Ministry of the Interior; while in Italy, the determination of status is carried by a territorial commission for recognition of international protection. These bodies offer greater oversight over the initial determination of refugee status, and they include a representative from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

In addition, asylum-seekers in Korea need to file their application within a year of their entry; this casts late applicants into the category of illegal migrants. No deadline exists in Japan and Italy. While Spain also places a deadline on asylum applications, rejected asylum-seekers face a lower risk of deportation as irregular migrants. In this regard, the tacit acceptance of irregular migrants as a low-skilled labor source and the weakness of internal enforcement in Spain and Italy may be another factor for the greater presence of refugees. In Southern Europe, the risks of rejection are lower than in Japan and Korea, where deportations are enforced regularly.

The result of these differences is that refugee/ asylee settlement in Korea has been very limited. The refugee population in Korea was only 266 as of January 2012. Compared to Korea, Japan’s refugee population is 8.7 times larger. Clearly, refugee flows have not constituted a significant factor in Korea’s multicultural transition.

Korea does settle a different group of forced migrants: North Koreans. The numbers are not massive. As of December 2009, 18,009 North Koreans have been resettled in South Korea (Ministry of Unification 2010). In contrast, their population was only about 10,000 as of May 2007 (Seel and Skrentny 2009a).

While North Koreans are considered citizens under the South Korean constitution, benefits to facilitate their social integration in South Korea decreased as more North Koreans arrived each year. Lankov (2006) reports that the international collapse of communism and the subsequent change in the composition of North Korean defectors from 1995 to 2000 transformed South Korea’s policy toward defectors. After the collapse of communism, South Korea’s reevaluation of unification policy in the 1990s took place amid public discussions of the experiences and negative economic

Figure 13.1 Comparison of Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Populations


number of asylum applications; only 3.25% of asylum-seekers were recognized in 1999, one of the lowest rates in Europe (Jabany-Bauccells 2002). There is no such requirement in Italy. Also, asylum seekers in Spain need to present their applications for asylum within the time limit depending on their legal status. Otherwise, their applications may be rejected. No deadlines exist for the submission of asylum requests in Italy. Secondly, Italy’s relatively high refugee figures have been a result of its closer geographic proximity to conflicts in the Balkans and the Mediterranean rim (Hamilton 2002).

Despite Spain’s relatively restrictive asylum process, it still admitted more refugees than Japan and Korea combined. Two factors help to explain this outcome. First, the design of the asylum process in Korea and

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14 We omit Taiwan and Singapore from this analysis as neither state is a signatory of the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol.
outcomes of Germany’s unification (Lankov 2006). This changed the political value and perceived costs of defection as it could affect the stability of North Korea. The economic value of defectors changed at the same time. While early defectors to South Korea consisted of skilled North Korean elites, later arrivals mostly consisted of low-skilled workers or dependents. Consequently, their settlement benefits have been radically reduced, consisting of only reduced payments of “settlement money” and a vocational training scholarship for most defectors by 2005 (Lankov 2006).

Conclusion: Managed Multiculturalism and the Developmental State

Why has refugee settlement been constrained? And, more generally, why has migrant settlement in Korea been limited? One way to understand the Korean similarities with other Asian states—including one as different as the multicultural, former colonial state of Singapore—as well as their differences with European immigration policy models is to consider immigration and multiculturalism as part of the more general approach to statecraft. Specifically, the “developmental state” model remains resilient in East Asia and continues to emphasize economic growth and productivity over redistributive policies and equality (Wong 2004). The instrumental nature of Korean immigration policy-making fits with the notion of a developmental state focused on growth over other concerns (relative to other industrialized states).

Because a developmental state seeks to avoid social costs while maximizing economic growth, immigration policies in Korea ought to be shaped by the perceived costs and benefits of settlement. We can see this in the policy to regulate work permits, where visas are granted to the economically useful workers, but denied to the workers’ dependents, who contribute nothing to productivity yet use state resources. Similarly, Chang (2012) argues that the Korean state’s commitment to economic development has shaped the social and economic practices of citizenship as well. Consequently, developmental policies are an integral part of Korean political culture and they have served as the basis for state-society relations or, in Chang’s words, “developmental citizenship.”

Korea’s response to the settlement of another group of refugees excluded from UNCHR’s counts, North Korean defectors, also helps demonstrate the significance of perceived costs in formulating settlement policy. Discouraging their entry and settlement, Korea’s refugee/asylee policy fits the model of a developmental state. In relation, the case of North Korean refugees indicates the limited salience of ethnicity in determining integration policies. Within a developmental state, the political and economic interests of the nation-state structure the settlement and integration policies of groups. We see this clearly in the case of ethnic return migrants. While Korea has shown considerable preferences to coethnic foreigners in its immigration policies, Seol and Skrentny (2009b) observe the construction of a “hierarchical nationhood” in that rights to settlement have varied according to the skill level of coethnics. The implementation of the Visit and Employment Programme for Ethnic Koreans with Foreign Citizenship in 2007 allowed coethnic foreigners to visit and seek short-term employment within designated economic sectors that require low-skilled labor (Seol and Skrentny 2009b). While legally open to all coethnic foreigners, only the low-skilled Chosŏnjok use this visa (H-2). On the contrary, the Overseas Koreans Act, as amended in 2003, granted skilled coethnics the F-4 visa status, which is almost equivalent to citizenship sans political rights (Seol and Skrentny 2009b). In practice, this effectively positions skilled ethnic Koreans from developed countries above the Chosŏnjok.

In our comparative analysis, the institutionalization of “hierarchical nationhood” in Japan and Taiwan also fits the model of a developmental state. The unequal positions of the Nijerijin in Japan and the “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan may be explained by their relative capacities to contribute to national economic development (Seol and Skrentny 2009b; Skrentny et al. 2007).10 In Spain, guest workers and irregular migrants from its previous colonies in Latin America fulfill the same function (Skrentny et al. 2007). However, it has been far easier for those postcolonial migrant workers to obtain permanent residence in Spain than for the Chosŏnjok to settle in Korea. With hierarchical nationhood, nation-states in East Asia have sought to avoid the social costs of a multicultural society while partly solving their structurally embedded demands for low-skilled labor. It is in this light that the rationale underlying Korea’s limited multicultural transition may be understood.

We have analyzed Korea’s multicultural developments by examining the extent of the inclusion of guest workers, marriage migrants, and refugees in a comparative perspective. Multicultural developments in

10 Even in multicultural Singapore, with its commitment to racial equality, the state’s promotion of Confucian-style Asian values and the use of Mandarin has served to orient and privilege middle-class Chinese Singaporeans as culturally adept economic actors who can take advantage of China’s rise as an economic power (Goh 2009).
Korea bear a striking similarity to those in other East Asian states, while diverging significantly from various trends of liberal multiculturalism in (Southern) Europe. In this regard, we established differences between our East Asian and Southern European cases by comparing institutional barriers to migrant settlement and their demographic outcomes. Therefore, we have argued that the implementation of the EPS Act had effectively excluded guest workers in the formulation of multicultural policies in Korea. Instead, the social integration of foreign wives and their children according to patriarchal norms has characterized the nascent institutionalization of multiculturalism in Korea. Lastly, we interpreted Korea’s limited recognition and settlement of refugees (including North Korean defectors) as part of the policy-making repertoires of a developmental state. The Korean path to multiculturalism, then, has been strategic and shaped according to the perceived costs and benefits of the settlement and social integration of different migrant groups.

References


